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Abstract 
The unexpected failures, the down time (outage) associated with such failures , the loss of 
production of power and , the higher maintenance costs are major problems in operation of 
thermal power plants. The unexpected failure of an equipments and systems causes economic 
risk and can be minimized using an effective maintenance strategy. The risk based approach 
ensures a strategy, which is cost effective. Such an approach uses the information obtained from 
the study of failure modes and their consequences. 
The purpose of the thesis is to develop and show how to implement a risk based 
maintenance (RBM) policy to a power plant. This quantitative approach will provide a basis for 
selection of the best alternative strategy to minimize the risk resulting from breakdowns or 
failures . 
The proposed methodology is comprised of three modules: risk assessment, risk 
evaluation , and maintenance planning . This work presents a mechanism for the study of the 
occurrence of failures and functional failures in equipment and the severity of their 
consequences , known as risk. Maintenance of equipment is prioritized based on the risk , and the 
reduction in overall risk of the plant is accomplished by focusing on the maintenance of high-risk 
items first. To the author's knowledge this quantitative approach has not been developed before . 
The study is conducted for Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, Holyrood thermal power 
generation plant. Failure data is collected from the existing power station (Unit 3- 150 MW) over 
a period of twelve years. The data is modeled using Weibull and Exponential distributions to 
estimate the parameters. A probabilistic risk analysis is performed to quantify the risk at the plant. 
An acceptable risk criterion is determined and the major systems and subsystems that are found 
to have a risk higher than acceptable risk are identified . The maintenance interval is calculated by 
reverse or target probability analysis for reducing the level or risk resulting from the failure of a 
system. 
ii 
To conclude, the risk based maintenance strategy can be employed to prioritize the 
systems for maintenance planning , and to improve the existing maintenance policies. In addition , 
this strategy provides cost-effective means for maintenance as well it minimizes the 
consequences (safety, economic and environment) related to a system failure . 
iii 
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Chapter- 1 Introduction 
1.1 Maintenance 
Industrial activities are generally classified into production and service. In case of 
production , equipment and labour are used to produce a product, which can be sold at a much 
higher price than that of the raw material , which was used in making the product. In the later 
case, equipment and labour are combined to produce a service . Power plants are classified 
under production . The production activity cannot continue to function unless a profit is made. Th is 
requires that the activity must be carried out in the most efficient and economical manner. The 
equipment used for the production of power will deteriorate if no maintenance is carried out. 
Maintenance is defined as the combination of activities by which equipment or systems are kept 
in, or restored to, a state in which it can perform its designated functions. 
1.2 Basic Maintenance policies 
The maintenance activity is divided into two major categories : replacement and 
maintenance. The selection of a maintenance policy depends on various factors and varies 
between types of power plant/industry. The most common maintenance policies are as follows: 
1.2.1 Breakdown Maintenance (Run to Failure) 
This pol icy is usually adopted when the component under consideration operates as an 
individual unit, thus, its failure will not affect the overall performance of the plant or constitute a 
safety hazard . The cost of preventing its failure may be more than the cost of breakdown. So, 
under this policy only lubrication and minor servicing and readjustments are performed . Most 
equipment maintained according to this policy suffers a large number of breakdowns. Many of 
these breakdowns develop from minor faults . These initial faults develop into more serious 
conditions because of absence of maintenance. 
Usually, breakdown maintenance is an unscheduled maintenance action , basically 
composed of unpredictable maintenance needs that cannot be preplanned or programmed on the 
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basis of occurrence at a particular time. This policy will make it hard to estimate the size of the 
maintenance team needed to maintain the equipment because maintenance requirement is 
random . This policy is used when the cost of the scheduled maintenance of the equipment is 
more than the cost of letting it run to failure 
1.2.2 Preventive maintenance 
The preventive maintenance strategy was introduced in 1950's. Preventive maintenance 
is an important component of maintenance activity. It can be described as the care and servicing 
by individuals involved with maintenance to keep equipment/facilities in a satisfactory operational 
state by providing for systematic inspection, detection, and correction of incipient failures either 
prior to their occurrence or prior to their development into major failure. However, the 
disadvantages of preventive maintenance are : exposing equipment to possible damage, using a 
greater number of parts , increase in initial costs, failure in new parts/components , and demands 
for more frequent access to an equipment (Dhillion, 2003) . 
1.2.3 Predictive maintenance (Condition monitoring) 
Predictive maintenance has emerged from being a technical niche into mainstream and 
widespread use as a critical element in the management strategy of power plants operating 
rotating machinery all over the world . The concept of condition monitoring is to select a 
measurable parameter on the machines, which will change as the health or condition of a 
machine, or other production asset deteriorates. The parameter is regularly monitored , to any 
changes. Once, a change is detected, a more detailed analysis of the measurements to 
determine what the problem is, and hence arrive at a diagnosis of the problem . Examples of 
parameters that can be monitored are vibration characteristics, temperature , and wear debris 
content and form. However, the selection of equipment for predictive maintenance based on risk-
based results will be more cost-effective. 
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1.2.4 Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) 
The origins of RCM can be traced to studies performed in the early 1960's by the 
commercial airline industry. This research revealed that scheduled overhauls of complex 
equipment had very little effect on reliability and safety, and that a new concept was needed to 
address scheduled maintenance. With the introduction of Boeing's 747 aircraft, the airlines 
recognized that it would be financially impossible to continue prior scheduled maintenance 
philosophy. Facing this, the airline industry utilized the results of this research to develop MSG 
(Maintenance Steering Group) Logic. This is a logic methodology for developing scheduled 
maintenance programs for new aircrafts. MSG Logic continued to evolve into MSG II and drew 
the interest of the military in the 1970's. At the request of the United States Department of 
Defense (DoD) , United Airlines was commissioned to develop a maintenance strategy based on 
MSG for the US military. The principles and applications of RCM were documented in Nowlan 
and Heap's publication , "Reliability-Centered Maintenance"(Office of the assistant secretary of 
Defense, 1978). This report became the foundation for modern day RCM processes . 
In the 1980's, DoD further refined and expanded the RCM process in a series of military 
standards and handbooks. Others developed similar processes. Through the 80's and 90's a 
number of these processes began to gain acceptance throughout various industries. Eventually, 
some of these processes began to diverge from the original tenets of the original Nowlan and 
Heap concept. Also, in the mid 1990's, DoD, in an effort to streamline its acquisition process , 
decided to rely more on commercial standards instead of traditional military standards . After 
reviewing available commercial processes and realizing that there was no "standard" RCM 
process, DoD asked the Society of Automotive Engineers to develop an RCM standard . 
Reliability centered maintenance is a systematic process used to determine what has to 
be accomplished to ensure that any physical facility is able to continuously meet its designated 
functions in its current operating context. It provides the means to assess and rank (priority index) 
the items and equipment that are critical to operational goals within the operational window. 
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Moreover, RCM , policy can be used to optimize the preventive maintenance by analyzing the 
constituent items of the systems with regard to the consequences of their failure . It results in 
increased reliability and operability, as well a reduced overall maintenance cost. But, RCM 
initiatives involve a tremendous amount of resources , time, and energy. It is usually a long-term 
goal with a short-term expectation. Recently , risk based maintenance policy started to emerge of 
the increased awareness of risk in public. 
1.3 Need of a Risk Based Maintenance (RBM) Policy 
An electrical power plant based on oil-fired technology is a highly complex production 
system comprising many different machines and types of equipment working under very different 
operating conditions . Failure of such systems can be catastrophic especially during winter 
seasons for all people living in Newfoundland and Labrador because of many houses are 
electrically heated. Generally, in these plants it is necessary to define a mix of different 
maintenance strategies in order to increase the availability and to reduce the operating costs. 
Industries worldwide spend a huge amount of money on maintenance of production 
machinery. In Canada, five billion dollars are spent because of poor lubrication practices in 
industries and power plants. Each year U.S industry spends well over $300 billion on plant 
maintenance and operation , (Dhilion , 2003) . Furthermore, it is estimated that approximately 80% 
of the industry dollars are spent to correct chronic failures of machines, systems and injured 
people . The elimination of these chronic failures through effective maintenance can reduce cost 
between 40% to 60%. 
Rapid industrialization and, the increased complexity of the machines in power plants in 
recent years, had led to new expectations. New techniques and new research in maintenance 
management are being pursued . Since the 1930s the evolution of maintenance can be traced 
through three generations. For the first generation , between 1940 to 1950, the policy was "fix it 
when it breaks". For the second generation , between 1950 to 1970, there was an explosive 
growth in new maintenance techniques such as scheduled maintenance and the introduction of 
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computers (Moubray, 1991) For the third generation, after 1970's, new techniques were 
developed including condition monitoring , hazard studies , failure mode and effect analysis , expert 
systems and Reliability Centered Maintenance. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the ASME Code (1998) focused principally on 
performance criteria to improve safety and reduce the frequency of failure , addressing pressure 
vessel and piping systems in particular. Later, the importance of risk (event probability multiplied 
by the consequences) was recognized as an important measure of system safety, and it was 
seen that risk analysis could be applied to design, material selection , defect criteria , fabrication , 
operation , maintenance and inspection. 
The risk of system failure has also attracted the attention of engineers and researchers 
related to the field of maintenance. In recent years maintenance has become a major issue and 
several approaches have been· developed and implemented. There have been numerous 
research papers written on reliability and quantitative risk analysis. Recently , Risk based 
Maintenance started to emerge in maintenance engineering field . Risk-based Maintenance 
(RBM) is a holistic approach used to improve maintenance management systems, programs, and 
practices. The key advantage is that RBM integrates risk information into the decision making 
process. The present study is based on this methodology, and in view with the need of 
comprehensive and quantitative risk analysis based on available data, this thesis proposes a 
maintenance policy for an electrical power generating plant, which will be more reliable than 
current practices. 
1.4 Aims and objectives 
The aim of this work is to identify, assess and quantify the risk of failure of the equipment in a 
power plant. The study integrates fault tree modeling and consequence analysis to quantify the 
risk. The detailed objectives of this study are 
• To illustrate how a risk based maintenance policy can be used to reduce the level of risk, 
caused by failure of critical equipment in a power plant, to an acceptable level. 
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• To illustrate how to use the developed RBM policy to optimize the maintenance of major 
systems and subsystems in a power plant. 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The background of the thesis has been presented in the previous sections along with the 
objectives of the study. The following chapters review the relevant literature as it relates to 
Risk Based Maintenance (RBM), the concept of risk , introduction to Holyrood power plant, 
the major components of Unit 3, description of the physical asset, failure data collection and 
modeling, risk estimation , evaluation and maintenance planning , findings and conclusions 
and finally recommendations. 
The major highlight of this study is the inclusion of functional failures . It has helped to 
identify the performance of the unit 3 from the bottom line to the maximum capacity. The 
failure data is collected based on the functional failures and modeled using Weibull 
exponential distributions to estimate the parameters. The system flow charts are analyzed 
and all the functional failures are identified from the system functional perspective and in 
consultation with plant engineers. The acquired information is transformed into graphical 
representation using the fault tree. This method quantifies the probability of system failure . 
The consequence models are developed to quantify the economic consequences . The 
probability of failure multiplied by the consequences gives the risk of system failure. This 
analysis helps to identify the individual system risk of failure, and provides the basis for the 
decision makers to choose the correct maintenance policy. 
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Chapter- 2 Literature Review 
In order to fulfill the research objectives outlined in the previous section a detailed review 
of literature is necessary to highlight the state of the art in this particular area. This chapter 
summarizes the development and use of risk based maintenance practices, starting from 1992 to 
2003. 
It is obvious that maintaining equipment and plants is very costly and time-consuming 
activity. Maintenance is also important to maintain the health and to promote the safety since 
records show that these activities are closely associated with excessive accidents rates 
(Rushworth and Masons, 1992). 
Veswly, Belhadj , and Rezos (1993) used probabilistic risk assessment as a tool for 
maintenance prioritization applications. The minimal cutset contribution and the risk reduction 
importance are the two measures calculated . Using , minimal cutsets or the risk reduction 
importances, the basic events and their associated maintenances can also be prioritized for their 
risk level. Moreover, basic events having low risk and unimportant maintenances can also be 
identified. 
A general procedure is presented by Vaurio (1995) for optimizing the test and 
maintenance intervals of safety related systems and components. The method is based on 
minimizing the total plant-level cost under the constraint that the total accident frequency (risk) 
remains below a set criterion . Component failures , common cause failures and human errors are 
included and modeled by basic events, the probabilities of which are simple functions of test and 
maintenance intervals. Analytical solutions have been obtained for several risk models , illustrating 
how different factors influence the optimization . 
A methodology for risk-based inspection of pressurized systems was developed by 
Hagemeijer and Kerkveld (1998) . The methodology is based on the determination of risk by 
evaluating the consequences and the likelihood of equipment failure . Likelihood of equ ipment 
failure is assessed , by means of extrapolation , at the future planned maintenance campaign to 
7 
identify the necessary corrective work. The objective is to optimize the inspection and 
maintenance efforts in order to minimize the risk in Brunei petroleum plant. The plant operates a 
large number of aging production and evacuation facilities . 
Harnly (1998) developed a risk ranked inspection recommendation procedure that is 
used by one of Exxon's chemical plants to prioritize repairs that have been identified during 
equipment inspection . The equipment are prioritized based on the severity index, which is failure 
potential combined with consequences. The reduction in overall risk of the plant is accomplished 
by working high-risk items first. 
Taking decision concerning a selection of maintenance strategy using risk-based criteria 
is essential to develop cost effective maintenance polices for mechanized and automated 
systems because in this approach technical features (such as reliability and maintainability 
characteristics) are analyzed considering economic and safety consequences (kumar, 1998). 
This approach provides a holistic view of the various decision scenarios concerning maintenance 
strategy where cost consequences of every possible solution can be assessed quantitatively . 
Risk based maintenance strategies can also be used to improve the existing maintenance 
policies through optimal decision procedures in different phases of the risk cycle of a system. 
Unexpected failures usually have adverse effects on the environment and may result in 
major accidents. Studies by Kletz (1994) , Khan and Abbasi (1998) , and Kumar (1998) show the 
close relationship between maintenance practices and the occurrence of major accidents. 
Profitability is closely related to availability and reliability of the equipment. The major challenge 
for a maintenance engineer is to implement a maintenance strategy, which maximizes availability 
and efficiency of the equipment; controls the rate of equipment deterioration ; ensures a safe and 
environmentally friendly operation ; and minimizes the total cost of the operation . This can only be 
achieved by adopting a structured approach to the study of equipment failure and the design of 
an optimum strategy for inspection and maintenance. 
The American Society of mechanical engineers recognized the need of risk-based 
methods and organized multidisciplinary research task forces on risk based in-service inspection 
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(lSI) and testing (1ST) and formulated polices, codes, standards and guides in the late 1980s. 
These research groups worked to determine appropriate risk-based methods for developing 
inspection and testing guidelines for several applications. A series of ASME publications present 
this work, which includes both nuclear and industrial applications . Balkey, Art and Bosnak (1998) 
developed a technology, which includes risk based ranking methods, beginning with the use of 
plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) , for the determination of risk-significant and less risk-
significant components for inspection and the determination of similar populations for pumps and 
valves for in-service testing . This methodology integrates non-destructive examination data, 
structural reliability/ risk assessment results , PRA results , failure data and expert opinion . These 
ASME methods were applied to the maintenance of nuclear power plants . 
There has been an increased focus on risk based maintenance optimization in the 
offshore industry prompted by new functional regulations on risk. Aplend and Aven (1999) 
presented alternative probabilistic frameworks for this optimization using a Bayesian approach . 
Industry, environmental agencies and the scientific community have all emphasized the 
need to include environmental impact considerations next to profitability objectives on the design 
phase of modern chemical processes, responding to the increasing social concern over 
environmental degradation on the past years. Vassiliadis and Pistikopoulas (2000) have 
developed maintenance-based strategies for environmental risk minimization on the process 
industries. The work represents the mechanism of occurrence of unexpected events usually 
related to equipment failures and the severity of their consequences. Detailed processes , 
reliability and maintenance characteristics are incorporated in the process optimization 
framework. The best preventive maintenance strategies that accomplish the conflicting 
environmental problems were developed. 
Dey (2001) presented a risk-based model for inspection and maintenance of a cross-
country petroleum pipeline that reduces the amount of time spent on inspection . This model not 
only reduces the cost of maintaining petroleum pipelines, but also suggests efficient design and 
operation philosophies, construction methodology and logical insurance plans . The risk based 
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model uses analytical hierarchy process (AHP) , a multiple attribute decision making technique , to 
identify the factors that influence failure on specific segments and analyses their effects by 
determining probability of risk factors. The severity of failure is determined through consequence 
analysis. From this the effect of failure caused by each risk factor can be established in terms of 
cost, and the cumulative effect of failure is determined through probability analysis. This method 
can be used to identify the right pipeline or segment for inspection and maintenance policy, 
serving the budget allocation for inspection and maintenance, providing guidance to deploy the 
right mix of labor in inspection and maintenance and enhancing emergency preparations. 
The use of a risk-based policy in the maintenance of medical devices has been tackled 
by Capuano and Koitko (1996) and Ridgway (2001 ). 
Misewicz, Smith, Nessim and Playdon (2002) developed a risk based integrity project 
ranking approach for Kinder Morgan, Inc natural gas pipelines and C02 pipelines. The approach 
is based on a benefit cost ratio, defined as the expected risk reduction in dollars per mile over the 
project useful life, divided by the total project cost. Risk reduction is estimated using quantitative 
risk analysis approach in which the failure rate reduction achieved by carrying out a given project 
is multiplied by the expected failure costs. The project ranking provides a useful guide for 
selecting projects that fit within maintenance budget while providing greatest risk reduction . The 
benefit cost results can also be used as a tool to justify the maintenance budget. Substantial cost 
savings can be achieved by using this risk-based approach . 
Maintenance decisions on risk analysis results were discussed by Backlund and Hannu 
(2002) . An effective use of resources can be achieved by using risk-based maintenance 
decisions to guideline where and when to perform maintenance. A comparative study based on 
three independent risk analyses performed on a specific Hydro power plant was discussed. The 
comparison and evaluation of the analyses reveal major differences in performance and results , 
along with various factors that affect the quality of the analyses . Based e>n the study the authors 
emphasized the need of quantitative risk analysis. Also, the focus when performing risk analysis 
must be on the functions required of the associated subsystems and equipments. 
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A holistic, risk based approach to asset integrity management was discussed by 
Montogomery and Serratella (2002). The approach is referred to as risk based maintenance and 
is based on proven risk assessment and reliability analysis methodologies, as well as the need to 
have appropriate management systems. Combining risk assessment techniques and risk based 
decision-making tools provides operators with the realistic way to achieve corporate and 
regulators objectives . 
The review of literature indicates that there is a new trend to use the level of risk as a 
criterion to plan maintenance tasks. However, most of the previous studies focused on a 
particular equipment type. Recently , Khan and Haddara (2003) proposed a new and 
comprehensive methodology for risk-based maintenance and illustrated the applicability of the 
same by applying it to a HVAC system. The methodology integrates quantitative risk assessment 
and evaluation and proven reliability analysis techniques. The equipment are prioritized based on 
total risk (economic, safety and environmental) , finally developing maintenance plan reduces 
unacceptable risk . 
Least-cost strategies for asset management (operation , maintenance and capital 
expenditures) are essential for increasing the revenues in power plants. The risk-centered 
approach of this study will help to take decisions on maintenance interval as well , to prioritize the 
equipments for maintenance. This thesis describes the application of a risk-based maintenance 
policy for developing planned maintenance guidelines to Holyrood thermal power plant. 
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Chapter- 3 Risk Based Maintenance 
The RBM analysis systematically prioritizes system failure modes based on total risks 
(business interruption, safety, maintenance cost, etc.) so that planned maintenance resources 
may be appropriately allocated . This specifies applicable and effective planned maintenance 
tasks (preventive and predictive) using a task selection guid.e that promotes consistent and 
appropriate choices of maintenance tasks and frequencies . Also, produces recommendations for 
system improvements that reduce and/or eliminate the need for planned maintenance tasks (or 
otherwise improve reliability) . The risk-based maintenance approach uses both the frequency of 
the failure occurrence and the consequence of the failure to prioritize component failure modes 
and ultimately to select a set of maintenance tasks based on the risk associated with the potential 
failure . Usu§311Y RBM improves maintenance decisions by appropriately 
• Integrating risk information into the decision-making process. 
• Focusing the resources on the highest-risk equipment failures that can lead to system 
failures. 
• Reducing maintenance costs by: (1) systematically determining/optimizing the facilities 
planned maintenance activities (2) identifying critical spares and optimizing 
maintenance stores inventories. 
• Providing means to evaluate alternative inspection and test strategies. 
• Providing means for prioritizing corrective maintenance activities . 
• Establishing systems to collect and analyze failure data (e.g., mean time 
between failures) . Identifying the highest-risk maintenance tasks on which training and 
procedure writing efforts should focus. 
3.1 The concept of Risk and its relevance to maintenance 
One of the main objectives of an effective maintenance strategy is the minimization of risk, 
caused by the unexpected failure of equipment. In addition , the strategy has to be cost effective . 
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Using a risk-based approach ensures a strategy, which meets these objectives . Such an 
approach uses the information obtained from the study of failure modes and their consequences. 
Risk analysis is a technique of identifying , characterizing , quantifying and evaluating the loss 
from an event. Risk anlysis approach integrates probability and consequence analysis at various 
stages of the analysis and attempts to answer the following questions. 
• What can go wrong that could lead to a system failure? 
• How can it go wrong? 
• How likely is its occurrence? 
• What could be the consequences, if it happens? 
In this context risk can be defined as 
Risk= Probability of failure x Consequences 
Risk assessment can be either quantitative or qualitative. The result of quantitative risk 
assessment is typically a number, which is the cost impact in dollars ($) per unit time. The 
number could be used to prioritize a series of items that have been risk assessed . Quantitative 
risk assessment requires a great deal of data both for the assessment of probabilities and the 
assessment of consequences. The Fault trees are used to determine the probability that a certain 
sequence of events will result in a certain consequence. 
A qualitative assessment presents a logical and structured argument for defining 
particular risk levels. Typically a qualitative assessment assigns frequency and consequence into 
broad bands and compares this to established risk acceptance criteria . A wide range of 
qualitative assessment techniques is available, but they are particularly useful for preliminary 
studies. maintenance (or other short term) activities, organizational changes and where 
meaningful data is not available. However, as these risk values are subjective, prioritizations 
based on these values are always debatable. 
The RBM strategy aims at reducing the overall risk of failure of major systems and 
subsystems in the power plant. For the systems with high and medium risk , a focused 
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maintenance effort is required , whereas in areas of low risk , the effort is minimized to reduce the 
total scope of work and cost of the maintenance program in a structured and justifiable way. 
The risk based maintenance methodology is broken down into three main modules risk 
assessment, risk evaluation and maintenance planning as given in Figure- 3.1. Holyrood thermal 
power plant (unit 3) is selected to study and implement the RBM methodology. The Unit 3 is 
divided into major systems based on the operational characteristics. Then , the functions of each 
piece of equipment, subsystem and major systems are studied after developing flow charts . 
Risk assessment combines frequency and consequence assessment results to portray 
the risk of undesirable events of major systems in Unit 3. Typical study involves analysis of 
failures and functional failures, fault tree development and analysis (Probabilistic failure analysis) 
to estimate the frequency of undesirable events and consequence analysis to estimate the 
economic losses during each failure . Finally, the results of the consequence and the probabilistic 
failure analysis are used to estimate the risk existing in unit 3. 
Risk evaluation is the process by which risks are examined in terms of costs and 
benefits , and evaluated in terms of acceptability of risk considering the needs, issues and 
concerns of the unit 3. The acceptance risk criterion is determined based on the yearly 
maintenance expenditure of unit 3. Now, the acceptance criterion is compared with the estimated 
risk of individual major system, any value higher than this is unacceptat?le. The major systems 
whose estimated risk exceeds the acceptance criteria are identified . These are the units that 
should have an improved maintenance plan . Finally, an effective maintenance and inspection 
plan is developed for each major system and subsystem that exceeds the acceptance risk level. 
Detailed description of unit 3 and the various stages of implementation of the methodology are 
presented in the subsequent sections. 
3.2 Introduction to Holyrood thermal power plant 
A steam power plant is a means for converting the potential chemical energy of fuel into 
electrical energy. In its simplest form it consists of a steam generator and a turbine driving an 
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electrical generator. In Newfoundland the operation of steam power plants started in 1969 at 
Holyrood . The first two units were built during the initial stage to provide a reserve back- up to the 
hydropower system. As the load increased, a third unit (referred as Unit 3) was added to 
Holyrood in 1979. 
3.2.1 Unit 3 
Unit 3 of the Holyrood power station has a rated capacity of 150MW. A single condensing 
steam turbine generator is supplied with steam from a 135 kilogram per second oil-fired 
generator. The Hitachi turbine-generator is designed to generate 150MW at 16 kV, 60Hz with 
throttle conditions 12,410 kPa at 538°C, reheat to 538°C and back pressure of 25.4mm Hg. The 
generator is hydrogen cooled and rated at 18.5 kVA, 0.85-power factor and is provided with 
Westinghouse static excitation . 
The condensing plant consists of a Foster Wheeler two pass, divided water box, surface 
condenser designed to produce rated vacuum at a sea water inlet temperature of 5.5°C. Cooling 
water is circulated to the condenser by two fifty percent duty cooling water pumps from the sea. 
The low pressure feed water system consists of two one hundred capacity condensate 
extraction pumps taking suction from the condenser hot well , a gland steam condenser, two low 
pressure feed water heaters and a tray type de-aerating heater. Two fifty percent duty fixed 
speed electric boiler feed pumps convey the feed water to the boiler via three high-pressure feed 
water heaters. The top heater draws bled steam from the cold reheat line, the others from the 
extraction points on the intermediate pressure and low-pressure turbines. The six stages of feed 
heating provide a final feed water temperature of 240.2°C. 
The reserve feed water system consists of high and low level reserve feed water tanks 
and , provides water for variation in cycle flow requirements. The system is fully automatic in 
operation and serves to provide both adequate storage for make-up ne~'ds during boiler start up 
and a surge system , receiving from or supplying water to the low pressure feed water system as 
determined by the level of condensate in the condenser hot well. If the reserve feed water tank 
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level is low, demineralized water from the water treatment plant is supplied to the condenser and 
transferred to the high level reserve feed water tank when the condenser hot well rises . 
Divide the power plant into 
manageable units 
Description of physical 
asset 
Analyze a subsystem at a 
time 
Risk assessment 
• Hazard identification 
• Probabilistic failure 
analysis 
• Risk quantification 
Maintenance Planning 
• Development of 
maintenance plan to 
bring down the 
unacceptable risk to 
acceptable level 
Risk Evaluation 
• Fixing up an 
acceptable criteria 
• Comparison of risk 
with acceptable 
criteria. 
Figure 3.1 Architecture of RBM methodology (Ref: Khan and Haddara 
(2003)) 
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The steam generator is a Bobcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd . radiant type oil fired unit 
pressurized furnace rated at 135 kg/sec, 13,030 kPa and 541 °C with re-heats to 541 °C. The 
boiler is designed to fire No.6 Bunker 'C' fuel oil under low excess air conditions using steam 
atomizing parallel throat burners. The steam generator has two case II 'R' type Ljungstorm 
regenerative air pre-heaters and two steam coil air heaters. Flue gases are discharged directly to 
a single 360 feet stack located immediately north of the main building . 
Heavy oil is stored in two oil storage tanks and the tanks are equipped with two suction 
heaters. The heated oil is discharged to the low-level day tank through gravity. The heavy oil is 
pumped to the boiler through duplex heavy oil pumping and heating set. Light oil (No.2 diesel) is 
supplied for emergency firing and to start the steam generator from the cold start. 
The auxiliary steam supplies approximately 13,610 kg/hr of steam at 1380 kPa , 218°C for power 
plant auxiliary services. The water treatment plant supplies demineralized water for make-up 
needs. Instrumentation and control systems provide the necessary control for the proper 
operation of the plant. 
3.3 Components of Unit 3 
Unit 3 is divided into ten major systems based on the operational characteristics . A major 
system in the plant comprises of several subsystems. Again the major systems are further divided 
into subsystems and equipments to simplify the analysis. Figure 3.2 gives the details of various 
major systems (second column) and the subsystems (third column) and its logical relationship to 
the whole system (Unit 3) . A subsystem comprises of different equipments or devices and the 
typical examples would be pumps, feed water heaters, valves and soot blowers. In other way , a 
component is considered the smallest part in an assembly, several components together form an 
equipment, examples would be springs , bearings , valve seat, valve stem , and pump impeller. 
However, the analysis is not carried out at the component level , but at the equipment and 
subsystems level. The functional descriptions of the major systems are described in the following 
Chapter. Appendix- A has the relevant flow diagrams of the major systems and subsystems. 
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(Unit 3) 
Fig. 3.2 Components of Unit 3 
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Chapter 4 Description of the physical asset 
In the previous chapter, the different components of unit 3 are discussed . The functional 
description of steam generator and the components are discussed in this section . The detailed 
description includes physical location of systems, construction details, materials used for 
construction , metallurgical details, and the operational parameters. Refer to Annexure-A for the 
remaining major systems description . Appendix-B has the relevant flow diagrams. 
4.1 Steam generator 
The steam generator is a device for turning water into steam . It can be broken down into 
several components. First the combustion zone, where the fuel oil supplied by the fuel pump, is 
burned. Forced draft fans supply air for combustion . The resultant heat is used to convert water 
into steam. Boiler feed pumps supply water to the economizer, which supplies water to the steam 
drum. The economizer separates traces of saturated steam from water. The water collected in the 
steam drum flows through the down headers and enters the water walls , in the bottom of the 
furnace. Figure 4 .1 shows the simplified flow diagram of the steam generator drawn using 
Smartdraw software. 
As the water rises up, and is converted into saturated steam, it reaches a steam drum 
for the separation of water and steam. Saturated steam from the steam drum flows through 
primary and secondary super heaters , and is converted into superheated steam. The 
superheated steam enters the high-pressure section of the turbine for expansion. The steam after 
expansion enters into the re-heater as a cold reheat, and is heated within the steam generator. 
The hot re-heat enters into intermediate and low-pressure sections of the turbine for expansion . 
The steam after expansion enters into the condenser and gets condensed as water in 
the hot well. The condensate is extracted by extraction pumps from the hot well and is supplied to 
the low pressure feed water heaters and , and then to the high pressure feed water heaters to 
raise the temperature of the feed water. The boiler feed pumps supply feed water to the 
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economizer to increase the sensible heat of water. The generator, which is coupled to the turbine , 
develops 
Steam outlet to primary super l_leaterst d 
__l earn rum 
water Inlet heaeter ..,-~~ 1111 water inlet eader 
Primary super heater 
Super 
H~:~:-:-a-r--------- · 
Wind box 
Burners 
Cold 
Feed water supply 
Secondary super heater 
c=:> Flue gases 
<====J Hot air 
1. Primary super heater outlet header 6. Primary super heater outlet header 
2. Re- heater outlet header 7. Economizer outlet header 
3. Re- heater inlet header 8. Economizers inlet header 
4. Secondary super heater inlet header 9. Down comers 
5. Secondary super heater outlet header 10. Re- heater attemperator 
Figure 4.1 Steam generator 
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power. The water-steam-condensate cycle is repeated again and again for the continuous 
generation of power. The steam generator is manufactured and installed by Bobcock&Wilcox 
Canada Ltd . It is a radiant type oil-fired unit rated at 135 kg/sec, 13,030 kPa and 541 oc with re-
heats to 541 oc. It is designed to fire No.6 Bunker 'C ' fuel oil under low excess air conditions using 
steam atomizing parallel throat burners 
4.1.1 Furnace 
The primary purpose of the furnace is to provide a gas tight enclosure for the complete 
combustion of fuel. It is a rectangular enclosure built with structure steel , and has provisions to 
keep all the steam generating equipments . The furnace has three linings: first , the ribbed outer 
casing , second , refractory lining , and the third water walls associated with input and output 
headers. The ribbed outer casing made from ribbed steel with wire mesh holds refractory lining 
together with water walls . The refractory lining provides good insulation to prevent heat losses in 
the boiler 
The water walls raises from the bottom to the top of the furnace, spread on the four sides 
of the furnace walls. Water enters into these tubes and is converted into saturated steam as it 
rises up. Apart from these the furnace has provisions to enter and inspect it. Also , it has openings 
for burners, at three levels from the bottom. 
4.1.2 Economizer 
The function of an economizer in a steam-generating unit is to absorb heat from the flue 
gases and add this as sensible heat to the feed water before it enters the steam drum. The 
temperature of the feed water is increased and in some cases steam is generated . The 
economizer, which is, a finned tube type located below the primary super heater, in the steam 
generator gas pass. [Refer to flow diagram 4.2] 
4.1.3 Steam drum 
The steam drum of a re-circulating boiler rece1ves the steam-water mixture from the 
evaporator tubes and separates this mixture into a water- free steam that flows to the super 
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heater, and steam- free water goes to the down comers. The separation of the steam-water 
mixture rising from the generating tubes is achieved by use of internal baffling which can be in the 
form of cyclone separators, scrubbers , dry pipes dry pans or a combination of these components. 
Feed water from the economizer is added to steam is added to team drum to maintain a safe , 
normal water level in the drum. Apart from separating the steam and water, the steam drum is 
used for purifying the steam after separation . About five percent of feed water is continuously 
blown down , from the steam drum to the continuous blow down tank, for water sampling . The 
drum has provision for adding chemicals to feed water for the safer operation of the steam 
generator and accessories. [Refer to flow diagram 4.3] 
4.1.4 Super heater 
The heat content of the saturated steam is increased while it passes through the super 
heater. The super heater is divided into the primary and secondary super heaters. The primary 
super heater is located in the gas pass of the unit. The secondary super heater is located in the 
front gas pass of the unit where it receives heat by convection . Both the super heaters have their 
drains fitted and connected to the blow down tank. 
The main steam from the boiler super heater outlet is fed to the high pressure (H .P) 
turbine through main steam piping system , turbine stop and control valve for expansion . The H.P 
turbine normally requires a constant pressure of 12,410 Kpa and 538°C. at the control valve . The 
main steam temperature is controlled with in steam generator by means of spray water 
attemperation between primary and secondary super heaters. The boiler combustion control 
system , controls the firing rate, to maintain a constant pressure of 12,410 Kpa at the throttle . The 
pressure transmitters on the main steam pipe at each turbine stop valve sense the pressure. 
[Refer to flow diagram 4.4] 
4.1.4.1 Super heater De- super heater 
The de-super heater or super heater attemperator is installed between the initial and 
finishing stage of the steam outlet. Steam from each end of the outlet header of the initial stage 
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super heater flows through the de-super heater adjoining it and on to the inlet of the high 
temperature or finishing stage of the super heater. Located in this manner, the temperatures to 
which a de- super heater will be subjected are considerably less than if it were positioned after 
the final stage. Likewise, the possibility of carrying spray water over to the turbine will be 
eliminated when operating according to the outlined position . 
A mechanical spray water nozzle is fitted in the middle of the · super heater to make it 
possible to reduce steam temperature, when necessary, and maintains the same design value 
within the limits of the nozzle capacity. The water is supplied from feed water lines through 
automatic control valves. The temperature varies with the load , rising as the load increases and 
falling as the load decreases. With the constant load , the temperature should be kept constant. 
4.1.5 Re-heater 
Re- heaters are used on high-pressure units to heat the exhaust steam from the high-
pressure turbine before it is admitted to the low-pressure turbine. After passing through the re-
heater the steam returns to the intermediate pressure section of the turbine through the hot 
reheat piping system and combined reheat stop and intercept valves. The steam exhausted from 
the H.P turbine is at a temperature 316°C to 371 °C and returns to the steam generator and re-
heated to 538°C before passing to the intermediate pressure (I. P) turbine. This increases the 
efficiency of the steam cycle 
Re-heat steam temperature is controlled by variable rate firing on the three burner levels, 
and in emergency , by spray attemperation , a pipeline spray attemperator being located in the 
cold reheat piping for this purpose. A control valve is linked to a separate automatic control drive 
unit regulates the flow of spray water supplied to the de- super heater. [Refer to flow diagram 
4.5]. 
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4.1.6 Blow down system 
The steam generator and associated piping system are provided with safety valves , 
drain , vent and blow down valves. These components are required for safe and proper operation 
of the boiler. 
4.1.6.1 Boiler drum 
The two drains from the boiler drum discharges into the continuous blow down tank. This is a 
pressurized tank with the flashed steam line at the heater and the water cascading under the 
control loop to the blow down tank. 
A small quantity of water is continuously drained from the steam drum for chemical 
analysis. The flow of this water is regulated by the two special , manually operated , angle valves . 
These valves are mounted in parallel and have high-pressure drop and ruggedized trim for 
flashing service. 
4.1.6.2 Continuous blow down tank 
The continuous blow down tank is maintained at the same pressure as the bled steam 
entering the de-aerating heater by connecting the tank vent to the bleed steam piping . Any flash 
steam entering from the blow down water therefore re-enters the thermal cycle and is recovered. 
The water collects in the bottom of the tank, the water level being controlled to provide a steam 
seal. The water drains, flows through control valve , to the blow down tank and from there to 
waste . 
4.1.6.3 Blow down tank 
This tank is a collector of high temperature and pressure drains. For safety reasons these 
cannot be drained directly to the plant discharge system but, instead , are permitted to stabilize to 
approximately atmospheric pressure conditions before discharge. 
To prevent the steam from discharging into the plant drainage system, a seal is provided 
so that a water seal is maintained between the blow down tank and the drainage system. 
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4.1.6.4 Auxiliary steam system 
Steam from the auxiliary steam system is taken from the primary super heater outlet 
header of the steam generator. The pressure reducing and de-super heating station provides 
outlet conditions for the auxiliary steam at 1380 Kpa and 218°C. The station is designed to 
handle a maximum flow of conditioned steam of 6.8 kg/sec and a minimum of 0.69 kg/sec. 
Estimated flow for an average winter day is 4.91 kg/s. 
Two pressure safety valves are installed at the outlet of pressure reducing valve . A drain 
trap is fitted at the low point in the inlet piping to the de-super heater to prevent the possibility of 
water accumulating that could be carried through the steam and cause damage to the de- super 
heater and downstream equipment. The steam from the de-super heater is fed to the two steam 
air heaters, the de-aerator, the fuel oil pumping and heating set and the steam water mixer. The 
steam for tre burners is reduced to a constant pressure of 1034 Kpa . Automatic on-off valves are 
installed on each burner for steam shut- off, steam purge and steam cooling. Estimated normal 
total flow to the burners is 0.255 kg/sec. 
4.1.8 Steam drum chemical dosing 
Sodium Phosphate is added to the steam drum water to precipitate dissolved solids 
including silica, chlorides and other matter. These precipitated solids are controlled at the desired 
minimum by continuously blowing down water from the steam drum. The system is provided with 
two 100% capacity positive displacement-metering pumps driven at constant speed by electric 
motors. The upstream and downstream manual isolating valves on the standby pump of each 
system are. kept closed until the pump is required to run. The quantity of chemical solution 
discharged by the pumps is manually set by adjusting the calibrated eccentric on the seed 
reducer to alter the length of stroke. The discharge of phosphate is max 1.26 1/s. The phosphate 
tank is also provided with a motor driven agitator, which operates continuously to ensure that, the 
phosphate stays in solution . 
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Chapter 5 Failure data collection and modeling 
The operating time data of the unit 3 is collected from January 1, 1997 to October 1, 
2002. It consists of the dates and times when the operation of Unit 3 is commenced and ended . 
Also, dates and times between transitions of different system operating state, operating under 
forced de-rating , operating under a scheduled de-rating, available but not operating state, forced 
de-rating state, scheduled de-rating , forced outage state, forced extension of maintenance 
outage, forced extension of planned outage, maintenance outage state , and planned outage state 
were given along with outage codes. The aim is to separate the functional failures of Unit 3. 
5.1 Failure and Functional failures 
The functions that users expect from their assets can be split into two categories , primary 
functions that covers issues like speed, output, and carrying or storage capacity. Secondary 
functions, that concentrates in areas such as safety, control, containment, structural integrity, 
economy, protection , efficiency of operation, and compliance with environmental regulation. 
Failure is defined as the inability of any asset to do what its users want it to do. Where as , 
functional failure is defined as the inability of any asset to perform a function according to the 
standard acceptable to the user. The different aspects of functional failures are partial and total 
failures . This definition of functional failure covers also the complete loss of function . It also 
covers situations where the asset still functions , but performs outside acceptable limits. 
The generating component of unit 3 is comprised of all the equipment up to the high voltage 
terminals of the generator transformer and the station service transformer. The actual energy 
produced from the plant is referred to as the Maximum Continuous Rating (MCR). The MCR is 
defined as the maximum output in Mega Watts (MW) that a generating station is capable of 
producing continuously under normal conditions over a year. The MCR of the unit 3 is 150MW. A 
total failure or a forced outage means a condition , which requires that the generating unit be 
removed from service immediately. A partial failure forces the unit to operate at a de-rating state. 
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Thus, the generating unit is spinning and/or synchronized with the system but is not capable of 
producing its MCR. 
So, the increased failure order times of a forced outage state and forced de-rating state of 
subsystems, equipments and components are tabulated . Functional failure is a random 
phenomenon and some probabilistic model is required to describe it. The objective is to derive 
the failure parameters from the failure times. 
5.2 Failure and reliability function 
Failure data obtained from the plant indicate that failure is a stochastic process . The 
stochastic phenomenon can be well described using probabilistic methods or concepts . The 
mathematics of probability is the mathematics of uncertainty, in that it is not possible to explain 
precisely the combinations of physical events, which cause the failure of the system. It is the 
mathematics of analyzing the chance events and predicting likelihood of events occurring during 
a given period of time. 
In risk and reliability engineering a failure can be described as a random event. Mechanical 
reliability is the probability that the component, device or system will perform its prescribed duty 
without failure for a given period of time when operated correctly in a specified environment. 
Where as , the probability of an item failing up to a given time is complementary, in the 
mathematical sense, to the probability of the same item's survival (reliability) . It follows that 
R (t) + F (t) = 1 
to express this relationship mathematically we define the continuous random variable t to be the 
failure time of the system on or before a time T~ 0 
Then the reliability can be expressed as 
R (t) = P (T~t) 
Where R (t)::?. 0, R (0) = 1, and lim R (t) = 0. For a given value oft, R (t) is the probability that the 
t-7a 
time to failure is greater than or equal tot. So, 
F (t) = 1- R (t) = Pr (T <t) 
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Where 
F(O) = 0 
and 
lim F(t) = 1 
t-+a 
Then F (t) is the probability that the failure occurs before timet. 
We will refer to R (t) as the reliability function and F (t) as the cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) of failure or otherwise lifetime distribution. A third function , defined by 
dF(t) - dR(t) f(t) = = _ ____:_...c._ 
dt dt 
is called the probability density function (PDF) . Given the PDF, f(t) , then 
l 
F (t) = f f(t)dt 
0 
00 
R (t) = fJ(t)dt 
the probability of failure occurring within some interval of time (a, b) may be found using any of 
the three probability functions , since 
b 
Pr (a~ t ~b)= F (b)- F (a)= R (a)- R (b) = f f(t)dt 
a 
5.3 Failure models 
The failure models useful in describing the failure process are Exponential , Weibull , 
Normal and Lognormal probability distributions. The widely accepted Weibull and Exponential 
distributions are selected for failure analysis in this study. 
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Fig 5.1 Failure density function 
FUt 
1.0 ------------------------------------------
Fig 5.2 Cumulative failure probability function 
5.3.1 Exponential distribution 
Failures due to completely random or chance events will follow this distribution . Many systems 
exhibit constant failure rates, and the exponential distribution is in many respects the simplest 
reliability distribution to analyze. It should dominate during the useful life of a system or 
component. 
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Figure 5.4 Exponential cumulative distribution function 
5.3.2 Weibull distribution 
Failure events, which have non-constant hazard rate functions over time , follow the Weibull 
distribution. The Weibull distribution is one of the most widely used lifetime distributions in 
reliability engineering. It is a versatile distribution that can take on the characteristics of other 
types of distributions, based on the value of the shape parameter, J3. It can deal with decreasing , 
constant and increasing failure rates and can consequently model all phases of the bathtub 
curve. It is characterized by a hazard rate function of the form 
Which is a power function . The function A. (t) is increasing for a>O,b>O and is decreasing for a>O, 
b<O. For mathematical convenience it is expressed as 
( )
/3-1 
A.(t) = ~ ; B > o, ~ > o, t ~ o 
f(t)=~ (~fe-(~t 
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I 
F (t) = fJ(t)dt = 1- e-(t/B)fJ 
-00 
R (t) = e -(t/B)fl 
Where (13) is the shape parameter and (9) is the scale parameter, or characteristic life- it is the 
life at which 63.2 per cent of the population will have failed . 
When 13 = 1, the exponential reliability function (constant hazard rate) results , with e = mean life 
( 1 //...) . 
When 13 < 1, we get a decreasing hazard rate reliability function . 
When 13 > 1, we get an increasing hazard rate reliability function . 
When 13 = 3.4, for example, the distribution becomes a Normal distribution . Thus the Weibull 
distribution can be used to model a wide range of life distributions characteristic of engineering 
systems. 
The value of the shape parameter 13 provides insight into the behavior of the failure process. 
Table 5.1 summarizes this behavior. 
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Table 5.1 Weibull shape parameter 
Value Property 
0<[3<1 Decreasing failure rate (DFR) 
[3 = 1 Exponential distribution (CFR) 
1 < [3<2 Increasing failure rate (I FR) 
[3= 2 Rayleigh distribution (LFR) 
[3> 2 Increasing failure rate 
3::;[3::;4 Approaches Normal distribution 
j ( ; ) 
1.2 t 
1.0 
l 
' 
:: t 
"·"t :,-/<~---~-
0.2 i // _ .. --·· ~ 
/ .· · .. ~--
/ . . . •' . .. ' ·... . ~ 
·. 
0.80 1.60 2.40 3.20 4.00 4.W 
Figure 5.5 The effect of 13 on the weibull probability density function 
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Figure 5.7 The effect of~ on the weibull hazard rate curve 
5.4 Hazard function 
In addition to the probability functions defined earlier, another function , called the failure 
rate or hazard function , is often used in reliability. It provides as instantaneous (at time t) rate of 
failure. The hazard function along with bathtub curve is typically used as a visual model to 
illustrate the three key phases of equipment fa ilures of Unit 3. 
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Pr (t::; T ::;t+~t) = R(t)- R(t+~t) 
And the conditional probability of a failure in the time interval form t to t+~t given that the system 
has survived to timet is 
Pr(t ~ T ~ t + t;..t)jT ~ t) P = R(t)- R(t + !;.,.t) 
R (t) 
-[R(t+t;..t)-R(t)] 1 
t;..t R (t) 
A.(t) =lim 
C.t--70 
_- dR(t) 1 f(t) 
dt R(t) R(t) 
Then A.( t) is known as the instantaneous failure rate or the hazard function . The failure rate 
function A. (t) provides an alternative way of describing a failure distribution. Failure rates in some 
cases may be characterized as increasing (IFR), decreasing (DFR) , or constant (CFR) when A.( t) 
is an increasing, decreasing, or constant function respectively . 
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Figure 5.8 Hazard function 
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5.5 Bathtub curve 
Reliability specialists often describe the lifetime of a population of products using a 
graphical representation called the bathtub curve. The bathtub curve consists of three periods: an 
infant mortality period with a decreasing failure rate followed by a normal life period (also known 
as "useful life") with a low, relatively constant failure rate and concluding with a wear-out period 
that exhibits an increasing failure rate . The bathtub curve is typically used as a visual model to 
illustrate the three key phases of equipment failures. 
The bathtub curve, displayed in Figure 5.9, does not depict the failure rate of a single 
item, but describes the relative failure rate of an entire population of products over time . Some 
individual units will fail relatively early (infant mortality failures) , others (we hope most) will last 
until wear-out, and some will fail during the relatively long period typically called normal life. 
Failures during infant mortality are highly undesirable and are always caused by defects and 
blunders: material defects, design blunders, errors in assembly, etc. Normal life failures are 
normally considered to be random cases of "stress exceeding strength." Wear-out is a fact of life 
due to fatigue or depletion of materials (such as lubrication depletion in bearings) . Bathtub curve 
can be used to distinguish the failure pattern of equipments and subsystems in unit 3 based on 
the hazard rate . Also, it can be useful to find the failure causes of equipments, so that planned 
maintenance tasks can be applied easily. Table 5.2 summarizes some of the distinguishing 
features of the bathtub curve. 
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Burn- in Useful life Wear out 
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Figure 5.9 Bathtub curve 
Table 5.2 Distinguishing features of the bathtub curve 
Failure rate Characterized by Caused by Reduced by 
Burn-in DFR Manufacturing defects: Burn-in test ing 
Welding flaws , cracks, Screening 
Defective parts Qual ity control 
Poor quality control , Acceptance testing 
Contamination , 
Poor workmanship. 
Useful life CFR Environment Redundancy 
Random loads Excess strength 
Human error 
Chance events 
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Failure rate Characterized by Caused by Reduced by 
Wear-out IFR Fatigue De-rating 
Corrosion Preventive 
Aging maintenance 
Friction Predictive 
Cyclical loading maintenance 
Parts replacement 
Redesign 
5.6 Failure data modeling 
The collection of failure data and various failure models used for describing the failure process 
is discussed in the previous sections. This section describes how to derive the parameters, 
directly from the failure times. The failure data collected from the various subsystems, equipment 
and components, is the complete data. The data are arranged in ascending order and the 
cumulative percentage failed at a particular value of t is used as an estimate of the failure 
distribution function F (t) at that time. The cumulative failure probabil ity is calculated using the 
median ranking . 
5.6.1 Mean ranking 
A simple approach to estimate the distribution function of a sample size N is to assign 1/N for 
the estimate ofF (t) at the first ordered failure time; 2/N at the second ordered time and so on . 
Thus, 
where I= 1,2 .. . N 
This distribution shows bias, in that the first failure is shown much further from zero probability 
than the last from 100%. It is better to make an adjustment to allow for the fact that each failure 
represents a point on the distribution . Other formulas for mean ranking which reduces the bias 
are 
F (ti) = 1/(N+1) where I = 1,2 ... N 
And 
F (ti) = (1-1/2)/N where I = 1,2 ... N 
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5.6.2 Median ranking 
Mean ranking is the appropriate method for a symmetrical distribution , such as the Normal. 
However, for a skewed distribution median ranking provides a better representation . The most 
common approximation as suggested by B'enard (Connor, 1991) is given by 
F(t) = i- 0.3 
' n+0.4 
Listing the increasing order of failure time's tj, ranking the failure times starting from 1 to n and 
then the above formula is used to calculate cumulative failure probability. Once the failure 
probability is calculated the next step is to estimate the parameters. 
Field data is often accompanied by noise. Even though all control parameters 
(independent variables) remain constant, the resultant outcomes (dependent variables) vary. A 
process of quantitatively estimating the trend of the outcomes, also known as regression or curve 
fitting , therefore becomes necessary. The terms linear regression and least squares are used 
synonymously in this reference. The term rank regression is used in the application instead of 
least squares, or linear regression , because the regression is performed on the rank values , more 
specifically, the median rank values (represented on the y-axis) . Thus, a curve with a minimal 
deviation from all data points is desired. This best-fitting curve can be obtained by the method of 
least squares. The method of least squares requires that a straight line be fitted to a set of data 
points such that the sum of the squares of the distance of the points to the fitted line is minimized. 
This minimization can be performed in either the vertical or the horizontal direction. The 
regression is on Y, and then this means that the distance of the vertical deviations from the points 
to the line is minimized. Failure distributions are converted as given below to fit a straight line, the 
slope and intercept gives the estimate of the parameters. 
5.6.3 Least- Squares fits 
Exponential distribution 
Rewriting the distribution in the form : 
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-At= ln[l- F(t)] 
----.,--
1
-___,. = At 
ln[1- F(t)] 
y = mx 
Weibull distribution 
Rewriting the distribution as: 
- (At)P = ln[l- F(t)] 
1 
ln ln [ ] = jJln t - jJln (} 
1- F(t) 
y = mx + c 
The failure times (xi) and their corresponding (yi) are known , and then from the following 
equations we can estimate the slope m and the intercept c of the straight line 
y = mx + c 
t, y, t. x,2 - (t. x.)( t. x, y, J 
c = ------------
n t,x,2 - ( t,x.J' 
For Weibull distribution the value of m is the value of p and the value of exponential , 
minus of intercept divided by p gives the value of e. For exponential distribution the value of m is 
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equal to the value of A.. An example of failure data analysis of subsystem Boiler is shown in table 
5.3 using Excel. Weibull failure distribution model is used to fit the data. 
To test the adequacy of the regression model the R2 and F-values are estimated from the 
data. The R-square value is the square of the correlation coefficient between X and Y, an 
indicator of how well the model fits the data. F - Value is the test for comparing the model 
variance with residual variance. If the variances are close, the ratio will be close to one and it is 
less likely that any of the factors have a significant effect on the response . If the Prob > F value is 
very small (less than 0.05) then the terms in the model have significant effects on the response . 
After, comparing both the R2 value and F-value between the different failure models discussed 
above, the most suitable model is selected . Weibull failure model is selected for Boiler. The same 
procedure is used for all the equipments and the results are tabulated. These failure parameters 
are used in probabilistic failure analysis and will be discussed in chapter 6. 
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Table 5.3 Failure data anlysis using Weibull model and the results 
Outage 
Code 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
12 
21 
21 
12 
Beta 
Intercept 
Theta 
Date of 
failure 
04.04.92 
04.04 .92 
01 .05.92 
08 .05.92 
20 .05 .92 
30 .11 .92 
13.02 .96 
20.03.96 
09.04 .96 
01.05 .96 
02.05 .96 
05 .05.96 
08 .04.02 
30.04.02 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Time of Failure 
failure time 
5.30 10997.3 
6.25 10998.2 
21 .04 11661 .0 
20.00 11828.0 
17.30 12113.3 
16.00 16768.0 
6.26 44838.2 
14.00 45686.0 
16.00 46168.0 
0.00 46680.0 
9.00 46713.0 
9.30 46785.3 
8.00 98696.0 
22.20 99238.2 
(I) F(ti) Xi= 
1 0 
2 0.1 
3 0.2 
4 0.2 
5 0.3 
6 0.4 
7 0.4 
8 0.5 
9 0.6 
10 0.6 
11 0.7 
12 0.8 
13 0.8 
14 0.9 
1.17836774 
-12.76963331 
50853.95901 
Ln(ti) 
9.31 
9.31 
9.36 
9.38 
9.4 
9.73 
10.7 
10.7 
10.7 
10.8 
10.8 
10.8 
11.5 
11.5 
144 
Yi=lnln(1/1- XiYi 
F(ti) Xi*2 
-3.067873 -28.5 86 .59 
-2.145823 -20 86 .59 
-1 .646281 -15.4 87 .68 
-1 .291789 -12.1 87.95 
-1.010261 -9.5 88.4 
-0.771668 -7.51 94.62 
-0.560288 -6 114.7 
-0.366513 -3.93 115.1 
-0 .18361 -1.97 115.3 
-0 .006117 -0.07 115.6 
0.171265 1.84 115.6 
0.354898 3.82 115.6 
0.554526 6.38 132.2 
0.790156 9.09 132.4 
-9.17938 -83.9 1488 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.890392 
R Square 0.792798 
Adjusted R Square 0.775531 
Standard Error 0.518369 
Observations 14 
ANOVA 
df ss MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 12.33748 12.33748 45 .9144 1.9692E-05 
Residual 12 3.224473 0.268706 
Total 13 15.56195 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Intercept -12.7696 1.793131 -7.12142 1.21E-05 -16.676529 
X Variable 1 1.178368 0.1 73903 6.776016 1.97E-05 0.79946624 
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Table 5.4 Failure parameters of various equipments of Unit 3 
Major system Serial Subsystem/ Equipment Outage Parameter 
No code 
1. Steam 1.1 Boiler 31000 13- 1.1 7, 8-50853.9 H 
generator 1.2 Burners 31270 13-1.65, 8-40215.4 H 
1.3 Re-heater 31702 A.=1 .74E-05 H 
1.4 Water walls 31540 13-1.27, 8-57746.9 H 
1.5 Burner Piping and valve 31230 A - 0.17/year 
1.6 Igniters 31280 A - 9.51 E-06 H 
1.7 Boiler control 63100 13-1.98, 8-4906 1.1 H 
1.8 Controls furnace draft 63200 A - 0.25/year 
1.9 Steam Ins. & Control 63400 A - 0.08/year 
1.10 Auxiliary steam and 73100 A - 0.16/year condensate system 
2.1 Fuel oil Management Ins & 63700 13-1.77,8- 522 19.9 H 2. Fuel oil Control 
supply 2.2 Combustion Control 63900 A - 2.90E-05 H system 
2.3 F.D fan# 1 32310 13-1.26, 8-52523. 1 H 
2.4 F.D fan# 2 32310 A - 3.00E-05 H 
2.5 F.D fan motor# 1 32330 A - 4.90E-05 H 
2.6 F.D fan motor# 2 32330 A - 2.11 E-05 H 
2.7 Fuel oil transfer system 37300 A - 0.16/year 
2.8 Fuel oil forwarding system 37400 A - 0.08/year 
2.9 Fuel oil boosting system 37500 13-2. 18,8- 72895.4 H 
3. Air and 3.1 Air pre-heater 1 31150 A - 1.50E-05 H 
flue 3.2 Air Pre-heater 2 31150 A - 2.00E-05 H gas 
system 3.3 Air extraction system 45000 A - 0.08/year 
3.4 Air extraction vacuum pumps 45100 A - 0.08/year 
3.5 Gland seal system 41500 A. - 0.08/year 
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Major system Serial Subsystem/ .Equipment Outage Parameter 
No code 
4.1 Turbine rotors 44120 A - 0.08/year 4 . Turbine 
4.2 Steam turbine aux. Ins. & 64100 A - 0.16/year con . 
4.3 Turbine bearing #2 41100 A- 0.08/year 
4.4 Pedestal bearing # 1 41170 A - 0.08/year 
5.1 Hydrogen gas cooling 42300 A - 0.08/year 5. Generator system 
5.2 Generator brushes 42114 A - 0.08/year 
6.1 Condenser tubes 44120 [3 - 1.51 , 8-74607 H 
6. Condensate 6.2 Condenser 44110 A - 1.50E-05 H 
system 
6.3 Feed water piping and 43090 
support A - 3.1 OE-05 H 
6.4 Condensate make-up 47000 A- 0.08/year system 
6.5 Condensate make-up 64700 A- 0.16/year system Ins.& Control 
7. Feed water 7.1 Boiler feed pump 1 43000 [3-1.1 8, 8-33925.7 H 
system 
7.2 Boiler feed pump 2 43200 [3-1 .34, 8-34845.6 H 
7.3 HP heater 4 43100 A - 0.0001 H 
7.4 HP heater 5 43100 [3- 2.9, 8-40607.4 H 
7.5 HP heater 6 43100 A- 0.08/year 
7.6 Feed cycle auxiliary 48000 A - 0.08/year 
7.7 Boiler feed water Ins & 64300 [3 - 2.2 1, 8-69743.4 H Control 
7.8 Feed water heater Ins& 64800 A - 0.08/year Control 
7.9 De-aerator 44500 A- 0.16/year 
5.7 Uncertainties 
Estimating population from inaccurate, deficient or biased data, which results in errors 
and information losses, causes uncertainties. This leads to difference between population and 
sample properties . The collected failure data of unit 3 have two types of uncertainties. The first is 
called as non-homogeneity in data, not coming from the same location . The second most 
important type of uncertainty is the sampling error. This has occurred due to estimating statistics 
from samples from an infinite population . 
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5.8 Failure patterns of equipments 
The graphical representation of the lifetime of the equipment is illustrated in section 5.5 
with bathtub curve . Moreover, the value of the shape parameter [3 estimated from the failure data 
provides insight into the behavior of the failure process of the equipments of Unit 3. Most of the 
equipments operates reliably for a period and then wear out. Most of the maintenance decisions 
are based on this assumption and planned to take preventive action shortly before the item is due 
to fail in future . This bathtub model is true in certain types of simple equipments. But, the power 
plant is more complex system with variety of electrical and mechanical items and the failure 
pattern is altered as shown in the Figure 5.10 
Pattern A is well known bathtub curve. It begins with a high incidence of failure (known as 
infant mortality followed by constant or gradually increasing conditional probability of failure , then 
by wear-out zone. Pattern B shows constant or slowly increasing conditional probability of failure 
(Hazard rate) , ending in wear-out zone. Pattern C shows slowly increasing conditional probability 
of failure , but there is no identifiable wear-out age . Pattern D shows a constant conditional 
probability of failure at al ages (random failure) . The study of failure patterns of equipments 
shows that 18% of the items conformed to Pattern B, 9% to C and the remaining 73% to D. The 
rest of the components other than this are conformed to Pattern D. Moreover, preventive 
maintenance has no effect on random failures (Charles, 1997). 
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Figure 5.10 Failure patterns 
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Table 5.5 Failure Patterns of important equipments 
Failure Serial Subsystem/ Equipment Outage Parameter 
pattern No code 
1.1 Boiler 31000 f3-1.17, 8-50853 .9 H 
1.2 Water walls 31540 f3-1.27, 8-57746.9 H 
1.3 F.D fan# 1 32310 f3-1.26, 8-52523.1 H 
Pattern C 
1.4 Boiler feed pump 1 43000 f3-1.18, 8-33925.7 H 
2.1 Burners 31270 f3-1.65, 8-40215.4 H 
2.2 Boiler control 63100 f3-1.98, 8-49061.1 H 
Fuel oil Management Ins & 
2.3 63700 f3-1.77, 8-52219.9 H 
Control 
2.4 Fuel oil boosting system 37500 f3-2.18, 8-72895.4 H 
Pattern B 2.5 Condenser tubes 44120 f3-1.51, 8-74607 H 
2.6 Boiler feed pump 2 43200 f3-1.34, 8-34845.6 H 
2.7 HP heater 5 43100 f3-2.9, 8-40607.4 H 
Boiler feed water Ins & 
2.8 64300 f3-2.21, 8-69743.4 H 
Control 
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Chapter 6 Risk assessment, evaluation and maintenance planning 
6.1 Risk assessment 
This module is comprised of four steps, which are logically linked as shown in Fig . 6.1 . A detailed 
description of each step is presented below. 
6.1.1 Failure scenario development 
A failure scenario is a description of a series of events, which may lead to a system failure. It 
may contain a single event or a combination of sequential events. Usually a system failure occurs 
as a result of interaction of a sequence of events. The acceptance of a scenario does not mean it 
will indeed occur, but that there is a reasonable probability that it would occur. A failure scenario 
is the basis of the study of risk : it tells us what may happen , so that preventing or minimizing the 
possibility of its occurrence of an unwanted event can be devised. After fixing the boundaries of 
each system, and the associated boundary interfaces (i.e., inputs, outputs) failure scenarios are 
developed. Such scenarios are generated based on the functional failure of the system . 
Functional failures are identified based on the guidelines given in the unit 3 operating manual and 
manufacturers equipment's manuals. The failure scenarios are incorporated during fault tree 
development and analysis. 
6.1.2 Probabilistic failure analyses 
Probabilistic failure analysis is conducted using a fault tree analysis (FTA) . The use of FTA, 
together with components' failure data, enables the determination of the frequency of occurrence 
of the failure of a system . Developing probabilistic fault trees is made easier using a methodology 
called "analytical simulation" (khan , Abbasi , 2001 ). 
The key features of this step are: 
a) Fault tree development: The top event is identified based on the detailed study of the process, 
control arrangement, and behavior of components of unit 3. A logical dependency between the 
causes leading to the top event (functional failure) is developed. The details of the Fault tree 
development is discussed in the section 6.2.3. 
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b) Boolean matrix creation : The fault tree having basic events in series, and/or parallel and their 
combination can be represented in a binary function as 
1, if a basic event is true 
0, if a basic event is not true 
in a similar way, fault tree for the complete system (unit: 3 ) can be represented as a combination 
of these basic events in terms of Boolean matrix function : 
Fk = matrix[jbi] 
lbl lb2 lb3 lbn 
2bl 2b2 2b3 2bn 
mbl mb2 mb3 mbn 
Where, jbi represents the element Boolean matrix, j represents a row, and I represents a 
column . 
The system function Fk is defined as: 
1, system fail (undesired event occurs) 
0, system is working (undesired event does not occur) 
Where, k represents the number of times a system function F is true or in other words, the cutsets 
of the fault tree. 
Once the complete system is represented in terms of jbi (basic events) using Boolean 
algebra, it is further evaluated using an analytical method to identify the dependency of F on the 
basic elements jbi. The evaluation of dependency gives the combination of basic events that can 
lead the system function F to a fail condition (undesired event to occur) . These combinations of 
basic elements, also known as minimal cutsets, give insight into the system. 
For a real-life industrial problem, the number of these minimal cutsets may be very large. 
Hence the concept of 'optimal minimal cutsets ', which represents the cutsets having direct 
dependency on the top event (having frequency/ probability of occurrence higher than a minimal 
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value) . The minimal cutsets can be optimized by using any standard optimization procedure. 
However the use of modified Fibonacci (Marchisotto, 1993) search method is the best tool to 
optimize the minimal cutsets. The optimal minimum cutsets can be represented as; 
G(Xi) =minimum [Ui=1 , 1 [jgi]] 
Ford >= minimal criteria 
d =Pii = 1, m [p(Xi)] where 
m [p(Xi)] = n(Xi) * base duration * boundary limitations 
where 
i represent the event 
j represent ~he number of cutsets 
Xi represents state of variable 
P (Xi) probability of occurrences of an event 
Jgi = probability of a cutset 
n(Xi) frequency of failure rate of an event i 
g(Xi) represent optimized minimal event set 
The optimized minimal cutsets are exceedingly important as they represent the core 
combination of events susceptible to cause an undesirable event. For a typical fault tree, which 
consists of a large number of basic events and gates the optimal cutsets of each module are 
linked with other modules according to their control barrier dependency. This step is repeated till 
all modules of the problem are combined . This combination finally gives the optimal minimum 
cutsets for the complete system . 
c) Analysis of optimal minimal cutsets using fuzzy set theory: In simple set theory, the probability 
of occurrence of top event, through optimal minimal cutsets, P Topn is described by a function of 
the basic events. 
pTop = h[P(X\ P(X20, ... ,P(Xi-1) ... P(Xn)] 
The probability of occurrence of top event when one event X1 has been eliminated or made not to 
fail can be representd as: 
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pTop1 = h[O, P(X2) , ... ,P(Xi-1) . . . P(Xn)] 
While cons idering these probabilities, an improvement factor has been defined as a factor 
representing an event's contribution to the undesired event. As per definition , an improvement 
factor signifies the improvement in the probability of occurrence of the top event (undesired 
event) . The higher the improvement factor for an event, the more likely it is going to cause the 
undesired event. Mathematically, an improvement factor for an event is represented as; 
(P Top- p Top 1) > 0 = improvement factor 
The simple set theory requires exact values of probabilities of each event described by 
optimal minimal cutsets to estimate the probability of undesired event, and the improvement 
factor. Even small deviations (uncertainty) in these values (probability data of basic events) get 
accumulated and thus lead to high deviation of the result. 
As discussed earlier, getting exact values of failure data is very difficult. To allow for 
inaccuracies in the failure data , fuzzy probability space concepts are used to decrease the 
dependency of the analysis on the reliability data . In the present context, fuzzy probability space 
means the probability of an event expressed in terms of a fuzzy set. Among various forms of 
fuzzy probability set representations , the trapezoidal representation is useful. For example; the 
probability of occurrence of an event xi is expressed as: 
P(Xi) tJ. = (qil , pil , pir, qir) 
Where fP(Xi) = represents a fuzzy probability 
Such that; 
=0 for qil ~ p(x) ~ 0 
= 1- {pil -p(X)}/ {pil-qil} for pil ~ p(x) ~ qil 
= ·1 I for pir ~ p(x) ~ pil 
= 1- {pil -p(X)}/ {pil-qil} for qir ~ p(x) ~ pir 
= 0 1 ~ p(x) ~ qir 
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Using the same procedure as discussed in simple set theory, the probability of occurrence of a 
top event can be expressed as 
p Top = h[ P (X \ P (X\ ... P (X\ ... + P (Xn)) 
pTop L1. = (qtl, ptl, ptr, qtr) 
The probability of occurrence after eliminating element, xi can be represented as: 
P Top1 = h[O, P (X\ P (X\ ... P (X\ ... + P (Xn)] 
pTop1 = ((qt11, pt11, pt1r, qt1r) 
And finally the improvement factor can be calculated as: 
pTop- pTop1 =improvement 
All computations are carried out in a fuzzy probability space . The final probability of 
occurrence and the improvement factor are also calculated in terms of fuzzy probability sets. 
Later the fuzzy probability is transformed to normal probability using the trapezoidal average 
function . 
The results obtained using this concept are more reliable compared to the results obtained 
by other methods with the same level of uncertainty in the input data. It is mainly because the 
single probability values are transformed in a well-defined space and all calculations are done in 
the same space. Doing that, the error in the data is also distributed to wider space and 
computation in this space causes lesser error accumulation . Eventually, the fuzzy probability can 
be transformed to normal probability as desired , using average function. 
Further, the improvement factor has been used to formulate an improvement index. This 
index gives a direct measure of the sensitivity of the top event to any preceding event. The higher 
the index the more sensitive is the system to that particular event. Using the index one can 
identify the basic events, which need greater attention if the probability of the top event (failure) 
has to be reduced. Fuzzy probability set theory is used in analytical simulation algorithm and 
coded in PROF AT software (Khan and Abbasi, 2001 ). The Analytical simulation methodology and 
PROFAT is shown in Fig . 3.3 
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6.1.3 Fault tree development 
As discussed earlier, a fault tree is a logical and hierarchical model of an undesirable 
situation expressed in terms of all possible sequences and combinations of intermediate and 
basic events or failure modes leading to the ultimate undesired situation , or top event. In general 
a fault tree model consists of four fundamental types of events described as: 
(i) an event that corresponds to a primary failure in the system, 
(ii) an event that corresponds to a functional failure of the system, 
(iii) an event that corresponds to a non-primary failure that is not decomposed into more basic 
events, 
(iv) an event hat does not correspond to a fault or failure but is an ordinary event existing 
inherently within the system. 
6.1.4 Functional failures and failure modes 
Failure can be defined as the inability of a system or system component to perform a required 
function within specified limits. A failure may occur when a fault is encountered . A functional 
failure is defined as the inability of a system or a system component to perform a required 
function to a standard of performance, which is acceptable to the user. Engineering systems fail 
due to different reasons. A failure mode is any event, which causes a functional failure. The 
causes are 
• Deterioration 
Any physical asset that fulfils a function , which brings it into contact with the real world , is 
subject to a variety of stresses. These stresses cause the asset to deteriorate by lowering its 
capability , or more accurately, its resistance to stress. Eventually resistance drops so much that 
the asset can no longer deliver the desired performance - in other words, it fails. Deterioration 
covers all forms of 'wear and tear' (fatigue , corrosion , abrasion , erosion , evaporation , degradation 
of insulation, etc) . These failures have been included in a list of failure modes wherever they 
thought to be reasonably likely. 
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• Lubrication failures 
Lubrication is associated with two types of failure modes. The first is caused by the lack of a 
lubricant, and the second is caused by the failure of lubricant itself. Dirt or Scaling The common 
cause of failure or falling in performance of power plant is ash formation , fireside deposition and 
scaling. 
• Disassembly 
These are usually failure of welds , soldered joints, or rivets due to fatigue or corrosion r the 
failure of threaded components such as bolts, electrical connections or pipe fittings , which can 
also fail due to fatigue or corrosion . 
• Human errors 
These refer to errors, which reduce the capability of the process to the extent that it is unable 
to function as required by the user. However, the human errors are not included in this study . 
• Design errors 
Design errors are of the form under capacity , over capacity , incorrect specification of 
materials and components and errors in the basic design of components. There are no details 
available to include this during the analysis. 
• Material defects 
• Maintenance deficiencies 
Apart from the failure modes discussed above, different types of failures and failure modes 
are obtained from the study of plant history cards , and maintenance manuals and are 
incorporated during fault tree development. Failure anlysis is not performed on every failure 
mode of a single component (Maurizio Bevilacqua, 2000) . This approach was choosen for the 
following reasons : 
(i) Such detailed level analysis is usually too burdensome 
(ii) The common causes of the analyzed equipment are practically always due to seals, valve 
seating and bearings . 
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Fault tree analysis is both qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative analysis consists of 
identifying the various combinations of events that will cause the top event to occur. This is 
followed by a quantitative analysis to estimate the probability of occurrence of the top event. 
There are four major steps to a fault tree analysis: 
• Defining the system, its boundaries , and the top event. 
• Constructing the fault tree, this symbolically represents the system and its relevant 
events. 
• Performing the qualitative evaluation by identifying those combinations of events that will 
cause the top event. 
• Performing a quantitative evaluation by assigning failure probabilities to the basic events 
and computing the probability of the top event. 
In construction of a fault tree, the two logic gates, the OR gate and the AND gate, are used to 
relate the resultant, basic, and intermediate events to the top event. Lower events are input to a 
gate , and higher event is the gate's output. The type of gate determines whether all input events 
must occur for the output event to occur (AND gate) or whether only one of the input events must 
occur for the output event to occur (OR gate) . Fault tree of steam generator is given below. Refer 
to Appendix- 8 for the rest of the fault trees of the entire unit 3. 
6.1.5 Selecting and fixing failure parameters for basic events 
Once the fault tree is developed the next step is to find the failure probability of basic events. 
Before finding the failure probability, the failure parameters for those basic events are allocated. 
The following three-fold procedure is used : 
1. Failure parameters are fixed from the estimated parameters using power plant failure data . 
2 The data collected from the operating plant does not contain failure data for all equipment, 
especially valves and other major components . For these components the failure rates were 
determined from data obtained from the reliability data banks. Refer to Appendix-C for the MTBF 
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confidence limits in determining failure rates of items with zero failures given in Non-electronic 
parts reliability data book (Denson, 1995). 
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This method is followed during selecting and determining failure parameters for the components 
with random failures For example, the globe valve, N.O 23047-006 -style: packaged unit, POP: 
20 (Page 3-549), the data given as 0/2 .9170. The failures are O.The hours are 2,917 x 1 0""6 
hours or 2917000 hours. Using the equation as shown in the PDF, the lower confidence interval 
is calculated as 2(2917000)/0.619 = 9424878.837 hours (MTBF). The failure rate is the inverse 
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of the MTBF. This gives a failure rate of 0.106 fa ilures/million hours. Similarly the upper value is 
2(2917000)/4.47 = 0.766 failures/million hours. 
3. The failure rates for the basic events that are rare events (subjective) and whose data are 
available neither from data banks nor from the plant data are determined from operating 
experience and by consulting with the plant personnel. Table 6.1 gives the failure rate data for 
machinery components from field statistics. 
Table 6.1 Failure rate data 
Reliability A.x1 o-6 
Extremely Reliable 0.01 
Highly reliable 0.01-0.1 
Good reliability 0.1-1 .0 
Average reliability 1.0-10.0 
Very unreliable 10.0- 100.0 
Intolerable > 100 
Source: Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd_ 
6.1.6 Estimating the probability of failure of basic events 
Based on the failure parameters, failure probability is calculated for the period of 20 years by 
selecting suitable Exponential and Weibull failure probability functions . Appendix- D has the 
values of failure parameters and failure probability calculations . 
I 
Exponential failure probability function F (t) = f f(t)dt =1 - e -A.I 
-00 
I 
Weibull failure probability function F (t) = fJ(t)dt = 1- e-(t/B)fJ 
-00 
6.1. 7 Fault tree analysis 
Once the fault tree is developed for any undesired event in unit 3 then it can be evaluated 
to identify the pathways, which would lead to the undesired events. Subsequently, using the 
failure probability of the basic events, these pathways can be further evaluated to estimate the 
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frequency of the top event. Using the software package PROFAT (Probabilistic Fault Tree 
analysis) the analysis is performed and the results for the steam generator are tabulated in Table 
6.2. Table 6 .3 has the consol idated results of unit 3. 
Table 6.2 PROF AT results of steam generator 
IMPROVEMENT INDEX RESULTS 
Event not- Probability Improvement Improvement 
occuring Index 
0 9.986943e-01 0. OOOOOOe+OO 0.000000 
1 9.974116e-01 5.130589e-03 11 .188756 
2 9.974116e-01 5.130589e-03 11 .188756 
3 9.969181 e-01 7.1 04814e-03 15.494133 
4 9.974116e-01 5.130589e-03 11 .188756 
5 9.973937e-01 5.202055e-03 11.344608 
6 9.973937e-01 5.202055e-03 11.344608 
7 9.974285e-01 5.062878e-03 11 .041092 
8 9.983252e-01 1.476347e-03 3.219609 
9 9. 983252e-01 1.476347e-03 3.219609 
10 9.974597e-01 4.938602e-03 10.7700733 
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Table 6.3 Fault tree analysis results of Unit# 3 
S.No Major Subsystem Failure scenarios Probability of 
system failure in 20 
years 
• Failed to generate steam 
. Failed to supply water 
I Power plant: • Failed to generate power 0.9999 Unit 3 
. Failed to start steam 
generator 
• Failed to generate steam 
• Failed to blow down and 
1. supply chemicals 0.9986 
. Auxiliary steam supply 
system failed 
. Failed to ignite the fuel 
1.1 Furnace • Heat transfer rate low 0.9825 
• Unable to run 
• Failed to supply water to 
steam drum 0.6291 
1.2 Economizer . Failed to vent the gases 
• Failed to raise the 
temperature of water 
• Failed to separate water 
and steam 
Steam • Failed to supply water to 0.9855 1.3 generator Steam drum down comers 
• Failed to relieve pressure 
• Presence of moisture in the 
steam 
. Failed to raise the 
temperature of steam 
• Failed to relieve the 0.9925 
1.4 Super heater pressure 
. High super heated 
temperature 
• High super heated pressure 
• Failed to supply spray water 
• Failed to re-heat the steam 
. Unable to spray water in the 
attemperator 0.9970 
1.5 Re-heater • Failed to supply and spray 
water 
. Failed to control the reheat 
steam temperature 
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S.No Major Subsystem Failure scenarios Probability of 
system failure in 20 
years 
Blow down • Failed to draw water from 
system steam drum 
• Failed to supply water to 
tank 1 0.9733 
1.6 • Failed to supply water 
• Unable to drain water Steam 
• Failed to low down water generator from all the headers 
Chemical . Failed to pump sodium 0.9786 
1.7 supply phosphate 
system • Failed to supply sodium 
phosphate 
• Failed to supply air to 
furnace 
• Failed to supply air at right 2. proportion 0.9991 
• Flue gas system failed 
Forced draft • Unable to run 
2.1 fan west • Inlet damper drive system 
failed 0.9662 
• Both inlet and outlet 
dampers failed to open 
Air and flue 
gas system Forced draft • Unable to run 
fan east • Inlet damper drive system 
failed 0.9969 2.2 
• Both inlet and outlet 
dampers failed to open 
Steam air • Failed to supply steam at 
heater west the required pressure 
• Failed to supply steam to air 0.9557 
2.3 heater 
• Failed to heat the air 
• Failed to drain the 
condensate 
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S.No Major Subsystem Failure scenarios Probability of 
system failure in 20 
years 
Steam air . Failed to supply steam at 
heater east the required pressure 
• Failed to supply steam to air 
heater 0.9557 2.4 
• Failed to heat the air 
. Failed to drain the 
condensate 
Air pre-heater . Unable to run the forced 
west draft fan 0.9724 
2 .5 • Failed to raise the 
temperature of air to the 
designed value 
Air pre-heater • Unable to run the forced 
east draft fan 0.9729 2.6 • Failed to raise the 
Air and flue temperature of air to the 
gas system designed value 
Air flow . Failed to send input signal 
control to air flow master station in 0.9568 
2.7 system west west from three levels 
• Failed to control dampers at 
three levels in west 
Air flow • Failed to send input signal 
control to air flow master station in 0.9568 
2.8 system west west from three levels 
. Failed to control dampers at 
three levels in west 
Flue gas • Excessive flue gas 
system temperature 0 .9720 
. Failed to detect and send 2.9 oxygen level signal to 
combustion control system 
• Failed to remove flue gases 
• Failed to supply oil to day 
Fuel oil tank 
3. system • Failed to supply oil to 0.9866 
burners 
. Failed to supply additive 
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S.No Major Subsystem Failure scenarios Probability of 
system failure in 20 
years 
Heavy oil • Failed to supply oil to main 
system header 0.9989 
3.1 • Failed to control 
temperature 
. Unable to control firing 
Light oil • Failed to supply clean oil to 
system pumps 
• Failed to pump oil at the 
Fuel oil required pressure 
• Failed to relieve pressure 0.9921 
3.2 system • Failed to supply oil to main 
pipe 
• Failed to supply light oil and 
air to the bottom level 
burners 
Fuel additive • Failed to supply magnesium 0.9201 
3.3 system hydroxide at three levels 
• Failed to supply additive to 
main header 
. Failed to supply main steam 
to intermediate pressure 
(IP) turbine 
• Failed to drain water tin the 
main pipe line 
• Failed to supply reheat 
steam to re-heater 
• Failed to supply reheat 
Turbine: steam to Low pressure (LP) 
4a. steam supply turbine 0.9999 
. Failed to drain water in the 
system 
re-heater pipe line 
• Failed to control the super 
heated steam pressure and 
temperature 
• Failed to control re-heated 
steam 
• Pressure and temperature 
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S.No Major Subsystem Failure scenarios Probability of 
system failure in 20 
years 
. Failed to initiate back wash 
6.4 Condenser Failed to perform back 0.7821 • 
back wash wash 
7. . Pumping and heating 
system failed 
• Failed to supply water 
during make-up 0.9995 
• Failed to supply chemicals 
• Failed to supply water 
• Extraction pump# 1 failed 
7.1 Water to supply water 0.9865 
extraction 
• Extraction pump# 2 failed 
to supply water 
• Failed to vent the gases Gland seal 0.8556 7.2 . Failed to supply steam 
condenser 
. Failed to drain water 
Low • Heat transfer rate reduced 
pressure 
feed water . Failed to vent and purge 
system (LP) gases 
• Failed to supply steam 
7.3 through pipe 1 & 2 0.9998 LP heater# 1 • Failed to drain the water 
from drain tank 
• Failed to drain water during 
abnormal level rise 
• Failed to vent and purge 
gases 
• Failed to supply steam 
through pipe 1 & 2 0.9900 7.4 • Failed to drain the water LP heater# 2 from drain tank 
• Failed to drain water during 
abnormal level rise 
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S.No Major Subsystem Failure scenarios Probability of 
system failure in 20 
years 
• Failed to supply make-up 
water to condenser 
. Failed to supply surplus 
water to high level reserve 0.9998 7.5 Reserve feed feed water tank 
water system . Failed to supply de-
mineralized water 
• Failed to supply water from 
Low low feed tank to high level 
pressure feed tank as required 
feed water 
system (LP) Water de- • Unable to supply water to 
7.6 mineralization supply pumps 0.9585 
system • Pumping system failed to 
supply water 
Chemical • Failed to pump 
supply • Failed to supply 
7.7 system 0.9786 
(Hydrazine 
and 
Ammonia) 
• Feed auxiliaries failed 
• Failed to pump water to 
High main header 
• High pressure heaters failed 
8. pressure to raise the temperature of 0.9999 feed water 
system (HP) water 
. Failed to supply water 
• Unable to continue water 
flow 
• Failed to supply air to the Instrument 
service air tanks 9. and service 0.9650 
. Failed to supply air to 
air system instrument air tanks 
6.2 Consequence analysis 
The objective here is to prioritize major systems, subsystems and components on the basis of 
their contribution to a failure of unit 3. Consequence analysis involves estimation of maintenance 
cost and product ion loss cost. 
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6.2.1 Estimation of maintenance cost 
Maintenance cost typically includes the cost of labor and parts and the down time associated 
with repairs . The maintenance cost is calculated using the mathematical model given below 
MC= Cr+ DTx Cv 
Where Cf- Fixed cost of failure (Cost of spare parts) , DT - down time, Cv - Variable cost per 
hour of down time (Labor rate and crew size). Appendix G has the details. 
A) Cost of spares 
The cost of raw material, internally manufactured part, the parts sent away for repairs , spare 
parts, consumables, small tools , testing equipments , rent for special equipments and special 
treatments are accounted. The cost of spares and raw materials is drawn from the plant stock 
book. For small tools $3.00 is added per man-hour. Special equipments rent and other special 
treatment cost is derived from plant records. 
B) Maintenance down time 
Down time means the total amount of time the plant would normally be out of service owing 
to the failure, from the moment it fails until the moment it is fully operational again . The repair 
process itself can be decomposed into a number of different subtasks and delay times as shown 
in the Figure 6.6 
Plant Maintenance Access 
outage Delay time 
Down time 
Diagnose Supply Replacement 
the fault Delay or repair 
Fig 6.4 Down time 
Revalidate 
the 
equipment 
Put the 
into se 
plant 
rvice 
Maintenance delay time is the time spent waiting for maintenance resources or facilities . It 
may also include administrative time and travel time. Resources may be personnel , test 
equipment, tools , and manuals or other technical data. Access time is the amount of time 
required to gain access to the failed component. In power plants , access time varies depending 
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on the equipment; access to the boiler will be the least. Diagnosis, or troubleshoot, time is the 
amount of time required to determine the cause of failure . The repair time or replacement time 
includes only the actual hands-on time to complete the restoration process once the problem has 
been identified and access to the failed component is obtained. Supply delay consists of the total 
delay time in obtaining necessary spare parts or components in order to complete the repair 
process. All of the power plant equipment requires validation before they put into service. 
C) Labor rate and crew size 
The cost of labor is an important component of the ma intenance cost. This is based on the 
hourly rate for various trades and the information is drawn from the plant documentation . 
Table 6.4 Labor rates 
Trade Description Hourly rate 
General Foreman $46.21 
Foreman $44.90 
Fitter/we lder $41.26 
Boiler maker Apprentice 3 $38.04 
Apprentice 2 $32.81 
Apprentice 1 $27.64 
Helper $38.04 
Pipe fitter Foreman $45.49 Welder/Journeyman $42.64 
Foreman $41.47 
Mill Wright Welder/Journeyman $40.22 Apprentice $38.60 
Journey $34.64 
lnstrumentcian $25.00 
Electrician $25.00 
Down time associated with forced outage and forced de-rating state is estimated from the 
failure data collected in the unit 3. Owing to the lack of data, the down time and the number of 
maintenance personnel involved in repair is estimated by interviewing the maintenance 
personnel. Appendix- E shows the excel sheet for repair cost estimation details. 
6.2.2 Estimation of production loss cost 
Asset utilization, a measure of production performance, has become a key manufacturing 
improvement tool in any production process . Asset utilization is defined as actual production 
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divided by capacity , for any given period of time. The difference between the two constitutes 
production losses, which is inherent in any manufacturing operation. The details about functional 
failures that cause production losses are discussed in chapter 4 .3. The production loss cost is 
estimated using the mathematical model given below. 
PLC = DT X PL X SP 
Where 
DT- Down time , PL- Production loss tae in Mega Watt hours, SP- Selling price 
The production loss rate in Mega Watt hours is computed from the failure data. The selling 
price is identified from the plant as $ 45.00 per Mega Watt hours. The selling price is derived 
from the cost of the No. 6 Fuel oil (High sulfur residual fuel oil is a heavy oil used by ocean liners 
and tankers as fuel , and for oil burning power plants) per barrel , combined with the plant 
overheads. Appendix G has the production cost estimation details. 
It is evident through the analysis that the functional failures of the system or equipment are 
due to various failure modes. Also, the system or equipment cannot put back into service until all 
failures are repaired, in addition , it involves down time. The system or equipment down time 
varies with the type of failure mode. The system remains in a failed state until the failure mode 
that utilizes the maximum down time is repaired . For this reason, the failure mode with the 
maximum down time is selected consequently , the production loss. For example , boiler failed 14 
times during 1992- 2002 and the failure has occurred because of different failure modes that 
caused partial and tota l failures (the cost of total failure w ith maximum down time is found as 
$3618000) . 
The combination of production loss cost and the maintenance cost gives the 
consequence of the failure in dollars. The major systems and equipment are prioritized based on 
the maximum loss associated with each failure . Appendix- F gives the details of consequences 
and the risk analysis. 
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6.3 Risk estimation and evaluation 
The results of the consequence and the probabilistic failure analysis are then used to 
estimate the risk of unit 3. Refer to Figure 6.5 for the detailed description. The individual risk for 
each subsystem is shown in Appendix- F. 
Risk evaluation is the process by which risks are examined in terms of costs and benefits , 
and evaluated in terms of acceptability of risk considering the needs, issues and concerns of the 
unit 3. The acceptance risk criterion is determined based on the yearly maintenance 
expenditure of unit 3. The acceptable risk criterion for the power plant is $2 ,000,000 per year. 
Now, the acceptance criterion is compared w ith the estimated risk of individual major system , any 
value higher than this is unacceptable. The major systems whose estimated risk exceeds the 
acceptance criteria are identified . These are the units that should have an improved maintenance 
plan . Three major systems steam generator, air and flue gas system and high pressure feed 
water system did exceed the acceptable risk criteria. This indicates that the risk should be 
reduced to maintain the continuous operation of unit 3. Considering these factors a new 
maintenance schedule is developed. The details are discussed in the following section . The 
algorithm used is shown in Fig .6.7 
6.3.1 Risk ranking 
As discussed in the previous sections, risk is a direct function of two factors , probability and 
consequence and represents the co-ordinate axes in a common x-y plot configuration. Every 
ordered pair of the probability value and its corresponding consequence value, [p ,c] , represents 
risk in major system . The risks associated with major systems are then ranked for setting 
priorities in implementing the risk management strategies. Those, which have unfavorable 
indicators with respect to acceptable criteria , need action . Fig 6.8 shows the co-ordinate system 
and risk ranking . Table 6.5 shows the ranking of major systems and the first three systems 
require maintenance planning . 
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Figure 6.5 Description of risk evaluation module (Ref: Khan and Haddara 
(2003)) 
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Table 6.5 Top potentially maintainable systems 
Consequence Probability of 
Major system in millions failure (Over Risk($) Rank 
20 years) (Over 20 years) 
1 3,674,435 Steam generator 3678481 0.9989 
High Pressure feed water 
2 2478842 0.9999 2,478,594 
system 
3 Air and flue gas system 2102023 0.9914 2,083,946 
4 Generator 1634060 0.9780 1,598 ,111 
5 Turbine- steam supply 1110574 0.9999 1,110,463 
6 Fuel oil system 1110574 0.9866 1,095,692 
7 Condenser 874745 0.9939 869,409 
8 Turbine rotating system 302053 0.9999 302,023 
Low pressure feed water 0.9995 9 286584 286,441 
system 
Instrument and service air 
10 25249 0.9650 24365 
system 
6.3.2 Risk Index 
The risk index is to evaluate which combinations pose the greatest risk to the failure of unit 3. 
In essence, the risk index is a filter for finding those risk element-impact-potential cause 
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combinations that have the greatest contribution to the failure . The division of risk and the 
acceptance criteria gives the risk index. Based on the risk index the subsystems are classified as 
high risk (above 1 ), medium (0.4-0.8) and low (below 0.4) . Table 6.4 shows the results . 
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Table 6.6 Ranking of subsystems and risk index 
S.No Subsystems Risk Value$ Risk index Level of 
concern 
1 Air preheater east 2045058 1.0225 High 
2 Forced draft fan east 1444656 0.7278 
3 Forced draft fan west 1333840 0.6669 
4 Heavy oil system 1109352 0.5547 Medium 
5 Re-heater 1107242 0.5536 
6 Super heater 1102245 0.5511 
7 Furnace 918590 0.4593 
8 Air preheater west 270734 0.1354 
9 Flue gas system 123272 0.0616 
10 Air flow control system west and 108783 0.0544 
11 Air flow control system east 108783 0.0544 
12 Steam air heater west and east 108658 0.0543 
13 Steam air heater west and east 108658 0.0543 
14 Economizer 79781 0.0399 
15 Steam drum 73312 0.0367 
16 Blow down system 32472 0.0162 
17 Vacuum system 19827 0.0099 
18 Water extraction 15374 0.0077 Low 
19 Cooling water supply system 12827 0.0064 
20 Screen wash system 12618 0.0063 
21 Light oil system 11568 0.0058 
22 Fuel additive system 18350 0.0092 
23 Low pressure heater #1 8372 0.0042 
24 Low pressure heater #2 8290 0.0041 
25 Reserve feed water system 7192 0.0036 
26 Gland seal condenser 7165 0.0036 
27 Water demineralization system 6894 0.0034 
28 Condenser back wash 2982 0.0015 
29 Chemical supply system 2338 0.0016 
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6.4 Maintenance Planning 
An effective maintenance and inspection plan is developed for each major system and 
subsystem that exceeds the acceptance risk level. Reducing the probability of failure and 
combining the consequences further reduce the three major systems with unacceptable risk to an 
acceptable level. The assigned or new probability value is used as the target probability of the 
failure scenario . Table 6.4 shows the target probability values and risk reduction results . Based 
on the target probability of the top event a reverse fault tree analysis is performed to find the 
target probability of basic events. Appendix- G shows the Matlab program to find the target 
probability of basic events. 
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Table 6.7 Risk Reduction results 
S.No Major system Consequence Probabili Risk factor Target Risk 
Scenario in $ ty of ($)(over probabili reduction in 
(Over 20 failure in 20 years) ty Dollars 
years) 20 years 
1 Steam generator 3,678,481 0.9989 3,674,434 0.54 1 ,984,1 94 
2 A ir and flue gas 2,102,023 0.9914 2,083,945 0.85 1,771 ,353 
system 
3 H P feed water 2,478,842 0.9999 2,478,594 0.80 1,982,875 
System 
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Figure 6.11 Description of maintenance planning module (Ref: Khan and 
Haddara (2003)) 
After re-arranging the failure functions and using the failure parameters a new value for the 
maintenance interval is calculated . Thus, the reverse fault tree analysis gives the optimal times at 
which maintenance/inspection is to be performed. 
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I 
Exponential failure probability function F (t) = ff(t)dt =1 -e-A-1 
-<X> 
( ln(l- F(t)J Maintenance interval t = A, 
I 
Weibull failure probability function F (t) = ff(t)dt = 1- e-(,;e)/3 
-<X> 
Maintenance interval t = (-ln(l- F(t) X (B)J3 r J3 
The calculated maintenance interval is modified based on the system complexity and access to 
maintenance. The maintenance schedule for the three subsystems of unit 3 is given in Table 6 .8 
Table 6.8 Unit 3 Maintenance schedule 
S.NO Major Calculated Modified 
system Components Maintenance Maintenance /Sub Interval in Interval 
system days 
Boiler 298 1 year 
Steam Furnace 1 year 
generator Economizer 1 year 
Steam drum 1 year 
Super heater 1 year 
1. Re-heater 1 _year 
Water walls 393 1 year 
Blow down system 1 year 
Chemical supply system 1 year 
Auxiliary steam supply system 223 1 year 
Igniter 90 3 months 
Furnace Burners 174 6 months 
Retractable soot blowers 84 3 months 
1.1 Rotary soot blowers 84 3 months Cleaning of ash 84 1 year 
Manual door in furnace 135 6 months 
Refractory lining in furnace door 152 6 months 
Economizer tubes 380 1 year 
Econo Water supply header 2501 7 years 
1.2 
-mizer Vent valve 266 1 year 
Globe valve 219 1 year 
Cleaning of excessive scaling 21 1 year 
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Major Calculated Modified 
S.NO system Components Maintenance Maintenance /Sub Interval in Interval 
system days 
Cyclone separator 109 6 months 
Feed water control system 555 2 years 
Level Indicating Transmitters (LIT) 119 6 months 
Steam drum 145 6 months 
1.3 Steam Clogged Down comer nozzles 116 6 months drum Worn gaskets and leakage 174 6 months 
Safety valves 152 6 months 
Plate dryers 89 6 months 
Liners 152 6 months 
Secondary Super heater (SS) 175 1year 
Primary Super heater (PS) 175 1year 
SS inlet and outlet headers 4167 10 years 
PS inlet and outlet headers 4167 10 years 
Safety valves 47 3 months 
Temperature indicating transmitters 102 6 months 
Steam and control system 77 3 months 
Super Attemperator 4167 1 year 1.4 Control valve 101 3 months heater Pressure indicating transmitters 123 6 months 
Boiler control 79 3 months 
Combustion contro l 32 3 months 
Fuel oil management and control 253 1 year 
Spray nozzle 103 1 year 
Globe valve 106 6 months 
By pass valve 120 6 months 
Primary re-heater 37 1 year 
Re-heater inlet and outlet headers 41669 10 years 
Secondary re-heater 37 1 year 
Control system (Attemperator) 59 6 months 
1.5 Re- Control valve 73 3 months heater Nozzle 71 6 months 
Globe valve 76 6 months 
By-pass valve 86 6 months 
TIT's 74 6 months 
Globe valve (Steam drum) 631 2 years 
Angle valve (Steam drum) 13 2 years 
Control valve 82 3 months 
Check valve 106 6 months 
Blow Level switch 29 6 months 
1.6 down By pass valve 49 6 months 
tank Blow down tanks 101 6 months 
Water seal 786 2 years 
Motorized valve (Individual system 
blow down) 71 3 months 
Globe valve (Individual system blow 
down) 60 3 months 
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Major Calculated Modified 
S.NO system Components Maintenance Maintenance /Sub Interval in Interval 
system days 
Chemical supply pumps 1 &2 103 3 months 
Chemical Ball valves 127 6 months 
supply Chem ica l supply pump Motors 80 3 months 
1.7 
system Strainers 112 6 months 
Safety valves 129 6 months 
Globe valve 120 6 months 
Check valve 43 6 months 
Forced draft system west 3 months 
Steam air heater system west 1 year 
Air preheater system west 3 months 
Air flow system control west 3 months 
Air and Forced draft system east 3 months 
2. flue gas Steam air heater system east 1 year Air preheater system east 3 months system 
Air flow control system east 3 months 
Air foil east 3 months 
Air foil west 3 months 
Flue gas system 1 year 
Force draft fan west (F.D) 144 3 months 
F.D.fan motor west 22 3 months 
Furnace draft contro l 48 6 months 
Inlet guide van drive 182 6 months 
PIT 179 6 months 
Forced Combustion control 47 2 months 
2.1 draft fan Inlet, outlet dampers 187 6 months 
west and Inlet, outlet damper drive 182 6 months 
east Controller 48 2 months 
Timer 211 1 year 
Relay 535 1 year 
F.D fan east 44 3 months 
F. D fan motor east 60 3 months 
Globe valve 324 1 yea r 
Control valve 320 1 year 
Steam air Com . and gas control 388 1 year 2.2 heater Gate valves 435 1 year Tubes Inspection 364 1 year 
Clean ing of fins 588 1 year 
Air pre-heater (A H) west 154 3 months 
A. H west drive motor 217 3 months 
Air pre Basket seals 365 1 year Plugged hot basket cleaning 200 1 year 2.3 heater Ducts inspection 109 1 yea r 
AH east 118 3 months 
A H motor east 217 3 months 
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Major Calculated Modified 
S.NO system Components Maintenance Maintenance /Sub Interval in Interval 
system days 
Flow indicating transmitters (FIT) 157 6 months 
Flow Indicators 517 1 year 
Air flow TIT's 157 6 months 
2.4 control Flow control systems (FCS) 175 6 months 
system Dam_Q_ers 2403 3 years 
Damper drives 196 3 months 
Cleaning of slag built up 208 1 year 
Flue gas Oxygen analyzers 384 1 year 2.5 
system Inspection of ducts 109 1 year Lining 4037 10 years 
Feed auxiliaries 480 1 year 
Feed water supply pump #1 246 1 year 
Gland sealing 472 1 year 
Gate valve 809 1 year 
High Feed water pump drive motor 562 1 year Feed water supply pump #2 311 1 year pressure Feed water pump drive motor 562 1 year 3. feed 
water HP heater #4 55 1 year 
system HP heater #5 843 2 years 
HP heater #6 480 1 year 
Feed water heater Ins.& Con. 480 1 year 
De-aerator 579 1 year 
Feed water piping and support 39 1 year 
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Chapter 7 Findings and Conclusion 
A) Findings 
The followi ng are the findings of Unit 3 based on the risk ana lysis. 
• The risk that exists in Unit 3 is calculated for 20 years 
• Three major systems steam generator, high pressure feed water system , and air and flue gas 
system have fall under high-risk category (the calculated risk of more than $2 ,000,000 is 
considered as high-risk and is unacceptable) . These three major systems contribute 62% of 
overall risk of power plant (Refer section 6.3.1) 
• The study of failure patterns of equipments based on the failure data collected from the plant 
shows that 18% of the equipments conformed to pattern B, 9% to C and the remaining 73% 
to D (Refer section 5.8) 
• The analysis of failure pattern of Burners, Boiler control , Condenser tubes , Boiler feed pump 
# 2, HP heater# 5 and Boiler feed water Ins & control shown that, failures have occurred in 
the wear out region . 
• The analysis of failure pattern in Boiler, Water walls , FD fan #1 , and Boiler feed pump #1 
shows that the failures occur due to random loads or chance events. Preventive maintenance 
has no effect on these equipments. 
• Based on risk index, subsystems are classified as high, medium and low risk. Air-preheater 
has high risk (Refer section 6.3.2) 
• The inspection time of furnace , economizer, super heater, re-heater, and water walls rema ins 
the same, as the opening of steam generator is associated with longer down time, and cost. 
Moreover the plant IS not operated through out the year. 
• A revised maintenance interval is suggested for components in furnace , economizer, super 
heater, re-heater and water walls . These subsystems play a major ro le in determining the 
operational life of steam generator. Refer Table 6.8 Unit 3 Maintenance Sched ule 
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• The maintenance interval for HP feed water system is fixed as one year. However, feed 
auxiliaries, feed water pumps, motors, control systems require frequent inspection . 
• The maintenance interval for the subsystems with acceptable risk remains the same. 
However, all the transmitters, flow indicators, required calibration once in 6 months. 
Moreover, safety valves, and control valves needs inspection once in 3 months instead of 
one year to improve overall efficiency and to ensure trouble free operation. 
• Non Destructive Testing (NOT) inspection frequency remains the same for all pipe lines, 
drains and tanks . 
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B) Conclusion 
Today, power plants have achieved some level of success using a conventional maintenance 
process and use a Computerized Maintenance Management System or CMMS to efficiently 
execute maintenance work- but is that work too much too soon or tool little too late? 
When discussing about the Today's challenges, equipments become increasingly complex. 
The risk and consequence of equipment failure is significant and can be devastating to the 
business. Stringent safety and environmental regulations, if not met, can result in significant fines . 
Further, the success of the power plants is dependent on the condition , availability and reliability 
of plant assets. 
So, to ensure that doing right work on the right equipment at the right time to optimize asset 
reliability , we need a more comprehensive process. Risk Based Maintenance methodology, 
discussed in the previous chapters ensured a structured approach to solve the today's problems 
and chal lenges 
To conclude, the strategy based on risk analysis has provided to develop a cost effective 
maintenance strategy, which minimizes the economic consequences of a system outage/failure, 
and help the management in making right decision concerning investment in maintenance or 
related field . This will , in turn , results in better asset and capital utilization . 
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Chapter 8 Recommendations 
This chapter presents the recommendations of this study based on the application of Risk Based 
Maintenance policy to Unit 3. 
The five major parameters operation , maintenance, design , management and construction of the 
plant have major impact on the production cost. Moreover, if the design and operation is poor, 
maintenance has no impact on plant performance. 
The failure pattern suggested that in 73% of equipments a failure occurs during useful life 
(random failures) . The causes are random loads, human error, and chance events . An analysis 
of operating conditions of the equipment needs to be done to find out the reasons behind their 
premature failure . 
The failure pattern suggested that in 23% of the equipments a failure occurs in the wear out 
zone , which is very good sign . The implementations of predictive maintenance techniques will 
enhance the life of these equ ipments and red uce the cost of maintenance. 
Fault tree models developed based on the system flow charts are the visual models of the 
individual system and less time consuming . This is the most effective method that brings up all 
the functional failures and hidden fa ilures. Also , it can be possible to predict the likelihood of 
failures . This aids in redesigning of existing system if necessary or helps in improving the 
reliabil ity of individual system. 
Equipments and systems are prioritized based on risk, so that the resources can be focused 
on the high-risk areas first , simultaneously medium risk and low risk. Careful selection and 
execution of optimal mix of condition based actions , other time or cycle based actions or run to 
fa ilu re approach will help to bring down the risk of failure in future . 
The failure data collected from the plant has various uncertainties. Failure history data may 
include parts (failed components) , operating conditions at the time of failure , and operators (who 
were they, where were they, what did they see, hear, feel or smell prior and after the incident). 
The data bank will be very useful to predict the changes in failure parameters in future . 
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Separate data bank is required to collect the maintenance cost, spare parts cost and other 
indirect expenses incurred during failure . 
The analysis shows that most failures happen more than once in a season , this is called 
chronic failures . A Root Cause Failure Analysis or RCFA is helpful in finding out why a particular 
failure or problem exists and correcting those causes . 
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Appendix- A Description of Major systems 
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1. Air and Flue Gas system 
The purpose of the air and flue gas system is to preheat the inlet air supplied for 
combustion . This is accomplished th rough recovering the heat from the flue gases. The hot air is 
used to increase the boiler efficiency as well as to improve the combustion efficiency. The entire 
system consists of forced draft fans, steam heaters and air pre heaters connected through 
ductwork. The ductwork has a combustion air intake system, a forced drat fan (F. D) fan discharge 
air outlets to steam coil air heaters , steam coil air heater outlets to regenerative air heater inlets , 
regenerative air heater outlets to wind box, an economizer outlets to regenerative air heater inlet 
and regenerative air heater outlet to stack inlet. The flues and ducts are generally of all welded 
construction using steel. Flexible metal expansion joints are installed where it is required to give 
adequate support and the guides are included to eliminate transverse loading of flexible 
expansion joints. [Refer to Flow Diagram 4.6) 
Dampers are installed in the air inlet and the outlet to the F.D fans to control the airflow. 
They are of the narrow multi-louvre type. Power operators are provided on the F. D fan discharge 
dampers and on the six sets of combustion air control dampers. Manual isolating dampers are 
fitted to the air and gas outlets of the air pre-heaters . 
The soot hoppers are located in the gas flues before and after the air pre heaters. The 
hoppers are equ ipped w ith flanged outlets for soot disposal. 
The two runs of ductwork upstream of the wind box in the east and west sides of the steam 
generator are each divided into three so that separate combustion air supplies are routed to the 
three horizontal levels of the burners . The airflow for each level of burners is measured by two 
airfoil-measuring elements and is automatically regulated by two control dampers. 
The air is drawn either from outdoors or from a combination of the two sources. Individual 
intakes and supply ducts are provided for each forced draft fan . The intake dampers are operated 
by pneumatic drives from remote manual station located at the operating level. 
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1.1 Forced draft fans 
The two fifty percent capacity centrifugal force draft fans are installed for parallel operation . 
That includes variable inlet control vanes; outlet louver dampers and flexible drive couplings. The 
fans are directly coupled to 1500 hp, 1190 r.p .m electric motor drives. The fan wheels have ten 
backward inclined airfoil blades. The discharge pressure of each fan is automatically controlled , 
the pressure being indexed to the load on the steam generator. The discharge pressure is 
regulated by modulation of the fan inlet vanes . 
The ducts on the outlets of the F.D fans downstream of the outlet dampers are 
interconnected . This permits single fan operation with air flowing through both air per heater and 
being distributed to both ends of the wind box. In the same manner, the combustion air ducts are 
interconnected to the downstream of the air pre heaters. 
1.2 Steam Coil air Heaters 
Steam air heaters are provided to limit air heater cold end corrosion , fouling and to 
preheat combustion air the flue gas air heaters can be put into service. The steam coil air heater 
is fitted in the air duct upstream of each main air pre heater. It consists of circular tubes with 
extended stee l fins , through which the bled steam passes. The arrangement is similar to the 
rad iator. The heater ra ises the temperature of the air entering the main air pre heater. The 
condensate disposal unit consists of steam traps, strainers and by-pass valves. The amount of 
steam fed to the steam coils is automatically regulated and is a function of the arithmetic mean of 
the sum of the main air pre heater gas outlet temperature and air inlet temperature . 
The steam coil air heaters are designed to maintain the flue gas outlet temperature at up 
to 350° F, corrected fo r leakage, over the full load range , with an a ir inlet temperature to the 
steam coils of -7°C (20°F) . 
1.3 Air pre heater (A.H) 
The air pre heaters are used to recover heat from flue gases at temperatures lower than that 
is econom ica lly possible w ith econom izers . It is also helpful to increase the boi ler effic iency. Two 
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continuous regenerative air pre heaters are fitted and operate in parallel. Regenerative means the 
gas flows through a closely packed matrix with consequent increase in matrix temperature and 
subsequently air is passed through the matrix to pick the heat. They are of the vertical flow design 
with the air for combustion entering at the bottom , passing upward through the heating surfaces 
and discharging at the top into the hot air ducts. The hot flue gas enters at the top , and counter 
flows to the air and exhausts down wards by natural draft to the stack. 
The mild steel rotor is the central part of the air heater and contains the heat transfer matrix. 
Radial plates extending from the hub divide the rotor into 24 sectors , which in turn are subdivided 
at the hot and intermediate end element containers . At the cold end of the rotor, grids welded 
between the radial divisions allow the sideways removal of the cold end elements without 
disturbing the upper tiers . The weight of the rotor is carried on the underside by a spherical roller 
thrust bearing , whilst at the top , radial loads are resisted by a spherical roller guide bearing . 
The heating surface area of each air pre heater is 4534 m2 made up of two layers of heating 
elements. The hot end layer is 81 .28 em and cold end layer is 30.48 em and the latter being 
made of corrosion resistant enameled steel. The cold end layer is mounted on baskets for side 
removal. 
1.4 Air flow control system 
This system controls the airflow and integrated with boiler master control , combustion 
control , firing ration control and forced draft damper control systems. 
1.5 Flue gas system 
Oil and air after combustion with in the furnace reaches the chimney through ducts. Heat 
is extracted from the gases in various stages. The outlet temperature of the heat recovery steam 
generator is limited to 140 oc to avoid low-temperature corrosion . During combustion the major 
constituents of the oil are converted to carbon dioxide, and water vapour, nitrogen and oxygen . 
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2. Fuel oil system 
A fuel oil system is used to supply heavy oil for burning and the whole system is designed to 
serve the following purposes. 1. To keep the oil in the storage tanks at a temperature at which it 
will flow by gravity into the transfer pump. 2. To raise the oil to a temperature which will give a 
viscosity that is suitable for atomizing into a spray at the burners . 3. To raise the pressure of the 
oil to that necessary to give efficient burner atomization over a specified load range . It has the 
following subsystems: heavy oil system , light oil system and fuel additive system. 
2.1 Heavy oil system 
This system provides and prepares the heavy oil for burning in the boiler furnace. The oil is 
drawn from the fuel oil storage tank farm . The oil is drawn through the suction header and 
transmitted to the day tank. It is fed from the day tank farm to the day tank by gravity . It is then 
drawn from the day tank, heated to the required temperature by the unit pumping and heating 
equipment for atomizing and burning, and discharged at a constant pressure and temperature to 
the unit main fuel oil burner header. [Refer to flow diagram 4.7] 
2.1.1 Fuel oil forwarding system 
The fuel oil is transferred to the oil tanks through pipelines from the ship this is called the fuel 
oil transfer system . The two oil tanks located in the farm have the same capacity of 33,710 m3 
each . Each storage tank has two suction heaters for raising the temperature of the oil as it is 
discharged from the tank. The heating medium is low-pressure steam from the auxiliary steam 
system. A self-contained temperature-regulating valve is provided with each suction heater. This 
is installed in the heater steam supply line with the temperature-sensing bulb located in the heater 
oil outlet piping . A steam trap on the steam outlet from the suction heater discharges the 
condensate to waste. 
In addition, two immersion-type steam heaters are provided for adding heat to the oil stored 
in the tank. The steam flow is regulated manually and, as with the suction heaters, the 
condensate is discharged through traps to waste . The oil supply to the day tank after raising the 
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temperature is called the fuel oil forwarding system. Oil level transmitters are installed for local 
and remote monitoring of the oil level in the tank. 
2.1.2 Fuel oil supply system from day tank to burners 
The fuel oil flows by gravity to the inlets of the fuel oil supply pumps on each unit. The fuel oil 
consumption in unit three is 10.08 kg/s . The two one hundred capacity positive displacement type 
fuel pumps are provided, each having a duplex basket strainer fitted to its suction piping . A 
differential pressure switch to alert the control room operator to abnormally high conditions 
monitors the pressure drop across the strainers. The suction oil temperature is indicated locally 
and inputted to the data logger. A by-pass is provided for uninterrupted oil supply. The discharge 
pressure is maintained at approximately 2068 kPa by pneumatic backpressure control system , 
which returns excess oil to the day tank. A pressure relief valve is fitted to the discharge piping of 
each fuel pump, upstream of the isolating valve, to prevent over pressuring . The temperature of 
the oil leaving the fuel oil heaters is 99° C and the viscosity will normally be between 125 and 130 
SSU. Both viscosity and temperature are required for correct operation of oil burners; it is 
measured and controlled using a controller system. 
Two arrangements have been provided under the control of the burner automation system for 
re-circulating oil to bring the piping systems up to operating temperature. The main supply route 
returns the oil to the day tank from the point on the 4" supply header immediately upstream of the 
main fuel oil trip valve FV-3292 through the re-circulation valve FV-3292. FV-3292 closes when 
FV-3281 is opened and opens when FV-3281 is closed. Upon opening FV-3281 , the fuel oil flows 
to the headers at the three horizontal levels of burners through the minimum header pressure 
valves FV- 3200 A , B and C up to the inlets of the header level trip valves BV-3200 A , B and C. 
The opening of any of these header trip valves will automatically open their associated header re-
circulation valve (FV-3250 A , B and C) allowing oil to flow through the t)eader and return to the 
fuel oil day tank. The quantity of oil re-circulated from each level header is regulated at 
approximately 0.63 kg/s by an orifice plate (F0-3200A, B and C) , located on the discharge of the 
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header re-circulat ion . The valve automatically closes upon the successful lighting of the first 
burner on that level. 
The steam generator has nine burners mounted on the front wall of the furnace section . The 
burners are arranged in three levels of three and the control of the reheat steam temperature is 
obtained by rationing the heat input to the furnace between these three levels of burners. This 
requires separate combustion control equipment for each oil supply level header, the equipment 
for each level being identical. This consists of a fuel oil supply control valve (FV-3200A, B or C) , 
with a minimum pressure control valve (FV- 3200A, B or C) piped in parallel , and a positive 
displacement type flow transmitter (FIT -3200A, B or C) . A drain is piped from the body of the 
transmitter, before the internal flow measuring components , to prevent build up sediment. The 
drain valve is normally cracked open. 
The minimum pressure regulator (PV-3200A, B or C) on each level header is a local 
pneumatic control loop with the pressure control mounted on the control valve . The controller is 
set to maintain the pressure downstream of the control valves FV-3200A, B or C at a minimum of 
358kPa approximately, with all burners on the level lit. The final pressure setting is to be 
determined in the field to suit proper oil burner operation . The automatic burner control system 
provides for safe, remote operation and management of the oil burners and the associated 
equ 1pment. The system is electronic but utilizes pneumatic actuators on the fuel oil trip and 
burner valves . These valves are two position types being either fully closed or fully open. Two 
limit switches are fitted to each valve to monitor closed and open positions. 
A hydraulic accumulator is installed in the main fuel oil supply header upstream of the main 
trip valve to prevent unacceptably high pressure surges in the upstream piping and equipment 
when this valve trips to the closed position . 
2.2 Light oil system 
The light oil system has been furnished to permit lighting of the system generator from a 
black start when atomizing steam is not available for firing with no .6 fuel oil. The light oil is piped 
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to the bottom level of three burners only . The air is supplied from the service air system and is 
used in the burners as the atomizing medium and as purging on burners during shutdown , when 
steam is rising with light oil. The light oil for un it three is supplied from the existing light oil storage 
tank ; the supp ly piping is connected in parallel to the suctions of the oil pumps for unit three and 
other units. The connection for unit three is taken form the unit two light oil suction header and is 
a 2" d iameter pipe. [Refer to flow diagram 4.8] 
The light oil pumping set consists of two one hundred capacity positive displacement pumps, 
each which is fitted with a simplex basket strainer. A safety relief valve is fitted to the discharge of 
each pump to prevent damage by overpressure. The discharged oil returns to the light oil storage 
tank. A check valve is also furnished at the discharge from each pump to prevent back flow 
through the stand-by pump when the isolating valve is open. The discharge pressure from the 
pump is held at a nominal 1034 kPa by a self contained back pressure regulating valve PCV-
3324 which relieves excess pressure by draining oil back to the light oil storage tank. The stand 
by pump is started automatically if the running pump is unable to maintain the discharge header 
pressure . Pressure gauges are fitted at the inlet and outlet of each simplex basket strainer, at 
each pump d ischarge and on the common discharge header. A 1" supply header connects the 
pumping set discharge to the bottom level of three burners. An automatic trip valve BV-3341 and 
a remote manually operated control valve FV-3343 are installed in the header. The control room 
operator uses the control valve to regulate the flow of oil. An indication of header pressure is 
provided to assist the operator making adjustments. A 1" re-circulat ion line routes the light oil 
form the header at the burner front back to the light oil storage tank. Isolation is performed by the 
manually operated gate valve LF-V513 that must be closed when the burners are operating on 
light oil. 
2.3 Fuel additive system 
There are three distinct problems in steam boilers from the use of fuels containing high levels 
of contaminants and sulfur such as the following : super heater and water wall deposits and 
99 
corros ion , cold end corrosion from sulfuric acid , and emissions. Deposits on the super heater 
tubes and water walls are derived from vanadium , lead, sodium and calcium in the fuel. These 
deposits can be modified and/or eliminated by treatment with magnesium oxide or magnesium 
hydroxide slurries. [Refer to flow diagram 4.9) 
The system has a storage tank , positive displacement pump and interconnecting piping . The 
pumps are pneumatically controlled . The control signal to each pump is the total heavy fuel oil 
flow to the burners of the associated steam generator. The pump is therefore set up to proportion 
the correct amount of additive at all steam generator operating loads. The unit has separate 
regulating systems and fuel o il supply headers for each of the three horizontal levels of burners. 
The additive is piped to each header immediately upstream of the header trip valve . A manual 
isolating va!ve is installed on the additive piping at the connection to the fuel oil supply header. A 
check valve is also fitted to prevent heavy fuel oil from entering the additive system. 
2.4 Firing ratio control system 
The firing ratio control system distributes the master demand signal from the boiler 
master to the individual burner elevations in the proportions determined by the reheat demand 
signal. Maximum and minimum fuel flow limits determined by the number of burners in service 
prevent the demand of the burners from exceeding their capacities . 
2.5 Fuel oil temperature control 
The fuel oil temperature control system provides for proportional plus integral control of the fuel 
oil temperature . The set point is adjustable form the miscellaneous instruments panel. 
Temperature control accuracy is improved by indexing the loop to the fuel oil total flow signal from 
the combustion control system. Controlling the steam supply to the fuel oil heater coil controls fuel 
oil temperature. Provision is also made for measuring and indicating the fuel oil viscosity . 
2.6 Burner management 
The function of burner management is to start up and shut down burners as required as a 
function of boiler load. 
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3 Turbine 
The steam turbine generator changes the stored thermal energy of steam into kinetic 
energy and then into electrical energy. Thermal energy is changed into kinetic energy by 
expanding the steam through stationary nozzle vanes and rotating blades in the High Pressure 
(HP), Intermediate Pressure (IP) , and Low-Pressure (LP) turbines . The stationary nozzle vanes 
direct and turn the steam into rotating blades so that the rotating blades develop a torque on the 
turbine shaft. 
Super heated and re-heat steam temperature is 538° C for the oil fired plant, on account 
of the increased risk of super heater and re-heater corrosion , that can occur with oil firing . Steam 
temperature is limited for reasons for both boiler and turbine design ; above 566° C , a rapid fall off 
in the creep strength of ferrite steels occurs, together with increased oxidation and sealing. 
As the speed or rotation is fixed by the electrical frequency , the highest possible speed 
with electrica l system is 60 rotations/second (3600 rotations/minute) . The Unit 3 Hitachi turbine 
uses one double flow HP turbine, one double flow IP turbine and one double flow LP turbine to 
suppl y the torq ue needed to drive the exciter generator system. During normal operation , two 
forces are exerted on the rotor by the expansion of steam through the turbine blading . One force 
produces the torque to turn the rotor; the other forces exert axial thrust on the rotor. The axial 
thrust is essentially balance by opposing sections of blading . The unbalanced portion of the thrust 
is restrained by the thrust bearing. 
The generator consists of a rotating field winding that develops a strong magnetic field , 
and a stationary armature winding in which the output power is produced . Since the magnetic 
f1eld 1s rotat ing , it causes alternating current (AC) voltage to be induced into three phase winding 
of the generator stator. When current is drawn from the generator stator, magnetic forces within 
the generator provide a braking action or drag on the generator rotor. This drag counteracts and 
absorbs the rotationa l torque produced by the turbine . In this way , the torque of the turb ine is 
converted into the electrical power. 
101 
The brush less exciter at one end of the rotating system supplies field current, or 
excitation for the generator. Kinetic energy from the rotor is changed to electrical energy by a 
permanent magnet generator. The regulator uses this electrical energy to supply current to the 
stationary field of the exciter. The exciter is an AC electrical generator whose output can be 
controlled by adjusting the field current supplied . The rotating armature of the exciter takes 
energy from the rotating shaft and supplies AC electrical power to a rotating rectifier. The rectifier 
changes the AC power to direct current (DC) power. The DC power is applied to the field winding 
of the generator through conductors in the center of the rotors . 
3.1 Main steam, re-heat and turbine drain system 
Main steam from the boiler super heater outlet is fed to the turbine via the main steam 
pipmg system. turbine stop and control valves (governor) valves . The superheated steam after 
expanding through the high-pressure turbine is returned to the re-heater section through the cold 
re-heat piping system. The steam is re-heated again in the re-heater section and returned to the 
intermediate pressure section of the turbine through the hot reheat piping system and combined 
reheat stop and intercept valves . Expansion continues uninterrupted through the intermediate 
pressure section and the low-pressure section turbines before finally exhausting into the 
condenser. 
The turbine normally requires a constant pressure of 12,410 kPa at the control valves at a 
maximum steam temperature of 538°C. Main steam temperature is controlled within the boiler by 
means of spray attemperation between the primary and secondary super heater. The 538°C full 
steam temperature cannot be attained under normal conditions until the load on the unit reaches 
approximately 75% of the steam. The steam temperature is regulated to give a maximum of 
540.6°C at both super heater and re-heater outlets. [Refer to flow diagram 4.1 0] 
The boiler combustion control system controls the firing rate to maintain a constant 
pressure of 12,410 kPa at the throttle, the pressure being sensed by a pressure transmitter on the 
main steam pipe to each turbine stop valve. Steam exhausting from the high-pressure turbine is 
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at a temperature of 316°C to 371°C and returns to the boiler to be reheated to 538°C before 
passing to the intermediate pressure turbine . Reheat steam temperature is controlled by variable 
rate firing on the three burner levels, and in emergency by spray attemperation, a pipeline spray 
attemperator is located in the cold re-heat piping for this purpose. 
A motorized boiler stop valve is utilized in the main steam piping for isolating the boiler 
during steam rising or for emergency use and can be operated from either the control room or 
locally at the va lve . The stop valve is furnished with a motorized by-pass, which is opened to 
facilitate main steam pipe warming and to reduce pressure differential across the stop valve when 
opened. A 2" main steam pipe drain with tandem manual drain valve is provided immediately 
upstream of the boiler stop valve and discharges to the boiler blow down tank. Downstream of the 
boiler stop valve, three drain lines are provided at low points in the main steam piping system. 
One 2" drain line located immediately downstream of the stop valve is fitted with tandem valves 
and drains can be directed to either the boiler blow down tank or the start-up de-super heater, 
each line being fitted with motorized isolating valves. The other pair of drain lines drains the main 
steam legs before the turbine stop valves . These drain lines are similarly equipped with tandem 
dra in vales , one being motorized . One additional 2" connection is provided downstream of the 
boiler stop valve which facilitates a supply of live steam to the turbine gland steam regulator 
during start-up or emergency make-up conditions. Draining to the boiler blow down tank means 
that the condensate is lost to the station drain . Draining to the start-up de-super heater permits 
recovery of the condensate by cooling of the steam and subsequent condensation of the drains in 
the condenser. 
Drains are also provided above and below the turbine main steam stop valve seats. The 
above seat drain from each of the two stop vales is attached to the common pipe beyond the 
tandem drain valves in each line and led to the boiler blow down tank. The below seat drains are 
similarly attached to the common pipe after the drain vales but are run to the condenser flash 
tan k . The vacuum in the flash tank provides the pressure differential necessary to ensure 
adequate blowing of the below seat drains at turbine start-up. 
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Piping drains are also provided on the cold reheat piping at the lowest point. These 
drains are led to the condenser flash tank through the orifice plates. The two turbines reheat 
combined stop and intercept valves are likewise fitted with above and below seat drains. The 
above seat drains which act as hot reheat piping drain points are led to the condenser flash tank 
via orifice plates . The below seat drains similarly are fed to the condenser flash tank but without 
the need for orifice plates . All motorized drain valves in the main steam and hot and cold re-heat 
piping are normally controlled from the centra l control room desk but local electrical or manual 
operation is also provided. 
Although the turbine leak-off steam blow down valve is automatically operated as a 
feature of the turbine protection system it is appropriate that reference be made to it in this 
section as an item in the turbine drains system. The blow down valve is provided to prevent 
possible over speeding of the turbine when venting the gland space between the high pressure 
and intermediate pressure turbine trips unit. When a turbine trip is initiated , the valve exhaust is 
directed to the condenser and is operate automatically. The gland space is vented rapidly by this 
method and the small quantity of steam, although at high temperature , causes no distress to the 
condenser. 
3.2 Rotating system 
The turbine generator has three large rotating shafts , and a small extension shaft at the 
governor end. The rotating parts are bolted together with solid couplings to form a single rotating 
system. There are totally six bearings supports the rotor, five journal bearings and , one thrust 
bearing . 
Two journal bearings support the HP and IP rotors. The other two supports the LP rotor. 
One thrust bearing is in between the HP, IP and LP turbines supports the rotating system with in 
the turbine casings in the axial direction . The axial expansion of the rotor system takes place from 
the thrust bearing and extends towards the generator end and towards governor end of the 
system . The generator conta ins two beari ngs one at the turbine end and the other at the collector 
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end . The major components on the exciter rotor are the permanent magnets, the armature of the 
AC exciter and a rotating rectifier wheel. 
3.2.1 Turbine rotor 
The rotor body is made from a solid alloy steel forging . Each rotor body is machined 
carefully to form a solid rotor composed of shaft, wheels, bearing journals and coupling flange . 
The formed wheels are machined to receive the dovetails of the buckets. 
3.2.2 Moving blades 
The moving blades are made from a chrome-iron alloy that is extremely resistant to 
corrosion and erosion by steam. They are machined from bar stock and are dovetailed to the 
wheel rims by a tight machine fit. Nozzle partitions are machined from a solid chrome-iron alloy 
and are incorporated into the diaphragm by either a welding or a cast-in process. In the high-
pressure end of the turbine , we lded type nozzle diaphragms are used . In the low-pressure end 
cast in type diaphragms are used . 
3.2.3 Bearings 
The main bearings are of self-aligning type , spherical seated , and pressure lubricated . The 
bearing casings are made from cast iron or cast steel and are lined with high grade, tin-base 
babbit. Seals are provided to prevent oil or vapor entering into the bearing . 
The axial portion of the rotor is maintained by the thrust bearing that is located on the 
rotor immediately in front of the turbine bearing . The tapered land thrust bearing consists of a 
rotat ing thrust collar on the turb ine shaft, which provides the front and back faces of the bearing , 
and two stationary thrust plates . These plates are supported in a casing , in order, that may be 
positioned against the rotating faces of the collar. 
Gland packing minimizes the clearance between the rotating and stationary elements of 
the turbine . All the shaft packing are of the metallic labyrinth type. Spring packed , segmented 
packing rings are fastened in the bore of the high-pressure casing . These rings are machined 
w ith a lternate high and low teeth that are fitted with minimum clearance into matching groove, cut 
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directly into the turbine rotor. The small clearance and the resistance offered by this series of high 
and low-teeth construction restricts steam flow to a minimum. 
3.2.4 Speed Governor 
The function of speed governor is to control speed of turbine when starting up and 
synchronizing, and to change the load after synchronizing by positioning control valves. The main 
speed governor also positions both intercept valves through a dashpot linkage connected to its 
speed relay that acts upon the intercept valve relay operating mechanism. The mechanism is 
adjusted to operate the intercept valves in a definite relation to the control valves. 
3.2.5 Turning gear 
The motor driven turning gear with its driving motor is mounted on the turbine bearing 
cover. The motor drive is transmitted through a silent chain and a reducing gear train to the 
turbine shaft. The primary function of the turning gear is to rotate the turbine generator shaft 
slowly and continuously during shutdown periods when rotor temperature changes occur. During 
shutdowns, the turning gear is used to keep the rotor revolving continuously until the temperature 
changes has stopped and casing become cool , so that the possibility of distortion is practically 
eliminated . Apart for this , the turning gear may be used to jack the rotor over small amounts at 
desired intervals for inspection . 
3.3 Stationary system 
The turbine cast-steel casing, with its integral steam chest, is particularly adapted for high 
pressure and high temperature operation . The casing halves are symmetrical, relatively uniform 
in thickness and have circumferential extraction passage ways. The turbine casing is holed to the 
front-bearing standard , and four radial keys maintain alignment. This arrangement allows the 
casing to expand and contract in all directions without disturbing the centerline alignment. The 
turbine end standard moves forward when the turbine expands. 
At the low-pressure end , the casing is bolted to the exhaust casing, which is splited at the 
horizontal centerline to permit disassembly and ·inspection . The joint flange surfaces are 
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machined to give full metal-to-metal contact. Steam tightness at these joints is obtained by co-
coordinated flange bolt design . 
3.4 Oil pumping system 
The main oil pump that is centrifugal pump mounted on the turbine shaft supplies oil to 
the hydraulic mechanism and bearings. Oil discharging from the main pump at about 14 kg/cm 2 is 
piped to hydraulic header and the individual feed lines branch off from this header, to supply oil to 
the governing and central mechanism. 
The motor driven oil pump is an auxiliary pump of the main pumping system, which 
supplies operating and lubricating oil. The pump is a centrifugal type , with a single impeller, and is 
normally driven by vertical induction motor. The pump is primarily used during starting and 
shutting down of the main turbine , when the turbine is below rated speed and the main pump is 
ineffective. 
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4 Generator 
The unit three generator is manufactured by Hitachi Ltd. , which is a continuous rating , 
three phase, 60 Hz frequency, 16,000 volts , 3,600 rpm, 2 pole, double star connected and , with B 
class msulation to generate 150 MW power. The generator is totally enclosed , self-ventilated , 
forced lubricated, direct hydrogen cooled and the solid cylindrical rotor machine. The generator 
casing is substantially cylindrical in shape and of welded construction . The end shields at either 
end of the casing are also of welded construction and support rotor bearings and shaft seals. The 
all welded construction provides a hydrogen tight enclosure . The generator casing supports the 
stationary armature. The generator is designed for continuous operation and is constructed to 
withstand suddenly applied loads or three-phase short circuit. The generator auxiliaries provide 
control and/or supervision of the hydrogen pressure and purity, shaft seal oil , and temperature of 
windings, cooling gas, cooling water and lubricating oil. 
4.1 Stator frame 
The stator frame consists of a gas tight cylindrical casing of welded plate construction , 
reinforced internally with axial and circumferential plates . The stator frame is supported from the 
foundation by feet bolted to the sides of the frame. Heavy end shi~lds, which contain the 
generator rotor bearings , are bolted to the ends of the stator frame . The frame structure also 
serves as the support and enclosure for the gas coolers. 
The armature winding is formed by insulated bars assembled in the stator slots , jointed at 
the ends to form coils , and connected in the proper phase belts by bus rings. Each phase is split 
into group coils , one group lying under each pole. 
The stator bars are composed of insulated copper conductors arranged in the form of 
rectangular bars by the transposition method . 
4.2 Generator terminal plates 
Both the line and neutral term inals are drawn through the term inal plate outs ide of the 
generator casing at the collector side . The terminal plate is made from nonmagnetic steel, welded 
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to the bottom of terminal box of the stator. Drains are located in the terminal plates to prevent 
accumulation of oil or water around the connections . 
4.3 High voltage bushings 
The line and neutral terminals are drawn out through the terminal boards by means of 
gas tight high voltage bushings. These bushings consist of one-piece porcelain insulators 
containing a copper conductor and silver plate. Terminal studs are provided at each end of the 
bushings for making connections . 
4.4 Ventilation of stator 
The ventilation of the armature core and windings are accomplished by forcing the 
cooling gas both inwardly and outwardly through the radial ducts present in the core . The 
circumferential plates in the frame at the back of the core, together with the outside wrapper 
plate, form a section that separate the frame into high and low pressure regions through which 
the cooling gases are forced into or discharged from the stator core. The gas supplied and 
discharged from these sections is conveyed through pipe or ducts which direct the cooling gas 
from the fans through the machine and back to the fans through the coolers. 
4.5 Generator rotor 
The rotor is machined from a single alloy steel forging, with longitudinal slots , machined 
radially in the body, contain field coils. Additional slots are machined in the teeth and under the 
coil slots , provide ventilation for the rotor body. The field coils are held in the slots against 
centnfugal force by wedges , both magnetic and non-magnetic types being used to secure proper 
flux distribution. These wedges are individually fitted and driven into dovetail openings machined 
in the rotor slots . The axial fans mounted near the ends of the rotor, draw the gas, and provide 
ventilation for the generator. 
4.6 Field winding and retaining rings 
The field winding has rectangular copper bars formed into coils . Several turns in one pair 
of slots around one pole form a coil. Several coils assembled around each pole to form the 
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winding. The individual turns of the winding are insulated from each other by mica. The coils are 
insulated within the slot wall in the body portion by molded slot liners made from sheet mica, 
asbestos cloth , and glasbestos cloth . The end turns are held in place against centrifugal force by 
heavy retaining rings machined from high strength, heat-treated alloy steel forgings , which are 
shrunk onto the rotor ends. 
4.7 Collector ring 
Excitation current is supplied to the field winding through the collector rings , which are 
connected with the winding through insulated copper bars assembled in the drilled-out center 
bore of the rotor forging. At one end of the connection bars, terminal rods or studs, assembled in 
gas-tight bushings into the radial holes on the rotor shaft, that connects the winding with the bars 
in the other end . Similar studs connect bars with the collector rings. The collector ring consists of 
a pair of grooved steel rings shrunk onto and insulated from the rotor shaft. 
4.8 Brushes and brush holders 
The brushes used in alternator are designed to have a small co-efficient of friction and 
also to have self-lubricating action . Two flexible copper stranded wires , called pigtails, are 
attached to the brush , and a metallic cap is riveted to its head . A plug attached to the tip of a 
helical spring is fastened into the hole of this cap; it presses the brush down in its centerline with 
the 0.67 kg to 0.97 kg pressure towards radial direction with respect to the slip ring. 
The brush is housed within the holder case ; a number of brush holders are attached 
together to a copper bus ring concentrically with the collector ring . The bus ring is divided up into 
two segments, which are clamped together by a clamp fitting. Thus, the bus ring and 
consequently the brushes are attached in a zigzag position to the sliding surface of the collector 
ring; this prevents all of the brushes from sliding over the surface of the collector ring along the 
same path . The cover, which covers the collector rings and the brush holder mechanism, is 
prov1ded w ith the door so that these parts can be inspected easily . 
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4.9 End shields and bearings 
The generator elliptica l bearings, the shaft sealing , the oil supply and drain piping are 
supported and enclosed in the end shields . The end shield is divided horizontally in two halves for 
easy dismantling . The fitting surfaces of these halves, the end shield and the stator frame are 
finished precisely to ensure the close contact between the surfaces, and has grooves in which 
sea l1ng com pound is fill ed to insure the gas tightness. The shaft seal prevents the hydrogen 
leakage through the shaft. 
4.10 Shaft seals 
A shaft seal of the oil film type maintains the airtight seal at the place where the rotor 
shaft passes through the end brackets. Seal rings are made from special metal with an inner 
diameter slightly bigger than the diameter of rotor. These rings are divided into either two or four 
segments and are fastened in the radial and axial directions by garter springs . Although , the rings 
are able to move in the radial direction together with the shaft, they are held in place by the pins 
at the top and bottom of the housing and will not turn around . The sealing oil supplied between 
the seal casing and the rings runs through the inside of the seal rings in the radial direction , and 
between the rings and the shaft in the axial direction . Forming an oil film in these areas prevents 
the gas from leaking outside the alternator along the shaft. 
4.11 Hydrogen coolers 
The hydrogen cooler is guided with rails and supported on the generator casing . The 
hydrogen gas is sealed off by means of gaskets between the casing and tube sheets of the 
cooler. The water feed pipes are connected to the cooler outside the generator and the hydrogen 
coolers can be removed from every unit of the generator casing , if the water feeding pipes and 
gas-tight gaskets are removed 
4.12 Turbine Generator auxiliary cooling system 
The auxiliary cooing system supplies water for generator hydrogen coolers , lubricating oil 
coolers and boiler feed water pumps. The system is completely closed loop with a head tank and 
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two one hundred percent duty electrical driven circulating pumps. The closed loop is filled with 
water and make-up is supplied from the unit reserve feed water system. There are three heat 
exchangers; each of fifty percent capacity dissipates the heat. The cooling water for these heat 
exchangers is supplied from the unit. [Refer to flow diagram 4.11] 
4.13 Hydrogen and carbon dioxide systems 
Carbon dioxide is used to purge the atmospheric air from the generator casing , and to 
provide hydrogen atmosphere. Hydrogen gas is used for cooling the generator co ils . 
5 .13.1 Hydrogen gas system 
Hydrogen gas is supplied from a three banks, each bank consists of sixteen cylinders . 
Each bank of s ixteen cy lmders is connected to a piping manifold and the cylinders discharge the 
gas simultaneously. Two of the banks of cylinders function as supply and stand-by systems. The 
supply bank makes up generator hydrogen losses during normal operation of the generator 
equipment. The stand-by bank is isolated from the system through isolated valves . When the 
pressure in the supply bank falls to approximately 100 psig the stand-by system is ready for 
putting into operation . The two banks are then changed over, with the stand-by becoming the 
supply bank and the depleted bank having its cylinders changed with .charged ones and then 
being put on stand-by. [Refer to flow diagram 4.12] 
The third bank of sixteen cylinders is intended for generator filling during emergency 
supply, if the problem arises with the other two banks of cylinders or with the supply system 
pressure reducing station . Cross over piping and valves have been provided for this purpose. The 
quantity of hydrogen required is 250 m 3 at operating pressure 207 kPa and the filling rate is 
approximately 34m3/h . Pressure safety valves on the downstream piping protect the low-pressure 
piping and equipment from being over pressured . The safety valves are set to operate at 830 
kPa . By-pass arrangements are provided to discharge hydrogen to atmosphere. The quantity of 
hydrogen required to pu rge the stator frame is 130 m 3 at stand still and 200 m 3 during running . 
Normally, purging is done when the generator is stopped or on turning gear. If necessary, can be 
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done when the generator is operating . During purging , the generator shaft sealing system must 
be in operation . 
A single bank of six carbon dioxide cylinders discharge gas into common 1" pipe 
manifold . The pressure in the cylinders at fully charged condition is 5720 kPa. Safety valves and 
by-pass valves are fitted to ensure protection for the system . 
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5 Condenser 
The ultimate heat sink for a large thermal power station is the atmosphere. There are various 
options available that use different processes to achieve the most effective heat sink and 
therefore meet the requirements of the condensing plant and cooling water system. After the 
steam has surrendered its useful heat to the turbine, it passes to the condenser. Holyrood 
thermal power units are incorporated with the closed cycle system and have a condensing plant 
and cooling water system. In order to operate an efficient closed cycle , the condensing plant, 
cooling water system , and associated pumps must extract the maximum quantity of heat from the 
exhaust steam of the low-pressure turbine. The primary functions of the condensing plant are: 
• To provide the lowest economic heat rejection temperature for the steam cycle . 
• To convert the exhaust steam into water and , for re-use the water in the feed water 
cycle . 
• To collect useful residual heat from the drains of the turbine feed heating plant and , 
other auxiliaries. 
The aim of the cooling water system is to maintain a supply-cooling medium to extract 
necessary heat to meet the condensing plant objectives. In order to fulfill the functional 
requirements , the system has cooling water pumps, circulating water pumps and air extraction 
pumps. The entire system is called as heated water system. The cooling water is supplied to the 
condenser from the sea and the heated water from the condenser outlet is discharged to the sea. 
The condenser is designed and supplied by Foster Wheeler Ltd . The condenser shell forms 
the boundary of the steam envelope. The type of the condenser is the M-single type and has a 
surface area of 57 ,670 square feet. The condenser has 7,410 tubes of one inch outside diameter 
and the effective length is 29 feet. The different subsystems are discussed in the following 
sections. 
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5.1 Circulating water system 
The circulating water system supplies the cooling water required for the turbine generator 
condenser, generator hydrogen coolers , turbo-generator lubricating oil coolers, general service 
water heat exchangers and the mechanical vacuum pump heat exchangers. 
The circulating water is seawater, drawn at the pump house. The pump house has two-mixed 
flow vertical c irculating water pumps , two dual flow-traveling screens, and the associated screen 
wash pumps. The seawater passes through the trash racks into the screen fro screening and 
pumped to the condenser. 
The condenser is designed to produce a rated vacuum with two cooling water pumps 
running at a seawater temperature of 5.6°C. One circulating water pump would be enough during 
the winter months because of the lower seawater temperature. Both the pumps may be required 
during the summer and maximum seawater temperature conditions, as one pump will only be 
sufficient for approximately 65% load under these conditions . However, Ferrous Sulphate dosing 
is essential for the protection of the condenser tubes from seawater corrosion . In addition, the 
condenser water boxes are fitted with zinc sacrificial anodes for the further protection of the wind 
boxes and tube ends from corrosion . The circulating water system flow is initiated by manually 
starting the circulating water pumps. Screen operation is only affected by either of the following 
conditions. [Refer to flow diagram 4.13] 
Pressure differential across the screens 
The allowable differential pressure is 10 em of water across the screens during the operation . 
When the differential pressure reaches 15.25 em, a pneumatic rubber bubbler system energizes 
the screen wash pump motor. Two one hundred percent duty pumps are provided- one normally 
on stand by. If one pump is unable to attain the required discharge pressure of 525 kPa the other 
automatically starts. The wash water pumps draw water from the main circulating water pump 
discharge via strainers and operate only when both circulating water pump and the screen are in 
operation . 
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Twenty-four hour timer. 
A continuously running adjustable twenty-four hour timer starts screen operation as described 
above for a period of time and repeats the cycle at set intervals. The initial timing is set for 15 
minutes operation after every 4 hours of non-operation . This sequence takes place regardless of 
the pressure differential as long as there is a minimum pressure of 14 kPa in the screen wash 
water pump suction line. In either case , the screen continues to run for 1.25 revolutions after the 
signal to stop is given in order to ensure that all screen panels are cleared of debris. 
Motorized butterfly valves are provided for each main circulating water pump discharge. These 
valves are interlocked with the pump and are fully automatic in operation. The cooling water flows 
to the main condenser and the auxiliary cooling system circuits . These are two 36" diameter 
connections . one to each inlet of the divided water box condenser and an 18" diameter branch 
connection to the unit auxiliary cooling circuits . These valves are fitted on the condenser outlet 
piping for flow control , balancing purposes and for condenser backwash purposes . Valve controls 
and position indicators for these valves are located in the plant central room . After passing 
through the condenser and auxiliary cooling system circuits, the seawater leaves the powerhouse 
and flows through underground reinforced concrete piping to the sea. 
5.2 Amertap tube cleaning system and condenser backwashing 
Condenser heat transfer efficiency can be maintained by cleaning the condenser tubes 
and back washing . The Amertap Washing System is designed for continuous mechanical 
cleaning of the condenser tubes thus aiding significantly in maintaining heat transfer efficiency. 
Also , backwashing frequency will be minimized with the use of the cleaning system. 
The cleaning system uses specially designed rubber balls that constantly circulate 
through the system. The constant rubbing action keeps the tube walls clean and free from 
deposits such as bio fouling , sediment, corrosion products and scaling . The balls are circulated in 
a closed loop and utilize the pressure drop across the condenser to force the balls through the 
tubes . The system equipment consists of a ball re-circulating pump, ball collector, ball injection 
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nozzles and strainer sections incorporated in the cooing water discharge legs. The strainer 
section consists of upper and lower screen sections arranged in 'V' formation for collection of the 
balls and re-circulate to the pump suction . The strainer sections are fitted with differential 
pressure switches, which monitor the differential pressure across the upper screen sections . The 
backwash alarm is initiated at 10 inches of water differential and emergency backwash alarm at 
50 .5-cm . The complete back washing is recommended to remove sludge etc. from the water 
boxes 
Back washing operation is semi-automatic, the condenser inlet and the outlet valves are 
motorized , as have the inlet/outlet water backwash valves and the return water box-
interconnecting valve. A control unit located in the control room performs the opening and closing 
of various cooling water valves in sequence automatically. An illuminated mimic panel is provided 
in the control room to indicate the status of the seven valves involved at any time during the 
backwash operation . There is a provision for operating the seven motorized valves locally from a 
control panel located alongside the condenser. When switched to local position , each valve may 
be operated individually by push buttons on the panel. In addition each valve is fitted with a chain 
wheel for manual operation if requ ired . 
5.3 Condenser air extraction 
The condenser air extraction system consists of two 100% duty air extraction pumps, which 
removes air and , incondensable gases that are present in the steam exhausting from the turbine. 
The presence of air and incondensable gases must be removed from the condenser because that 
impairs the vacuum and heat transfer capability of the condenser. The air extraction pumps, 
located at the west end of the condenser, maintain vacuum in the condenser by drawing off air 
and incondensable which collect at the center of the tube bundles. The condenser is the divided 
water box design , two 8-inch piping connections are provided on the condenser shell , one per 
side , and these are connected together with a common pipe, for the air extraction pump section . 
[Refer to flow diagram 4.14] 
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The air extraction pumps perform two functions : 
1. Rapid removal of air from the condenser, turbine and other steam spaces during vacuum 
raising on the turbine generator or "hogging" as it is commonly known . A vacuum of at least 50 .8 
em Hg must be obtained before the steam is admitted to the turbine. 
2 . Maintaining the design vacuum or "holding" under normal operating conditions. 
The pumps are liquid ring type manufactured by Siemens A.G. Although a single stage impeller is 
used . the pumps perform both hogging and holding operations by virtue of a specially design 
discharge port. The water forming the liquid ring within the pump is cooled in a heat exchanger by 
seawater from the circulating water system. Make-up water for the liquid ring is supplied from a 
tank integral with the air exhauster package. The hogging capacity time required for evacuating , 
623m3 of gases from atmospheric to 25.4 em Hg absolute is 15 minutes. The holding capacity 
0.44m 3/minute at 2.54 em Hg . absolute , with 18.3°C cooling water and , 0.64m3/minute , with 1. rc 
cooling water. A vacuum breaker valve is installed in the condenser air extraction line to control 
the speed of the turbine, when it is off-loaded. The valve is motor operated, and can be opened 
from the control desk. An air filter is installed on the upstream side of the valve to prevent the 
ingress of dust when the valve is opened . 
5.4 Turbine-Generator auxiliaries and boiler feed pump cooling system 
The auxiliary cooling system supplies coolant for the turbine-generator hydrogen coolers , 
lubricating oil coolers, and feed water pumps. The system is completely closed loop with a head 
tank and two 100% duty, electrically driven circulating pumps. The pump circulates coolant 
through auxiliary heat exchangers on the shell side, then around two separate piping loops, one 
feeding the generator hydrogen coolers and returning to the pump suction , the other loop feeding 
the boiler feed pumps and the turbine generator lubricating oil coolers then returning to the pump 
suction . It is completely filled with treated condensate and the make-up from the unit reserve feed 
water system . The heat is dissipated from the system by three heat exchangers , each of 50% 
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capacity. These are supplied with cooling water from the unit main circulating system. They are of 
the horizontal straight tube type fitted with quick opening doors for cleaning purposes. 
5.5 General service cooling water system 
The general service water system is designed to conserve raw water. The system 
provides cooling water for the following equipment: air compressors , control room air 
conditioners, excitation room air conditioner, condensation extraction pump motors, high pressure 
heater drain pump seals, forced draft fan bearing cooing, main air pre heaters, water and steam 
sample cooling station , and local grab sample station . 
The service water is chemically treated clarified water and is circulated through the system by 
two 100% duty horizontal centrifugal pumps of 12.62 liters/second nominal capacity .. The storage 
tank, acts as a head tank to the service water system and is connected to the general service 
water pump suction . In the event that either pumps or both heat exchangers are out of service, 
the closed system can revert to the open system. Make-up water to the service water tank is 
supplied from the water treatment plant. 
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6 Feed water system 
The feed heating system associated with a turbine provides the means by which the steam 
condensed in the main condenser is fed to the boiler. It is also used to heat the feed water with 
the use of series of heat exchangers as demanded by the cycle design . 
6.1 Functions of feed water system 
1. Provides the required amount of feed water to the boiler at a temperature dictated by the cycle 
design . 
2. Maintains stable suction regime for the boiler feed pumps. 
3. Contains a buffer store for the water to allow for a short-term mismatch between the boiler 
demand and the available feed water. 
4. In the longer term it keeps the water content constant. 
5. Supplies water to the boiler with an acceptable oxygen content. 
6. Automatically cut-off the supply of contaminated feed water to the de-aerator, and to the 
boiler, in the event of, condenser leakage or the chemicals from the polishing plant. 
7. The feed water system contains lot of stored energy ; it protects turbine-generator from over 
speed, during the turbine trip or sudden reduction of speed. 
The system consists of low pressure feed water system ; high pressure feed water system and 
reserve feed water system. 
6.2 Low pressure feed water system 
The low pressure feed system is defined as the heaters and the equipment between the 
outlets of the condenser hot well and the condensate inlet to the de-aerator system. As the name 
implies, the system conveys and progressively heats low-pressure condensate from the 
condenser hot well to the de-aerator storage tank. In addition the condensate is utilized in 
condenser flash box, LP turbine exhaust hood , gland sealing water for the boiler feed pumps and 
as a water supply to the phosphate and hydrazine chemical injection units . [Refer to flow 
diagram 4.15] 
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The system consists of two one hundred percent capacity electrically driven condensate 
extraction pumps, a gland steam condenser, two low-pressure feed water heaters and a tray-type 
de-aerating heater. The system incorporates several features designed to maintain constant 
quantities of condensate in the cycle. The pumps are vertical canister type, draw the condensate 
from the condenser hot well , pumping it progressively, through the gland seal condenser, #1 and 
#2 low pressure heaters , and finally into the de-aerator. 
The gland steam condenser and low-pressure heaters have stainless steel tubes for 
corrosion protection. The de-aerator is equipped with heavy-duty stainless steel trays for 
improved strength and reliability. The de-aerator storage tank contains approximately 81 ,648 kg 
of condensate at normal operating level or the enough condensate to supply the boiler feed 
pumps for approximately ten minutes at full load. A pneumatic control valve LV-3528 located 
between the gland seal condenser and #1 low-pressure heater controls condensate admission to 
the de-aerator by maintaining a constant level in the storage tank. An ·.electronic, two-element 
controller LK-3528 operates the valve, which receives input signals from the de-aerator storage 
tank level and feed wa ter flow. 
The operator interface for the controller is located on the control room auxiliary 
instrument panel. Separate level switches are provided on the de-aerator storage tank for high 
and low level alarm annunciation. Additional storage tank level switches are provided to shut 
down the boiler feed pumps and condensate extraction pumps on extremely low and high level 
and to trip the bled steam trip valves. This variation in level is used to control admission of make-
up to, or rejection of surplus condensate from the system . Increasing level in the hot well opens 
the reserve feed water system surplus control valve LV-3501 B and allows condensate to be 
rejected from the low pressure feed water system from a point downstream of the gland steam 
condenser to the high level reserve feed water storage tank. Conversely, a falling level in the hot 
we ll opens the reserve feed water system make-up control valve LV-3501 A which admits water 
to the condenser from the high level feed water storage tank until the hot well level is restored to 
a normal. 
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The con trol output of the hot well level control system is split between these two control 
valves with a dead band at mid range to ensure that only one valve is open at time. A level switch 
fitted on the high level reserve feed water storage tank will trip the make-up motorized isolating 
valve to the closed position in the event of low level in high reserve feed water tank to prevent 
loss of condenser vacuum. The high and low level switches fitted to the condenser hot well 
annunciate abnorm ally high and low levels. The low level switch will also stop the condensate 
extraction pump. 
The control valve FV-3512 is opened to re-circulate the water back. to the condenser during 
the flows to the de-aerator below 28 kg/s that, prevents damage to the condenser extraction 
pump The water levels in the condenser hot well and the de-aerator storage tank are indicated 
on the unit control board in the control room and are inputs to the data logger. The dropping of 
level in the high level reserve feed water tank actuates a control valve which permits water to flow 
from the de-mineralized water storage tanks in the water treatment plant to the condenser hot 
well. This raises the level in the condenser hot well and , as explained above, rising hot well level 
opens the system surplus control valve reserve feed water storage tank thus restoring the level in 
this tank. Spray water from the system is supplied to the LP turbine exhaust hoods and the 
condenser flash box. 
6.3 High pressure feed water system 
The feed water supply for the steam generator originates at the de-aerator; two 
electrically dnven feed pumps each of fifty percent capacity pumps the water. These pumps draw 
feed water directly from the de-aerator storage tank and each is capable of supplying up to 90 
MW load and for excess load the pumps are operated in parallel. The pumps are double case 
horizontal construction ; rated at 75 Lis and coupled to a 3550-rpm , 2350 horsepower and , three-
phase electric induction motor. The pumps discharges water at high pressure through the high -
pressure heaters and then into the economizer inlet of the generating unit. The system 
incorporates a suction valve, a suction strainer and suction flow meters on each boiler feed pump 
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to indicate flow and alert control room operator on pump flow conditions. It also contains 
combination of check and re-circulation valve, main feed water flow meter, spray water flow 
meters, feed water control valves, spray water control valves and Nos. 4 , 5 and 6 high pressure 
feed water heaters , piping and miscellaneous instruments. In addition , the water is supplied to the 
super heater attemperator spray nozzle , the emergency reheat attemperator spray nozzle, the 
auxiliary steam de-super heater, the start-up de-super heater and for feed pump warming . A relief 
valve is fitted between the pump and its associated suction valve to protect the low-pressure 
parts during opening of warming line with the pump suction valve closed . The pump suction valve 
is fitted with a limit switch, which prevents the pump from being started unless the valve is fully 
open. [Refer to flow diagram 4.16] 
The spray water from the boiler feed pump discharge is supplied to super heater and re-
heater atte111perators. The water is required to maintain the super heater steam temperature at 
538° C above approximately 70% load .. On demand for reheat spray water, the controlling valve 
opens and a limi t switch mounted on it actuates block valve , which moves to the fully open 
position . A manually operated drain valve installed between the two control valves is intended for 
periodically testing for block valve leakage. The same source of spray water is used to supply the 
auxiliary steam de-superheating station and start-up de-superheating station . 
Two control valves are provided to regulate the supply of feed water to the steam 
generator economizer. The 3" size valve operates during start-up and is in operation up to 
approximately 25% load. The 1 0" control valve takes over above twenty percent load and that w ill 
be in normal operation . A control system is available for automatic sequencing of opening and 
closing of these valves. The control system is of the three-element type-utilizing signal from boiler 
drum level. The feed water flow nozzle is located on the 1 0" feed water supply header upstream 
of the control valves manifold. 
To permit bypassing of feed water heaters motorized isolating and bypass valves have 
been installed . Individual bypassing has been provided for heater# 6 so , that it can be taken out 
of operation to allow increased operating capacity . The bypass system will also operate 
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automatically if an abnormally high level of condensate is detected in the shell of the heater. The 
heaters 4 and 5 are coupled and are bypassed together. These heaters will also be bypassed if 
high water level is detected . 
6.4 Reserve feed water system 
The reserve feed water system is an essential part of the boiler feed water system. It 
provides storage for large quantities of condensate for normal make up and during emergency 
requirements. It also provides adequate storage to meet boiler start up requirements as large 
quantity of steam is discharged to atmosphere from the super heater, starting vents and from 
other drams. It cons ists of a h1gh level and a low-level storage tank, together with the transfer 
pump, interconnecting pipe work, valve controls and instrumentation . The system supplies make-
up feed water to the condenser or receives surplus condensate from the low pressure feed water 
system. The system also supplies water for chemical feed units, gland sealing system , make-up 
water to the turbine generator auxiliary cooling system head tank and sealing water for the main 
condenser air extraction pumps. (Refer to flow diagram 4.17] 
6.5 Chemical injection system 
Boiler feed water is chemically controlled to prevent corrosion of boiler evaporator 
surfaces, super heaters, re-heaters and turbines. A solution of hydrazine is fed to mix with the 
condensate extraction pumps . This compound has the ability to absorb oxygen with an end 
product of nitrogen and water. This also prevents the increase of boiler water solids and raises 
the pH as well as scavenging oxygen and protects the entire wet portion of the cycle against 
corrosion and iron pick up. (Refer to flow diagram 4.19] 
Morpholine is also used to control pH. This amine is added to the condensate at the 
discharge of the condensate extraction pumps to maintain the proper pH level. When Morpholine 
reaches the boiler it is vaporized with the water and passes along with the steam. It condenses 
with the steam and is therefore effective in maintaining a high pH in all parts of the system. 
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The chemical supply system has solution tanks and two one hundred percent capacity 
positive displacement-metering pumps (One pump is standby) driven at constant speed by 
electric motors. The upstream and downstream of manual isolating valves on the standby pump 
of each system are kept closed until the pump is required to run . Adjusting the calibrated 
eccentric on the speed reducer to alter the length of stroke manually controls the quantity of 
chemical solution discharged by the pumps. The pump operating capacity is 0.247 Lis . and same 
for the both pumps. The dilution water is supplied from the high level reserve feed water storage 
tank. A safety valve and a pressure gauge are fitted to the discharge of each metering pump. 
6.6 Boiler feed pumps Gland sealing water system 
The pumps are fitted with throttle bushings , where the shaft cqmes through the outer 
barrel ends. A seal is required to prevent the escape of hot condensate and to minimize the 
possibility of wear of the shaft in the bushings . The cool condensate serves as a seal. The 
clearance between the shaft and throttle bushing is 0.014" to 0.015" (radial) and there is neither 
conven tional packin g nor a mechan ical seal . The coo ling seal ing water is fed into the throttle 
bushing about two-thirds along its length , nearest to the pump end , and at a pressure of 15 psi , 
above the pump suction pressure . 
Under normal operating conditions the water supply for the boiler feed pump gland seals 
is taken from the L.P feed water system at the discharge of the condensate extraction pumps, 
upstream of the gland seal condenser. The pressure at the inlet to the system is 1725 KPa and if 
the pressure at the inlet fall to 1035 KPa , pressure switch will cause the gland seal water injection 
pump to automatically start and supply water to the system . This pump takes its suction from the 
reserve feed water system . For the correct operation of the gland seals the supply water must be 
mainta ined at a constant pressure of 15 psi above the suction pressure of the pump. The water 
when it drains from the stuffing boxes is collected in the gland seal drain tank from where it is 
pumped to the surface condenser. Level controls are fitted to the tank to maintain a constant 
water level and to alarm on abnormally high and low water levels. 
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6.7 Feed water heaters 
The thermal efficiency of the steam plant cycle is increased by add ing feed water heaters 
and , acts as a heat exchanger that wi ll raise the temperature of the incom ing feed water to a 
specified out let temperatu re, by drawing a predeterm ined amount of steam from the turbine cycle . 
There are three groups of heat exchangers used in the feed system to fulfill this function : 
• High pressure feed water heaters 
• Low pressure feed water heaters 
• De - aerator heaters 
The feed heaters 4 , 5 and 6 are located in the high pressure feed water system and the heaters 
1, and 2 are located in the low pressure feed water system . The low-pressure heaters 1 and 2 are 
closed , U-tube, two-pass type with carbon steel shells and have stainless tubes. 
High and Low pressure feed water heaters 
The high-pressure heaters are closed , U - tube , two pass , horizontal type w ith carbon 
steel shell and tubes . The heaters are manufactured by Foster Wheeler Limited , Canada and 
have three zones to heat the feed water. The condensing zone heats the feed water by removing 
the latent heat. A system of baffles is provided for an even distribution of the steam throughout 
the length of heater. The extraction steam enters through this zone from the steam inlet nozzle 
near the thermal centerline and flows in both directions, directed by evenly spaced baffles . The 
accumulation of non-condensable gases reduces efficiency by decreasing the effective surface 
and cause corrosion . The vent connections , located at the end of the shell provide the means to 
remove non-condensable gases. The sub-cooling zone reduces the temperature of the dra ins, 
leavin g the condensing zone; below th e saturation temperature by transferring heat to the 
entering feed water. The sub-cooling zone is located on the feed water inlet pass and is enclosed 
by wrapper plates. This reduction in temperature reduces the tendency of the drains to flash 
with in the piping while being transferred to the next lower stage. 
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The high-pressure heater, has an integral de-superheating zone , and the enveloping 
wrapper plate encloses the tubes for the second or return tube pass for a given tube length . This 
is an independent section or sub-assembly constructed with a twin-enveloping baffle of all 
welding construction . The de-superheated steam is circulated and spaced to meet the heat 
transfer requirements with a minimum loss of pressure. A steel impingement plate is provided 
beneath the steam inlet nozzle. 
De-aerator feed heater 
The water from the condenser, heated by the low pressure feed heaters, is supplied to 
the de-aerator. The water is further heated and de-aerated; fed to the boilers by the boiler feed 
pump, via the HP feed train. The de-aerators are designed to provide feed water with not more 
than 5 micrograms per kilogram of oxygen. 
The de-aeration is achieved by the application of Henry's Law, which states that the 
quantity of gas dissolved in a given quantity of solution is proportional to the partial pressure of 
that gas over the solution . When this law is applied to the removal of oxygen from feed water, 
where the atmosphere above and around the condensate contains no oxygen, then the dissolved 
oxygen will escape to the atmosphere in attempt to achieve equilibrium . 
The de-aerating heads and tanks are cylindrical pressure vessels, with dished ends 
constructed. of mild steel. The spray nozzles and trays are made of stainless steel to prevent 
corrosion. The spray water distribution system and tray support structure, are made of mild steel 
and the perforated stainless steel trays are supported and held by this structure . The water flows 
through the head where it is heated and de-aerated before it drains to the storage tank. The 
design uses spray nozzles to produce a fine film/spray to maximize the surface area of the water 
available to the steam for heat transfer and to minimize the distance that the oxygen has to travel 
to be released . The residual oxygen is released while the water is further heated as it passes 
over a series of perforated trays, which causes the condensate to fall as continues 'rainfall ' from 
tray to tray. 
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6.8 Turbine extraction steam system 
The bled steam is extracted from the turb ine at different expansion stages. The steam 
from the HP cylinder is utilized for the 6 heater, the extraction point being on the cold reheat line. 
The heaters 3, 4 and 5 are fed from the gth, 1oth, and 1 i h stage extraction points , which are on 
the turbine I P cyl inder. The steam is bled to 1 and 2 heaters from the extraction points on the 14th 
and 16th stages of the double flow low-pressure section of the turbine. The bled steam to the 
heaters is carried in two pipes . An isolating valve is fitted to the bled steam piping for each heater. 
These valves are manually operated except for the one on the # 6 heater bled steam line. A 
power assisted reverse flow check valves are installed in the bled steam piping , to each heater, to 
prevent steam flow reversal to the turbine in the case of emergency trip . A second check valve is 
provided in the bled steam piping to the de-aerator and is installed close to the de-aerating 
heater. Two check valves in series are required because of the large quantity of entrained energy 
contained in the de-aerator storage tank. (Refer to flow diagram 4.19] 
A three-way solenoid valve is installed in the air supply line to each bled steam check 
valve. A liquid level switch actuates solenoid to close the check valve and stop the supply of bled 
steam . when abnormally high condensate level is detected in the shell of the heater. The 
downstream sides of each bled steam check valve is fitted with an automatic drain trap. The traps 
discharge to the condenser flash tank and are installed to prevent the possibility of condensate 
draining back through the bled steam lines to the turbine. In addition , automatic drain traps are 
fitted at the low points in the bled steam piping upstream of the check valves. The temperature , 
flow and pressure conditions of bled steam to each heater are transmitted to control room . 
6.9 Feed water heater drains system 
The bled steam gives up heat to the feed water by condensing in the heaters. The 
condensate levels within the closed heaters are controlled by regulating the quantity of 
condensate d ischarged to the drainage system . The difference in pressure between succeeding 
heaters permits cascading the drains from one heater to the next lowest. The high-pressure 
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heaters 6 ,5 and 4 , when in normal operation , drain from 6 to 5 to 4 and from 4 to the direct 
contact de-aerating heater. The low-pressure heaters 2 and 1, when in normal operation , drain 
from 2 to 1 and from 1 are pumped forward into the low pressure feed water system . In a heater 
6, a higher level than normal will cause the drains to be diverted directly to the de-aerator. If the 
heater level continues to rise to a present high limit, the bled steam supply will be shut off and the 
heater will be automatically by-passed on the high pressure feed waterside. [Refer to flow 
diagram 4.20] 
On raising the level in heater 5, the drains cascading from heater 6 will be shut off. On 
further increase in level to a preset high limit, the bled steam check valves for heaters 5 and 4 will 
close and both heaters will be by-passed on the high pressure feed waterside. On the 
condensate reaching a high level in heater 4 , the drains cascading from heater 6 into heater 5 will 
be shu t-off and the drains from the heater No.4 will be diverted to the condenser. The continued 
increase to the preset high-level limit will cause the bled steam check valves to close and heaters 
4 and 5 to be by-passed on the high pressure feed waterside . 
The low-pressure heater 2 cascades its drains to low-pressure heater 1 when operating 
at the normal water level. The drains will be diverted to the condenser if the level rises to a preset 
level. The continued level increase to a maximum setting will cause the bled steam check valve to 
close. Under normal level conditions and with unit load above thirty percent, the drains from low-
pressure heater 1 are discharged into the low pressure feed water system using one of the two 
one hundred percent capacities drain pumps. To provide more stable conditions for pump 
operation , a drain tank is placed between low-pressure heater 1 and the pump. The condensate 
in the tank is at the same level as the condensate in the heater and the two vessels are 
maintained at the same pressure, both being connected to the same bled steam supply. If the 
water level should not be maintained in the heater as it rises to a preset level , the drains 
cascading from low-pressure heater 2 will be shut off and the dump valve on the drain by-pass 
to the condenser will be open . Further, level increase in low-pressure heater 1 to a preset high 
limit will close the bled steam check valves . Controls are provided for the low-pressure heater 
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drain pumps so that the stand-by pump will automatically start if the running pump were unable to 
maintain pressure . The running pump will trip if the level in the drain tank falls to a minimum low 
setting. 
6.10 Feed water heaters vent system 
The high and low pressure closed type feed water heaters are fitted with both start-up air 
purge vents and continues air vents. The purge vents on the high-pressure heaters discharge into 
a common header, wh ich is connected to the surface condenser. A globe valve on the header is 
motorized and , prior to steam admission , the three heaters are normally purged of air 
simultaneously. Individual motorized air purge vent valves and piping are provided on the low-
pressure heaters. These vent pipes are also taken to the condenser. 
To prevent entrapped air from accumulating between the baffles in the heaters, 
continuous vents are required on each of the high-pressure heaters. The vent cons ists of a 
central tube drilled with holes in different baffle areas. On the discharge piping a flow restricting 
orifice is installed. A normally closed , manually operated by-pass around the orifice plate permits 
a higher rate of venting during testing the heater operation . A common vent header carries the 
continuous vents from H.P heaters 6,5 and 4 to the condenser. 
Connections on the sides of the low-pressure heaters, along the length of the heaters, 
are provided for continuous venting . These vents are fitted with flow restricting orifice plates and 
discharge via a common header to the condenser. A by-pass is fitted around each restricting 
orifice, the normally closed valve being opened when testing heater operation . 
The de-aerating heater vent piping allows the vents to be either taken to the condenser or 
discharged to atmosphere. A safety valve is fitted to the shell of each heater. The high-pressure 
heaters and the de-aerating heater safety rel ief valves vent into a common vent line to the outs ide 
of the boiler house and the condensate from the vents drains to waste. The vents on the 
discharge of the low pressure feed water heater safety valves discharge to the floor drainage 
system . 
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7 Water treatment plant 
The de-mineralized water plant is an integral part of power generation at the Holyrood 
generating station. The water is drawn from Quarry Brook, refined in the water treatment plant 
and enters a continuous water/steam cycle as make-up water. Each time it passes through this 
cycle, it is purified in the condensate polishers. The condensate polisher is located beside the 
condenser, under the turbine. 
There are three main types of impurities in water, ionic and dissolved , nonionic and un-
dissolved and gaseous. These impurities found in water can have various detrimental effects, 
when the water is used in a manufacturing process. The first effect is a scale formation in boiler 
and other heat exchanger equipments. This is a result of hard water and acts as an insulating 
material , preventing heat transfer and causes boiler tube failure through overheating of the tube 
metal walls . The second area of concern is impurities carried over into the steam . The silica 
volatizes under pressure and can deposit on the blades of steam turbines , decreasing their 
efficiency rapidly . The third major area of concern is the corrosion of metal surfaces in contact 
with water and steam , which is the major maintenance expense in the power industry. These 
adverse effects are primarily caused by ion ic impurities in the feed water and are min imized by 
de-mineralizing the water. The demineralization is accomplished through an ion exchange 
process. 
The water treatment process consists of four steps 
a. A pretreatment stage to enhance clarification, 
b. A clarification stage involving settling and filtration , 
c. A demineralization stage, utilizing a strong acid and cation exchanger, a strong base 
anion exchanger, and mixed bed exchanger, 
d. A polishing process on the steam condensate. 
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7.1 Raw water system 
The fresh water from the dam reaches the raw water sump. The water is pumped to the 
clarifier through a control valve from the raw water sump. The suspended un-dissolved matter 
from the water is removed through water clarification that is accomplished by a process of 
coagulation , settling and filtration . The coarse particles of suspended matter settle down , but 
some suspended impurities such as turbidity and color, are finally divided or even colloidal , and 
do not settle readily . Coagulation , induced by adding chemicals to the water, agglomerates the 
finely divided, suspended solids into masses that settle more readily , leaving clarified water. The 
water treatment plant uses a gravier re-activator for clarification of the raw water. Alum is used as 
a coagulant, lime for pH control ; a coagulant aid is used to improve performance. The alum and 
lime are fed in powder form using Wallace and Tiernan dry feeders and the coagulant aid is 
mixed in a tank and fed as a liquid . The plant chemists determine the necessary dosages of these 
three chemicals and feed rate is adjusted . The inlet flow to the clarifier is measured with flow 
totalizer and the rate of chemicals addition is set as a proportion of raw water flow. The inlet flow 
meter is fitted with a mechanism, which initiates the operation of the chemical feeders each time, 
so that, fixed quantity of water has been passed, independent of the rate of flow. 
The graver re-activator is a solid-contact type treatment unit in which, large quantities of re-
circulation precipitates are thoroughly mixed and kept in intimate contact with incoming raw water 
for an extended period of time in the center cone of the re-activator. The ultimate contact between 
the water, treating chemicals , and previously formed precipitates causes the chemical reactions 
to proceed at a rapid rate with a m inimum of treating chemicals . 
The draft tube, and impeller, which is driven by the variable speed drive, is essentially a low 
lift vertical pump. Re-circulating sludge is drawn into the lower draft tube around the bottom of the 
draft tube extension and flows upward through the draft tube and discharges near the top of the 
cone. The raw water and treatment chemicals are introduced into this re-circulating sludge stream 
where they are thoroughly mixed. After leaving the upper draft tube, the water and re-circulating 
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sludge flow downward beneath the cone , where one portion of stream will flow back to the lower 
draft tube for continued re-circulation . The sludge scraper continuously moves precipitates , which 
settle to the floor of the re-activator, to the central sump where they are concentrated and 
periodically blown off to waste. The clarified water in the collector flows by gravity to three dual 
compartment mono valve filters to remove those suspended materials that have not settled down . 
7.2 Mono valve filters 
The mono valve filters are gravity fed sand filters . There are three dual compartment filters 
running in parallel. They contain their own backwash water internally , the backwash is initiated 
automatically on high pressure, and backwashing is implemented by operating a valve . During a 
service run , the incoming water percolates through the filter bed to the false bottom , where the 
Part1lok stra1ners co llect it. The filtered water flows to the backwash compartment from the under 
drain compartment and out to service. The water level in the backwash storage compartment 
remains fixed , while the backpressure increases gradually above the filter bed . This continues 
until the backpressure reaches the predetermined point, usually above 5 feet of water, at that 
point a pressure switch will initiate a backwash . 
When the pressure switch is activated , the PLC activates the control valve for the filter 
compartment with the high backpressure. This causes the water in the back wash compartment 
to flow up through the filter bed , expanding and backwashing the sand bed , and proceeding down 
the tail pipe and into the sump. The water filtering through the other compartment is also used as 
backwash water. 
After filtration , the water flows from the mono valve filters to the clearwell . Modulating the inlet 
flow to the clarifier as detailed in previous sections controls the level in the clearwell . Water is 
drawn off the clearwell by two clarified water pumps, pumped to clarified water storage tank in the 
top of the boiler house, and pumped direct to the inlet of the de-mineralizer plant. The clarified 
water storage tank provides cooling water flow to the general cooling system , and also 
pressurizes and provides large volume storage backup for the fire protection system. 
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7.3 De-mineralizers 
Demineralization is a process of removing the mineral salts from water by ion exchange. 
There are two basic ion exchange reactions in demineralization . The first reaction is removal of 
metallic cations on a strong acid cation exchanger. To complete the ion exchange, the second 
stage removes the anions in a basic anion exchanger. A mixed bed de-mineralizer is used as the 
last step to further purify the water by removing any ions that are leaked by the first two stages . A 
mixed bed de-minearlizer has both types of ion exchange resins in the same vessel. 
7.4 Condensate polishers 
The condensate polishers are utilized to remove trace impurities from the feed water. This is 
important during plant start-up for which they are used to remove crud from the system . The 
secondary use is to remove salt when a condenser leak occurs to allow chemical adjustment 
and/or orderly shutdown . Polishing is comprised of two processes: filtration and ion exchange. A 
mixed bed de-minearlizer can perform both the ion exchange and filtration necessary to provide 
pure feed water. 
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8 Instrument and service air system 
Compressed air is required to operate the power plant instruments, valves and to seal the 
furnace to prevent gases out from the furnace. It is divided into three systems as described 
below. 
8.1 Instrument air system 
The instrument air system supply dry and oil free air for the power plant instrument 
requirements. The air is supplied from the service air system by two Atlas Copco compressors. 
The air flows through an isolating valve and check valve to the pre-filter and the air dryer after 
discharged from the compressor. After drying, the air passes through a second filter before 
entering the power plant instrument air receivers . The air is piped to the instrument and control 
facilities throughout the plant from the receivers . The receivers are connected in parallel with 
valve facilities for isolation . [Refer to flow diagram 4.21] 
A pressure control valve is installed on a main branch discharge header of the service air 
compressors. If the pressure in the instrument air system drops to 580 kPa this valve will open 
and by-pass the instrument air dryer to supply the air for emergency requirement. 
8.2 Service air system 
. The compressed air from both the compressors , discharged to the air receivers through 
ch eck valve and isolating va lves . The service air receivers are connected in parallel with valve 
facilities for isolation . The air is supplied for the atomizing and aspirating air systems, the gas 
temperature probe and for driving the air motors on the air pre-heaters . 
8.3 Boiler aspirating, sealing and scanner air system 
The aspirating air discharges into the wall box opening to create a barrier, which prevents 
the escape of hot furnace gases from the furnace. The air must be put on when the steam 
generator is in operation and it is required to open an observation door or port to remove a piece 
of equipment for servicing . 
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The sealing air is used to prevent gas leakage, from the places, where the equipments 
protrude from the steam generator. In addition, sealing air is used for sealing leaks, to prevent 
plugging of aspirating jets, to provide cooling and to keep fly ash out of the ports. The air supply 
is taken from the discharge of the forced draft fans . The interconnecting piping is furnished with 
the steam generator. The aspirating air distribution piping is also furnished with the steam 
generator and the air is supplied from the service air system. 
Each burner has 3" observation window, carbon arc igniter, which are required sealing 
and aspirating air. Oil burner and scanner assembly, are required aspirating air. Aspirating air is 
also provided to the scanner packing gland assembly and is required when isolating tube is 
removed for service. The scanner requires a continuous supply of purge air from the cooling air 
blowers when the steam generator in operation . The temperature of scanner will rise and causes 
the scanner output to fall if the purge air supply is not available . 
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Appendix B- Flow diagrams 
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4.18 Chemical feed system 
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T 
Failed to control the re-
heat steam te111J. 
Failed to transrrit the 
te111J. signal 
TlT 1 
failed 
TIT2 
failed 
I 
• 
Control systerrs failed 
to control 
Boiler 
control 
failed 
Fuel oil 
mange. 
failed 
Corrbustion 
control 
failed 
T 
Failed to transrrit 
pressure signal to feed 
water control system 
• 
PIT 1 
failed 
RT2 
failed 
164 
Journal Journal Thrust 
bearin g I bearing 3 bearing 
failed 
Journal 
bearing 2 
failed 
failed 
Journal 
bearing 4 
failed 
failed 
5.4 (b) Turbine- Rotating system 
Unable to run the turbine 
Oil 
deflector 
failed ( 4) 
Vibration 
detector 
failed (2) 
Nk:>ving 
lnstrume 
-ntation& 
control 
failed 
blades 
failed 
Turbine 
rotors 
failed 
Nozzle 
failed 
Coupling 
failed 
Nozzle 
diaphragm 
failed 
Rotor 
position 
detector 
failed 
Failed to cool the oil 
Oil 
cooler 1 
failed 
Oil 
cooler 2 
failed 
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' Journal 
bearing 1 
failed 
Oil 
Failed to run the 
generator 
Rotor 
failed 
Stator 
Control 
system 
failed 
deflectors failed 
failed 
Shaft 
seal 
failed 
Journal 
bearing 2 
failed 
5.5 Generator 
Unable to run the generator 
continuously to generate power 
Failed to supply OC 
power to generator 
Generator 
brushes 
failed 
Rectifier 
failed 
Failed to supply hydrogen 
and cooling the generator 
Hydrogen 
seals 
failed 
Hydrogen 
cooling 
system 
failed 
Failed to supply 
to seal oil to seals 
seal 
oil pump 
failed 
MJtor 
failed 
Failed to 
distribute power 
Terninal 
box 
failed 
Bushings 
failed 
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/ 
5.6 Condenser 
Failed to perform condenser . 
cooling and vacuum 
Condenser failed to Failed to 
serve its purpose Failed to trap gases 
' 
built 
vacuum 
., 
Vent 
Failed to valve 
supply Condenser 
water J 
' 
/ 
Failed to 
perform 
backwash 
failed 
/ 
/ 
Condenser 
tubes failed 
failed 
' 
Vent 
valve 
failed 
" I Failed to perform 
screen 
\ wash \ 
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Water 
Pumping and heating 
system failed 
' 
L.P 
extraction heater 
system # 1 failed 
failed 
Gland seal L.P heater 
condenser 
failed #2 failed 
5.7.2 Low pressure feed water system 
Low pressure feed water system failed to 
heat and supply water to de-aerator tank 
Con . 
makeup 
system 
failed 
Failed to supply water 
during make-up 
I 
~ 
Con. make 
up system 
Ins& con. 
Reserve 
feed water 
system 
failed 
/ 
Water 
de-min. 
system 
failed 
Failed to supply 
chemicals 
I 
• 
Hydrazine 
supply 
system 
failed 
\ rvbrpholine 
I supply 
system \ failed 
Failed to supply 
water 
Condenser 
level 
low 
Low 
vacuum 
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Feed 
auxil. 
failed 
I\J1ain pumping 
system failed 
Supply 
pump 
#1 failed 
Gland 
sealing 
failed 
Gate 
valve 
failed 
5. 7.3 High pressure feed water system 
Failed to pump water to 
main header 
Redundant pumping 
system failed 
rvbtor 
failed 
Supply 
pump 
#2 failed 
+ 
Gate 
valve 
failed 
Gland 
sealing 
failed 
rvbtor 
failed 
High pressure feed water system 
failed to heat and supply water 
H.P heaters failed to raise 
the temperature of water 
H.P 
heater 
#4 failed 
H.P 
heater 
#6 failed 
H.P Feed water 
heater 
# 5 failed 
heater 
ins.&con. 
failed 
Failed to 
supply water 
De-aerator 
failed 
Feed water 
ins.&con. 
failed 
Feed water 
piping 
and support 
failed 
unable to continue 
water flow 
Low 
water 
level 
Te"1J 
Low 
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--· 
Clarifier 
failed 
' 
rv'ono 
valve 
filters 
failed 
Unable to supply water 
to supply purrps 
Cation Mxed 
exchanger bed 
failed exchanger 
failed 
Anion 
exchanger 
failed 
5.8 Water de-mineralization system 
Failed to supply demineralized 
water to the condenser requirement 
\ 
Gate 
valve 
failed 
Butterfly 
valve 
failed 
Pump 
failed 
water pu rrp 1 
failed to sup ply 
Butterfly 
valve 
failed 
I 
• 
Pressure 
switch 
failed 
fvbtor 
failed 
Purrping system failed to 
supply water 
Water purrp 2 
failed to supply 
Check 
valve 
failed 
Purrp 
failed 
Butterfly 
valve 
failed 
I 
• 
Pressure 
switch 
failed j 
rv'otor 
failed 
Check 
valve 
failed 
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Screw 
camp. 
failed 
Compressor 1 failed to 
supply air 
Comp. 
control 
failed 
I 
A 
Gate 
valve 
failed (3) 
Presser 
switch 
failed 
5.9 Instrument and service air system 
Failed to supply service air 
to the service air tanks 
Failed to supply service air and 
instrument air to various instruments 
Failed to supply service air 
to the instrurrent air tanks 
• r-------~~~ L----~ 
Compressor 2 failed to 
supply air 
Failed to filter and dry 
the air 
Failed to by-pass 
the air 
Check 
valve 
failed 
\ 
I 
I 
/ 
Screw 
camp. 
failed 
Comp. 
control 
failed 
Gate 
valve 
failed (3) 
Check 
valve 
failed 
Presser 
switch 
failed 
Filters 
failed 
(2) 
I 
A 
Gate 
valve 
failed (4) 
Dryers 
failed 
(2) 
Gate 
valve 
failed (2) 
Pressure 
switch 
failed 
Control 
valve 
failed 
Check 
valve 
failed 
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Igniters 
failed 
Failed to ignite the 
fuel 
No air 
flow 
No Light 
oil supply 
,I 
No 
steam 
flow 
---."' 
Burners 
failed 
5.1.1 Steam generator-Furnace 
Unable to start the furnace and 
control heat loss 
Heat transfer rate 
low 
Retractable 
soot Accurrulation 
blowers of 
failed (12) ash 
/ 
Rotary 
soot 
\ 
' I 
blowers 
failed(10) (n)- No. of blo\M9rs 
Unable to run 
fv'anual 
door failed 
to close 
/ 
Refractory 
lining failed 
172 
I 
5.1.2 Steam generator- Economizer 
/ 
Failed to supply 
water to steam drum 
._, 
I 
• 
Econonizer 
tubes 
failed 
/ 
Supply 
header 
, damaged 
Failed to raise the temperature of 
water and supply to steam drum 
Failed to vent the 
gases 
/ 
Vent 
valve 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed(3) 
( 
· Failed to raise the 
temp. of water 
/ 
" Less 
flue gas 
flow 
/ 
Excessive 
scaling 
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Fails to separate 
water and steam 
Failed to separate · 
water 
Cyclone 
separator 
failed 
Water 
level 
high 
Feed water 
control 
system 
failed 
Failed to transmit 
level signal 
I 
• 
LfT 2 
failed 
LfT 1 
failed 
5.1.3 Steam generator - Steam drum 
Failed to supply steam after separating 
L- --
the water 
.l 
Failed to supply water to 
down comers 
Steam 
drum 
cracked 
D<l'Ml 
correr 
nozzle 
Worn gaskets 
ard 
leakage 
,_ clogged / 
Failed to relieve 
pressure 
I 
• 
Safety 
valve 1 
fails 
" Safety 
valve 2 
fails 
Presence of moisture in 
the steam 
Faulty 
plate 
dryers 
Liners 
broken 
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Failed to raise the 
terrperature of steam 
----
" PS PS 
SS heater outlet inlet header header 
damaged damaged damaged 
PS ss 
heater 
1nlet 
header 
damaged 
damaged 
., 
ss 
oullel 
header 
damaged 
Failed to relieve 
excess pressure 
I 
• 
Safety 
valve 1 
fails 
/ 
Safety 
valve 2 
fails 
5.1.4 Steam generator - Super heater 
Failed to heat and supply the steam at constant 
pressure and temperature 
-_] -_- - -J_jll_ __ 
High super heated 
temperature 
High super heated 
pressure 
Failed to trans mit 
terrp. signal 
TIT 1 
failed 
TIT 2 
failed 
Failed to control 
terrperature 
//---· 
Steam and Control 
. 
' \ 
con trol 
system 
failed 
/ 
A tterrperator 
damaged 
valve 
fa iled 
" 
I 
Failed to transrrit 
pressure signal 
PIT 1 
failed 
PIT 2 
failed 
/ 
Control systems 
failed 
Boiler 
control 
failed 
Corrbustion 
control 
failed 
Fuel oil 
man g. 
control 
failed 
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5.1.4 Steam generator - Super heater 
& 
I 
Failed to supply 
and spray water 
,_ --. 
~! 
unable to supply spray water ~ 
to attemperator 
/ 
-. 
Nozzle 
failed 
/ "'·-...., 
Globe 
valve 
' failed(2) 
··- -
l_ 
Bypass 
lei I.e 
failed 
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/ 
Failed to re-heat the steam 
Primary 
Re-heater 
heater 
damaged 
Re-heater 
inlet 
header 
damaged 
Re-heater 
outlet 
header 
damaged 
Secondary 
Re-heater 
heater 
damaged 
unable to spray water 
in atterrperator 
Control 
system 
failed 
Control 
valve 
failed 
5.1.5 Steam generator - Re-heater 
Failed to reheat and supply steam at 
constant temperature 
Failed to sup ply and 
spray water 
unable to supply and 
spray water to atterrperator 
Motor 
con1rol 
lo<lll<! 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed(2) 
By pass 
lo<lll<! 
failed 
Failed to control the re-
heat steam terrp. 
I 
,-----~~LI -----. 
Failed to transmt the 
terrp. signal 
Control systems failed 
to control 
TIT 1 
failed 
TTT2 
failed 
Boiler 
control 
failed 
Fuel oil 
mange. 
failed 
Combustion 
control 
failed 
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Failed to draw water . 
from steam drum 
Globe 
valve 
failed(2) 
Globe 
valve 
failed(2) 
\ 
r 
Fails to suppty -, '\27 
water to tank 1 v 
I 
• _j~ 
Main flow system 
failed 
By-pass flow 
system failed 
Globe Globe 
valve valve 
failed(4) failed(4) / 
/ 
Angle Angle 
valve valve 
failed failed 
5.1.6 Steam generator- Blow down system 
Failed to blow down water from boiler 
accessories 
Failed to suppty 
water 
Failed to suppty when 
water level raised in tank 1 
/ 
control leve l 
valve control 
failed switch 
' 
failed 
,, 
Check 
valve 
failed 
By pass 
-.al'.<! 
failed 
J -1 
Unable to drain 
water 
Blow down 
tank 1 
cracked I ' 
water 
seal 
failed 
Blow down 
tank 2 
cracked 
" 
178 
LP 
Failed to blow down water 
from SS outlet header 
• 
Globe 
valve 
failed(2) 
Motorized 
valve 
failed 
5.1.6 Steam generator- Blow down system 
& 
I 
Failed to blow down water 
from re-heater inlet header 
• 
Globe 
valve 
failed(2) 
Motorized 
valve 
failed 
& 
Failed to blow down water 
from PS inlet header 
• 
Globe 
valve 
failed(2) 
Motorized 
valve 
failed 
& 
I 
Failed to blow dow n water 
from PS outlet header 
• 
Globe 
valve 
failed(2) 
Motorized 
valve 
failed 
& 
I 
Failed to blow dow n water 
from SS inlet header 
• 
Globe 
valve 
failed(2) 
Motorized 
valve 
failed 
& 
I 
Failed to blow dow n water 
from re-heater outlet header 
• 
Globe 
valve 
failed(2) 
Motorized 
valve 
failed 
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I Supply 
pump 
Il l failed 
5.1.8 Steam generator-chemical supply system 
Failed to pump and supply 
Sodium Phosphate 
r - - ---. 
Failed to purrp 
Sodium Phosphate 
Purrping system 1 failed Purrping system 1 failed 
Ball 
valve 
failed(2) 
1\/otor 
failed 
Strainer 
failed 
Low 
cherncal 
level 
Safety 
valve 
failed 
Supply 
purrp 
#2 failed 
/ 
i 
// 
Ball 
valve 
failed(2) 
1\/otor 
failed 
Strainer 
failed 
Low 
cherncal 
level 
Safety 
valve 
failed 
I - .. -··-- .. - - --Failed to supply the 
Sodium Phosphate 
/ Globe 
valve 
failed ) 
Check 
valve 
failed 
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Unable to run the 
' forced draft fan west 
Forced 
draft 
fan l'.eSI 
failed 
Forced 
draft fan 
motor west 
failed 
5.2.1 (a) Forced draft fan west 
Failed to supply air at the required pressure 
Furnace 
draft 
control 
failed 
Inlet dall'per drive 
system failed 
Inlet guide 
van drive 
failed 
PfT 
failed 
Combustion 
control 
failed 
Inlet 
dafTIJers 
damaged Inlet 
Daflller 
dri-.e 
damaged 
Both inlet and outlet 
dall'pers failed to open 
Outlet 
daflllers 
damaged 
Controller 
failed 
Inlet 
dafTIJerS 
damaged 
outlet 
daflller 
dri-.e 
damaged 
Both inlet and outlet 
dampers failed to open 
Timer 
failed 
Relay failed 
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::: 
Q) 
.2:' 
~ 
t: 
0 
-.:; 
t: 
Q) 
...... 
t: 
·. 
·' 
Unable to run the 
forced draft fan west 
··•·· 
Forced 
ctaft 
fan west 
fatted 
Forced 
dran 
fan motor 
west failed 
5.2.1 (b) Forced draft fan east 
Failed to supply air at the required pressure 
Fum ace 
draft 
control 
failed 
Inlet darrper drive 
system failed 
PfT 
, failed 
Inlet guide 
van drive 
failed 
Corrbustion 
control 
failed 
I net 
dampers 
damaged Inlet 
Darrper 
driw 
damaged 
Both inlet and outlet 
darrpers failed to open 
Controller 
failed 
Outlet 
dampers 
damaged 
Inlet 
dampers 
damaged 
outlet 
darllJ€f 
driw 
damaged 
Both inlet and outlet 
darrpers failed to open 
/ 
Tirrer 
failed 
Relay failed 
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Failed to supply steam 
at the required pressure 
• I 
Steam control station failed 
Globe 
"'"" far led (2) 
•• 
Control 
valve 
failed 
Control 
system 
failed 
Bypass 
111110! 
failed 
5.2.2 (a) Steam air heater west 
Failed to supply hot air to air preheater 
Failed to supply 
steam to air heater 
Gate 
valve 1 
failed 
Gate 
valve 2 
failed 
Gate 
valve 4 
failed 
Gate 
valve 3 
failed 
Failed to heat the air 
Failed to send 
temp. signals 
... 
Trr 1 
failed 
TIT2 
far led 
Internal components 
damaged 
Comb air 
&gas 
conlrol 
failed 
Tubes 
damaged 
Dust 
collected 
over fins 
Gate 
valve 1 
failed 
Failed to drain 
condensate 
Gate 
valve 2 
failed 
Gate 
valve 3 
failed 
Gate 
valve 4 
failed 
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Failed to supply steam 
at the required pressure 
··~ 
rl. 
Steam control station failed 
Globe 
"'he 
failed (2) 
• 
Control 
valve 
failed 
Control 
system 
failed 
By pass 
"'I"' failed 
5.2.2 (b) Steam air heater east 
Failed to supp ly hot air to air preheater 
Failed to supply 
steam to air heater 
Gate 
valve 1 
failed 
' 
Gate 
valve 2 
failed 
Gate 
valve 4 
failed 
Gate 
valve 3 
failed 
Failed to heat the air · 
Failed to send 
temp. signals 
' 
• 
m1 
failed 
TIT 2 
failed 
Internal components 
damaged 
Corrb. air 
&gas 
control 
failed 
Tubes 
damaged 
Dust 
collected 
over fins 
Failed to drain 
condensate 
Gate 
valve 1 
failed / 
Gate 
valve 2 
failed 
Gate 
valve 3 
failed 
Gate 
valve 4 
failed 
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5.2.3 (a) Air pre heater west 
Failed to supply hot air to the main ducts 
Unable to run the 
forced draft fan west 
' t . I 
Failed to raise the terrperature ; 
of air to the designed value 
Gas flow problems Air flow problems 1 Draft fan internals failed 
Air pre-
heater 
west failed 
Dme 
rrvtor 
failed 
Reduced 
gas flow 
Gas inlet 
terrp. low 
Reduced 
airflow 
Air inlet 
terrp. low 
Broken 
seals 
Plugged 
hot 
baskets 
Damaged 
ducts 
186 
I 
\ 
5.2.3 (b) Air pre heater east 
Failed to supply hot air to the main ducts 
Unable to run the 
. forced draft fan east 
Air 
pre-heater 
west failed 
Dm" 
rrotor 
failed 
Failed to raise the temperature 
of air to the designed value 
.-----··-· r • 
Gas flow problerrs 
Reduced 
gas flow 
Gas in 
terrp. low 
t Air flow problerrs 
Reduced 
air flow 
Air in terrp. 
low 
· Draft fan internals failed 
Broken 
seals 
• 
Plugged 
hot 
baskets 
Damaged 
ducts 
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FrT 1 
failed 
Fl1 
failed 
5.2.4 (a) Air flow control system west 
Failed to supply air to vvind boxes in three levels at 
the required pressure (west) 
Failed to send input signal to air flow 
master station in west from three 
levels 
Frr2 
failed 
Fl2 
failed 
Frr3 
failed 
Fl3 
failed 
TIT 
failed 
I 
A 
' FCS 1 
failed 
Darrpers 
damaged 
Darrper 
drive 1 
failed 
Failed to control 
darrpers at three levels 
in west 
' FCS 2 
failed ' 
Darrpers 
damaged 
Darrper 
drive 2 
failed 
FCS 3 
failed 
Darrpers 
damaged 
Corrbusbon 
control 
failed 
Darrper 
drive 3 
failed 
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' Frr 1 
failed 
Fl1 
failed 
5.2.4 (b) Air flow control system east 
Failed to supply air to Vvind boxes in three levels at 
the required pressure (east) 
Failed to send input signal to air flow 
rraster station in east from three levels 
Failed to control 
darrpers at three levels 
in east 
FrT2 
failed 
Fl2 
failed 
FrT3 
failed 
Fl3 
fa iled 
TIT 
failed 
. I FCS 1 \ 
failed 
/ 
/.,.-
! 
\ 
Darrpers 
darraged 
\ 
Damper 
drive 1 
failed 
/ 
FCS 2 
failed ! 
Darrpers 
darraged 
Damper 
drive 2 
failed 
/ 
Corrbustion 
control 
failed 
r--,-'-------, " / 
FCS 3 
failed ; 
--, 
Darrpers 
darraged 
Damper 
drive 3 
failed 
•' 
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5.2.5 Flue gas system 
Failed to control temperature and remove flue 
Excessive flue gas 
terrperature 
More 
slag 
built up 
lncorrplete 
corrbustion 
Low load 
in the 
generator 
Failed to detect and send oxygen level 
signal to corrbustion control system 
-....... 
" 
oxygen 
analyzer 
west failed 
I 
oxygen 
analyzer 
east failed 
Failed to remove the 
flue gases 
.. , 
"""'-
Ducts 
darmged 
\ 
Lining 
failed 
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Failed to keep oil 
level high 
Lrr 
failed 
Control 
wlw failed 
Failed to supply oil 
to the rrain header 
5.3.1 Heavy oil system 
Failed to supply and control heavy 
oil firing as demanded 
Failed to control 
temperature 
Failed to supply oil 
from storage tanks 
Failed to supply oil 
from day tank 
By pass 
valve 
failed 
Gale"'"" 
failed 
Gale wlw 
tailed (2) 
Fuel oil 
boos ling 
sy.;tem 
failed 
Temp. 
control 
failed 
Control 
wlw failed 
Corroustjon 
control 
failed 
Burner pipe 
and vales 
failed 
Unable to control 
fuel oil firing 
Burner 
manage me 
nt sy.;tem 
failed 
Boiler 
master 
control 
failed 
Combustion 
control 
failed 
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Failed to supply clean oil to oil purrps 
.-------'.'----, 
Unable to sup ply oil ' 
to the strainers 
•• 
Failed to clean and 
sup ply the oil 
,i_, 
5.3.2 Light oil system 
Failed to supply air and oil at the 
required conditions to start the boiler 
Failed to purrp the oil at the 
required pressure 
l'vlain supply 
failed 
By-pass supply 
failed 
t-.b oil in 
the tank 
Gate 
valve 
failed 
Strainers 
blocked 
Gatewl\e 
failed 
Strainers 
blocked 
Gate val~.e 
failed 
Oil 
pump 1 
failed 
Pump 
control 
failed 
1\tlotor 
failed 
Oil 
pump 1 
failed 
Pump 
control 
failed 
1\tlotor 
failed 
Failed to relive 
excess oil pressure 
Failed to pass 
excess oil 
I 
• Globewl~.e failed 
Failed to supply oil 
to main pipe 
• Globewl~.e failed 
Gate Control 
val\e 
failed (2) 
Control 
val\e failed 
valve 
failed 
Control 
s:,stem 
failed 
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5.3.2 Light oil system 
-t J Failed to supply light oil 
to the bottom .level burners ... 
Failed to supply air to the 1 
bottom level burners j 
·• 
. ,, 
' 
Gate ! Gate \ Gate Gate Gate Gate valve 
valve valve valve 
valve · valve \ failed failed fa iled fa i led failed ; failed 
''· ,,J ·,, / / 
"· /"'' Piston Piston Piston Piston Piston / Piston \ valve valve valve valve 
valve valve fa iled fa i led failed failed I failed ' failed ." ' / / 
"" 
" 
./ 
"'··- . 
193 
/ 
' 
' 
"\ \ / Globe Reducer Globe 
valve failed valve 
failed (2) failed 
/ 
Check \ Piston 
/ 
valve valve 
failed failed 
5.3.3 Fuel additive system 
Check 
valve 
failed 
Failed to supply magnesium 
hydroxide at three levels 
,.;-"'' 
/ 
" Reducer Globe 
failed valve 
(2) failed / 
Piston Check 
valve valve 
failed failed 
/ Red~cer ' 
failed 
(2) 
" 
' 
Pump 
Piston failed 
valve 
failed 
Failed to supply additive 
to main header 
Pneumatic 
control 
system 
failed 
Motor 
failed 
194 
Failed to supply air 
, to the J'T"qin header 
Butterfly \ 
valve 1 
\ failed 
" 
Butterfly 
valve 2 
failed 
/ 
.. 
/ 
Butterfly 
valve 
failed ,, 
Extraction pump 1 failed 
to extract air 
Mltor 
failed 
I 
Mltorized 
valve 
failed 
Vacuum 
pump 
failed 
5.6.3 Condenser 
Failed to build vacuum 
in the condenser 
Failed to extract air 
Check Butterfly 
valve valve 
failed failed 
Extraction pump 2 failed to 
extract air 
Mltor 
failed 
Mltorized 
valve 
failed · I 
Vacuum 
pump 
"- failed 
Check 
valve 
failed 
Failed to reduce the 
temperature of water in 
the vacuum pump 
. 
.. 
' Globe Heat \ 
exchanger valve 
failed failed 
/ 
' Gate 
valve 
failed 
Failed to maintain 
water seal 
Level 
con. val\e 
fa iled 
Globe 
valve 
, failed 
Gate 
valve 
failed 
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, 
Purrp if 
failed 
rvbtor 
failed 
Water purrp #1 failed 
to sup ply water 
Relief Timer 
valve failed 
failed (2) 
-
' rvbtorized 
valve 
failed (2) 
/ 
5.6.1 (a) Condenser 
Failed to supply cooling 
vvater to condenser inlet 
'\ 
Screen \ Pump 
blocked : failed 
Selector 
switch 
failed 
\ 
rvbtor 
failed 
/ 
Water purrip #2 failed 
to supply water 
\ Relief \ Timer 
valve failed 
failed (2) 
' 
' 
rvbtorized 
valve 
/ failed (2) 
" 
/ 
Screen 
blocked 
' 
Selector 
switch 
failed 
196 
PurllJ 
failed 
tv1otor 
failed 
Water purllJ #1 failed to 
supp~ water to screens 
Butterf~ 
valve 
failed (3) 
Gate 
valve 
failed (2) 
Check 
valve 
failed 
Tirrer 
failed 
5.6.1 (b) Condenser 
Failed to clean 
the screens 
Pressure 
switch 
failed 
Pump 
control 
failed 
rTll Pu 
fa iled 
' 
tv1otor 
failed 
Water purllJ #2 failed to 
supp~ water to screens 
Butterf~ 
valve 
failed (3) I 
Gate 
valve 
failed(2) 
I 
/ 
Check 
valve 
failed 
Tirrer 
failed 
Pressure 
switch 
failed 
PurllJ 
control 
failed 
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. . 
Failed to initiate 
backwash 
• 
' Pressure 
SWitch 1 
failed 
Pressure 
switch 2 
failed 
5.6.1 (c) Condenser 
Unable to perform the 
condenser back vvash 
I 
/ 
Butterf~ 
valve 1 
failed 
Butterf~ 
valve 2 
failed 
Failed to perform back 
Butterf~ 
valve 3 
failed 
wash 
• 
Butterf~ 
valve 4 
failed 
Butterf~ 
valve 5 
failed 
Butterf~ 
valve 6 
failed 
Butterf~ 
valve 7 
failed 
: I 
198 
/ 
, Bu!terfly 
valve 
failed 
l'v'btor 
failed 
5.7.2 LP- Water extraction 
Failed to Extract and supply feed water 
to gland seal condenser 
Extraction pump #1 
failed to supply water 
Gate 
valve 
failed(2) 
/ Pump '\ 
control 
failed 
/ 
Hot well 
level low 
De-aerat 
or level 
high 
Check 
yalve 
failed 
Pump 
failed 
terfly '. But 
va 
fa 
lve 
iled 
l'v'btor 
failed 
/ 
., 
, Extraction pump #2 1 • 
! failed to supply water l 
~ate 
valve 
failed 
) 
Hot well 
level low 
I 
Pufll] 
control 
failed 
\ 
/ 
.. -
De-aerat 
or level 
high 
Check 
valve 
failed 
Pufll] 
failed 
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Purge venting failed 
Check 
"""'failed 
Globe ' 
valve 
failed 
Failed to vent and 
purge gases 
Continuous venting 
failed 
Orifice 
fa1led 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
5. 7.2 (a) LP- Gland seal condenser 
Gland seal condenser failed to increase 
the temperature of water 
, Failed to supply 
steam 
. "' : / ButtEirf! , 
y valve ' 
failed 
' ./ 
Nozzle 
failed 
F,ailed to drain 
water 
Globe 
valve 
failed(2) 
Globe 
\<lilA! 
failed(2) 
Heat transfer rate 
reduced 
Tube 
·, failed 
Excessive 
scaling 
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Continues venting 
# 1 failed 
Orifice 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
Continues venting 
# 2 failed 
Oufice 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
5. 7.2 (b) LP heater #' 1 
Low pressure heater No. 1 failed to raise 
the temp. of water. 
Continues venting 
# 3 failed 
Oufice 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
Failed to vent and 
purge gases 
Continues venting 
#4 failed 
Orifice 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
Continues venting 
#5 failed 
Ortfice 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
Continues venting 
#6 failed 
Onfice 
fill led 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
Purge venting 
failed 
Heat transfer 
rate reduced 
• • 
Motor 
control 
"'I"' failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
Tubes 
failed 
Excessive 
scaling 
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Failed to supply 
steam 
• 
Butter fly 
valve failed 
Nozzle 
failed 
Failed to supply steam 
through pipe 1. 
Failed to cut supply of 
steam during turbine trip 
Check 
valve 
failed 
• 
Control 
relay 
failed 
pneumatic 
actuator 
failed 
5.7.2 (b) LP heater #1 
Failed to supply steam to L.P heater #1 and to cut the 
supply during turbine trip and high water level 
Failed to cut steam supply 
during high water level 
solenoid 
valve 
failed 
' 
Level 
switch 
failed 
Check 
valve 
failed 
pneumati 
c actualor 
failed 
Failed to supply 
steam 
• 
Butter fly 
valve failed 
t\lozzle 
failed , 
Failed to supply steam 
through pipe 2. 
Failed to cut supply of 
steam during turbine trip 
Check 
valve 
failed 
• 
Control 
relay 
failed 
pneumatic 
actuator 
failed 
Failed to cut steam supply 
during high water level 
solenoid 
valve 
failed 
' 
Level 
switch 
failed 
Check 
valve 
failed 
pneumatic 
actuator 
failed 
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Motor 
failed 
Drain 
purrp 1 
failed 
Drain purrp #1 failed 
to drain the water 
Level 
switch 
failed 
Low 
water 
level 
Gate 
valve 
failed (2) 
Purrp 
control 
failed 
Failed to drain the 
water from drain tank 
Check 
valve 
failed 
tvbtor 
failed 
Drain 
purrp 1 
failed 
5.7.2 (b) LP heater #1 
Failed to drain water from L.P heater#1 
Drain purrp #1 failed 
to drain the water 
Level 
switch 
failed 
Low 
water 
level 
Gate 
valve 
failed (2) 
Purrp 
control 
failed 
Check 
valve 
failed 
Control 
valve 
failed 
Failed to drain the water during abnormal 
level raise in heater#1 and drain tank 
Failed to drain water from 
heater #1 to conden?er 
Gate 
valve 
failed (2) 
Solenoid 
valve 
failed 
Orifice 
failed 
Level 
switch 
failed / 
By pass system 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
Orifice 
failed 
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Continues venting 
# 1 failed 
Orifice 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
Continues venting 
# 2 failed 
Orifice 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
5. 7.2 (c) LP Heater #2 
Low pressure heater No. 2 failed to 
raise the temp. of water. 
Continues venting 
# 3 failed 
Orifice 
failed 
Globe 
va lve 
failed 
r· 
, Failed to vent and 
purge gases 
Continues venting 
#4 failed 
/ 
Orifice 
failed 
" 
Globe 
valve 
failed / 
Continues venting 
#5 failed 
Orifice 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
Purge venting 
failed 
Motor 
control 
val~.e failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
Heat transfer 
rate reduced 
Tubes 
failed 
Excessive 
scaling 
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Failed to supply 
steam 
, ............ 
Butter fly 
val~.efai l ed 
~- . ..,. 
Nozzle 
failed 
5.7.2 (c) LP heater #2 
~ 
I -
Failed to supply steam to 
L.P feed water heater #2 
Failed to cut supply of 
steam during turbine trip 
,/ 
. ........ 
Failed to cut steam supply 
during high water level 
-. 
I .. 
/" 
/ " 
Check Control solenoid solenoid 
valve 
failed 
pneumatic 
actuator 
failed 
relay valve 
failed failed '/ 
Level 
switch 
failed 
valve 
failed 
pneumatic 
actuator 
failed 
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Control 
valve 
failed 
5.7 2(c) LP heater #2 
Failed to drain the water 
Failed to cascade the drains to 
L. P heater #1 
Failed to drain water from 
heater #1 to condenser 
Gate 
valve 
failed (2) 
Solenoid 
valve 
failed 
Orifice 
failed 
Level 
switch 
failed 
, By pass system 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed ,, 
Orifice 
failed 
Control 
valve 
failed 
Failed to divert drains to condenser tank 
· if the level rises to preset level in heater#2 
I 
Failed to drain water from 
heater #1 to condenser 
/ 
Gate 
valve 
failed (2) 
Solenoid 
valve 
failed 
Orifice 
failed 
Level 
switch 
failed 
By pass system 
failed 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
Orifice 
failed 
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Motor 
control valve 
failed 
/ 
Failed to supply make-up 
water to condenser 
M3in flow system 
failed By-pass 
+ 
valve 
failed 
Level Control 
trans . station 
failed failed 
Level Control Gate 
switch valve valve 
failed failed failed 
5.7.4 Reserve feed water system 
Reserved feed water system failed to 
supply water during shortage. 
Failed to supply surplus water to 
high level reserve feed water tank 
M3in flow system 
failed 
~ By-pass valve failed 
Control Gate Level 
valve valve switch 
failed failed failed 
Control 
station 
failed 
Failed to supply de-nineralized 
water 
M3in flow system 
failed 
+ 
Butterfly 
valve 
failed 
•· Butterfly 
valve 
fa iled(2) 
Solenoid Control 
failed valve 
failed 
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Purrp 
control 
failed 
5. 7.4 Reserve feed water system 
Level 
switch 
failed 
Failed to sup ply water from low level feed tank 
to high level feed tank to as required. 
I 
.~'------
r 
Forwarding purrp failed 
to start and supply water 
Purrp 
failed 
/ 
I Gate 
\ valve 
\ failed(3) 
l\lbtor 
failed 
"' 
/ 
Orifice 
failed 
Check 
valve 
failed(2)- . 
I 
L 
\ 
/ 
., 
Purrp failed to start 
• 
·"' 
.. 
Level 
switch 
failed 
Purrp 
control 
failed 
"I 
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•. 
5.7.5 Chemical supply system 
Failed to pump 
Hydrazine 
Failed to pump and supply . 
Hydrazine 
r-----'~  
. I 
Pumping system 1 failed 
Supply 
pump 
#1 failed 
Ball 
valve 
, failed(2) 
• I 
fvbtor 
failed 
Low 
chemical 
level 
Strainer 
failed 
Safety 
valve 
failed 
Supply 
pump 
#2 failed 
I , , ' 
Pump1ng system 1 failed. , 
Ball 
valve 
failed(2) 
fvbtor 
failed 
Low 
cherrical 
level 
Strainer 
failed 
Safety 
valve 
failed 
Failed to supply the 
Hydrazine 
Globe 
valve 
failed 
/ 
Check 
valve 
failed 
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Supply 
purrp 
#1 failed 
Pumping system 1 failed 
Ball 
valve 
failed(2) 
IVotor 
failed 
Low 
chemical 
level 
Strainer 
failed 
5.7.5 (b) Chemical supply system 
Failed to pump and supply 
Hydrazine 
Failed to purrp 
Hydrazine 
Safety 
valve 
failed 
Pumping system 1 failed 
Supply ' 
pump 
#2 failed 
I Ball 
valve 
failed(2) 
IVotor 
failed 
., 
Low 
chemcal 
level 
Strainer 
failed 
Safety 
valve 
failed 
Failed to supply the 
Hydrazine 
Globe 
valve 
failed ) 
Check 
valve 
failed 
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Appendix D- MTBF Confidence Limits 
211 
MTBF Confidence Limits 
When a product's failure rate is considered constant, The Chi-Square distribution may be 
used to calculate confidence intervals around measured mean time between failures (MTBF), the 
total test time among all tested products divided by the number of failures . The calculation differs 
depending on whether the test data truncates on the last failure or at a time after the last failure. 
For time truncated tests For failure truncated tests 
One- sided 
confidence interval 
2T 2T 
X 2 (a,2n) 
(MTBF lower limit) 
Two sided 
Confidence 
2T 2T 2T 2T 
Interval 
MTBF limit Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Where T is total test time 
a is the acceptance risk of error (1 -desired confidence) 
n is the number of failures observed 
The following table is derived from the formulas : 
d Lower limit Upper limit 
2 0.185 0.127 0.272 0.333 0.433 0.61 4.47 9.46 19.38 39.5 100 200 
4 0.135 0.151 0.180 0.210 0.257 0.33 1.21 1.88 2.82 4 .10 6 .66 10.0 
6 0.108 0.119 0.139 0.159 0.188 0.23 0.65 0.90 1.22 1.61 2 .30 3.00 
8 0.909 0.100 0.114 0.129 0.150 0.181 0.437 0.57 0.733 0.921 1.21 1.48 
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10 0.080 0.085 0.097 0.109 0.125 0.149 0.324 0.411 0.508 0.600 0.78 0.90 
12 0.070 0.075 0.085 0.095 0.107 0.126 0.256 0.317 0.383 0.454 0.55 0.64 
14 0.063 0.069 0.076 0.083 0.094 0.109 0.211 0.257 0.305 0.355 0.43 0.5 
16 0.058 0.062 0.069 0.076 0.084 0.097 0.179 0.215 0.251 0.290 0.34 0.38 
18 0.053 0.057 0.063 0.069 0.076 0.087 0.156 0.184 0.213 0.243 0.286 0.32 
20 0 05 0 053 0 058 0.063 0.07 0.079 0.137 0.158 0.184 0.208 0.242 0.270 
22 0.046 0.049 0.054 0.589 0.064 0.073 0.123 0.142 0.162 0.182 0.208 0.232 
24 0.043 0.046 0.050 0.054 0.060 0.067 0.111 0.128 0.144 0.161 0.185 0.200 
26 0.041 0.043 0.047 0.051 0.056 0.062 0.101 0.116 0.130 0.144 0.164 0.178 
28 0.039 0.041 0.044 0.048 0.052 0.058 0.092 0.106 0.118 0.131 0.147 0.161 
30 0.037 0.039 0.042 0.045 0.049 0.055 0.085 0.097 0.108 0.119 0.133 0.145 
32 0.035 0.037 0.040 0.043 0.046 0.051 0.079 0.089 0.099 0.109 0.122 0.131 
34 0.033 0.035 0.038 0.041 0.044 0.049 0.074 0.083 0.092 0.101 0.113 0.122 
36 0.032 0.034 0.036 0.039 0.042 0.046 0.069 0.078 0.089 0.093 0.104 0.111 
38 0.031 0.032 0.035 0.037 0.040 0.044 0.065 0.073 0.080 0.087 0.097 0.103 
40 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.035 0.038 0.042 0.061 0.068 0.075 0.082 0.090 0.096 
Notes: 1. Multiply value shown by total part hours to get MTBF figure in hours 
2. d = 2 x (#of failures accumulated at test termination) 
3. For the lower limit on tests truncated at a fixed time where the number of failures 
occurring is less than the total number of items placed on the test initially, use: d = 2x 
(#failures accumulated at test termination +1 ) 
For example, the globe valve, N.O 23047-006- style: packaged unit, POP: 20 (Page 3-549), the 
data given as 0/2 .9170. The fa ilures are O.The hours are 2,917 x 10/\/\6 hours or 2917000 hours. 
Using the equation as shown in the PDF, the lower confidence interval is calculated as 
2(2917000)/0 .619 = 9424878.837 hours (MTBF). The failure rate is the inverse of the MTBF. This 
213 
gives a failure rate of 0 .106 failures/million hours. Similarly the upper value is 2(2917000)/4.4 7 
= 0. 766 failures/million hours. 
Source: RAC Publication, CPE, Reliability Toolkit: Commercial Practices Edition. 
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Appendix E- Failure parameters and Probability Calculations 
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Failure Parameters 
Failure 
Major system Failure Probabi S.No /subsystem Basic events parameters lity in 20 
years 
Steam generator Boiler r3 -1.1 7, 8-50853.9 H 0.982 5.1 (SG) Water walls ~- 1.27, 8-57746.9 H 0.979 
Auxiliary steam supply 0.16/year 0.083 
5.3 Fuel oil system Fuel oil transfer system 0.16/year 0.959 Fuel oil forwarding system 0.083/year 0.810 
Boiler stop valve 3.36E-06 H 0.445 
Main stop valve 0.1/year 0.865 
Motorized valve 3.36E-06 H 0.445 
Gate valve 1.50E-06 H 0.231 
Globe valve 2 .76E-06 H 0.383 
Check valve 6 .70E-06 H 0.691 
Turbine - Steam Combined re-heat valve 0.1/year 0.865 5.4 (a) Orifice 1.50E-07 H 0.026 
supply TIT 5.70E-06 H 0.632 
Steam and control system 0.083/year 0.810 
Control valve 5.73E-06 H 0.634 
PIT 3.50E-06 H 0.458 
Boiler control r3-1.1 7, 8-50853.9 H 0.867 
Combustion control 2.90E-05 H 0.994 
Fuel management and control ~- 1. 77, 8-522 19.9 H 0.949 
Motor 8.60E-06 H 0.778 
Gear box 2.37E-06 H 0.340 
Governor 1.00E-06 H 0.161 
Globe valve 1.66E-05 H 0.945 
Intercept valve 9.00E-06 H 0.793 
Oil pump 1.00E-05 H 0.827 
Shaft packing* 0.1/year 0.865 
Journal bearing 0.083/year 0.810 
Thrust bearing 0.083/year 0.810 
5.4 (b) Turbine- Rotating V ibration detector 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
system Oil deflector 3.20E-07 H 0.055 
Turbine instrumentation and 0.16/year 0.810 
control 
Moving blades* 1.14E-05H 0.864 
Turbine rotors* 0.083/year 0.810 
Nozzle 1.14E-05 H 0.864 
Nozzle diaphragm 1.14E-05H 0.864 
Coupling 9.90E-09 H 0.002 
Rotor posit ion detector 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
Oil cooler 6 .50E-07 H 0.108 
Journal bearing failed 1.9 1E-07 H 0.033 
5.5 Generator Oil deflector 1.60E-07 H 0.028 
Rotor** 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
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I I Stator** 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
Generator brush 0.083/year 0.810 
Rectifier 2.60E-07 H 0.045 
Hydrogen seals** 1.00E-07 H 0.017 
Hydrogen cooling system 0.083/year 0.810 
Seal oil pump 3.90E-07 H 0.066 
Terminal box 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
Bushings 2 .00E-08 H 0.003 
Control system 1.00E-07 H 0.017 
5.6 Condenser Condenser 1.50E-05 H 0.928 Condenser tubes [3-1 .51 , 8-74607 H 0.830 
5.7.2 Low pressure feed Extraction pumps 4.21 E-06 H 0.522 
water system (LP) Condensate make-up system 2.76E-06 H 0.959 
Feed water supply pump #1 [3-1.18, 8-33925.7 H 0.952 
Gland seal system 0.083/year 0.810 
Gate valve failed 1.50E-06 H 0.231 
Feed water supply pump #2 [3-1.34, 8-34845.6 H 0.966 
5.7. 3 High pressure feed De-aerator 0.16/year 0.959 
water system (HP) HP heater #4 0.0001 H 0.990 
HP heater #5 [3-2.9, 8-40607.4 H 0.998 
HP heater #6 0.08/year 0.798 
Feed water heater Ins.& Con . 0.08/year 0.798 
Motor control valve 3.36E-06 H 0.445 
Screw compressor 2.86E-06 H 0.394 
Compressor control 0.25/year 0.993 
Gate valve failed (3) F.O 4.50E-06 H 0.545 
Instrument and Pressure switch 1.40E-07 H 0.024 59 
serv1ce air system Filters failed (2) 1.40E-07 H 0.024 Gate valve failed (4) F.O 6.00E-06 H 0.650 
Dryers failed (2) 6.00E-08 H 0.010 
Gate valve (2) F.O 3.00E-06 H 0.409 
Control valve 5.73E-06 H 0.634 
Igniter 9.51 E-06 H 0.811 
No air flow** 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
No light oil supply** 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
No steam flow** 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
5.1 .1 SG- Furnace Burners [3-1.65, 8-40215.4 H 0.999 Retractable soot blowers* 0.083/year 0.810 
Rotary soot blowers* 0.083/year 0.810 
Accumulation of ash8 0.083/year 0.810 
Manual door 2.72E-06 H 0.379 
Refractory lining 5.00E-07 H 0.084 
Economizer tubes 3.00E-07 H 0.051 
Supply header 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
5.1 .2 SG -Economizer Vent valve 5.70E-06 H 0.632 Globe valve failed (3) 8.33E-06 H 0.768 
Less flue gas flow** 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
Excessive scaling** 1.14E-04 H 0.990 
5.1.3 SG- Steam drum Cyclone separator* 6 .58E-06 H 0.684 
Water level high** 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
Feed water control system [3-2.21, 8-69743 .6 H 0.996 
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LIT 5.70E-06 H 0.632 
Steam drum 3.00E-06 H 0.409 
Down comer nozzle clogged 6.00E-06 H 0.650 
Worn gaskets and leakage 5.00E-07 H 0.084 
Safety valve 1.85E-06 H 0.277 
Faulty plate dryers 9.82E-06 H 0.821 
Liners broken 2.00E-06 H 0.296 
Super heater 5.40E-07 H 0.090 
Super heater inlet header 1.00E-10H 0.0001 
Safety valve 1.90E-05 H 0.964 
Steam and control system 9.51 E-06 H 0.811 
5.1.4 SG- Super heater Attemperator damaged** 1.00E-1 0 H 0.000 
Boiler control failed [3-1 .17, 8-50853 .9 H 0.982 
Nozzle 6 .00E-06 H 0.650 
Globe valve failed (2) 5.52E-06 H 0.620 
By pass valve 2.76E-06 H 0.383 
Primary re-heater 1.74E-05 H 0.953 
Re-heater inlet header 1.00E-1 0 H 0.000 
Globe valve failed (4) F.O. 1.11 E-05 H 0.856 
Angle valve failed . F.O 4.60E-06 H 0.553 
5.2 .5 SG - Re-heater Control valve fails . F.O 5.73E-06 H 0.634 Check valve fails F.O 2.30E-06 H 0.332 
Level switch f 0.22/year 0.988 
Blow down tank 3.00E-06 H 0.409 
Water seal failed 2.00E-07 H 0.034 
Globe valve failed (2) F.O 2.77E-06 H 0.384 
Supply pump #1 4.78E-06 H 0.567 
Chemical supply Ball valve failed (2) 2.00E-06 H 0.296 5.1.8 Strainer 3.70E-06 H 0.477 
system Low chemical level** 3.00E-07 H 0.051 
Safety valve 1.85E-06 H 0.277 
FD fan west (3-1.26, 8-52523.1 H 0.985 
FD an motor west 4.90E-05 H 0.783 
Furnace draft control 0.25/year 0.993 
5.2 1 (a, Inlet guide van drive 2.80E-06 H 0.388 
b) Forced draft (FD) Inlet dampers 6.70E-07 H 0.111 West and east Controller 0.25/year 0.993 
Timer 1.20E-06 H 0.190 
Relay 3.00E-08 H 0.005 
FD fan east 3.00E-05 H 0.995 
FD fan motor east 2 .1 1 E-05 H 0.975 
5.2 .2 (a, Steam air heater Com . and gas control 2.77E-06 H 0.384 Tubes 1.00E-08 H 0.002 b) West and east Dust collected over fins** 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
5.2 .3 Air pre-heater AH west fan 1.50E-05 H 0.928 
(a, b) West and east (AH) Reduced gas flow** 1.00E-07 H 0.017 
Gas in temperature low** 1.00E-07 H 0.017 
Reduced air flow** 1.00E-07 H 0.017 
Air in temperature low** 1.00E-07 H 0.017 
Broken seals 7.00E-07 H 0.1 15 
Plugged hot baskets* 1.00E-05 H 0.827 
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Damaqed ducts 2.17E-05 H 0.978 
AH east 2.00E-05 H 0.970 
5.2.4 Air flow control Fl failed 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
(a, b) system Flow control system 3.92E-06 H 0.497 
More slaq built up* 0.083/year 0.810 
5.2 5 Flue gas system Incomplete combustion** 1.00E-07 H 0.017 Low load in the generator* 1 0/day 1.000 
Oxyqen analyzer* 1.00E-06 H 0.161 
Fuel oil boosting system 0-2.18, 8-72895.4 H 0.927 
Temperature controller 0.1/year 0.865 
5.3.1 Heavy oil system Control valve 5.73E-06 H 0.634 
Burner pipe and valves failed 0.16/year 0.959 
Burner management system B-1.77, 8-52217.9 H 0.949 
No oil in the tank** 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
Strainers blocked 3.70E-06 H 0.477 
5.3 .2 Light oil system Oil pump 4.78E-06 H 0.567 Pump control 0.37/year 0.999 
Control system 0-1.77,8-52217.9 H 0.949 
Piston valve 3.00E-08 H 0.005 
Check valve failed 2.30E-06 H 0.332 
5.3.3 Fuel additive Reducer failed (2) 6.00E-08 H 0.010 
system Pump failed 1.21E-05 H 0.879 
Pneumatic control system 0.37/year 0.999 
Butter fly 1 valve failed 1.00E-06 H 0.161 
Motorized valve failed 3.36E-06 H 0.445 
Motor failed 8.60E-06 H 0.778 
Vacuum pump failed 0.083/year 0.810 
Condenser- Check valve failed 2.30E-06 H 0.332 5.6.3 Vacuum Heat exchanger failed 1.52E-06 H 0.234 Gate valve failed 1.50E-06 H 0.231 
Globe valve failed 2.77E-06 H 0.384 
Level control valve failed 1.90E-05 H 0.964 
Gate valve failed 1.50E-06 H 0.231 
Globe valve failed 2.70E-06 H 0.377 
Pump failed 1.21 E-05 H 0.880 
Condenser- Relief valve 1.14E-05 H 0.864 
5.6.1 (a) Cooling water Motorized valve (2) F.O 6.72E-06 H 0.692 
supply Selector switch failed 0.22/year 0.988 
Screen blocked** l.OOE-07 H 0.017 
Condenser- Pump failed 1.21 E-05 0.879 Butterfly valve failed (3) F.O 3.00E-06 H 0.409 5.6.1 (b) Screen wash Pressure switch 1.20E-07 H 0.021 system 
Pump control 0.37/year H 0.999 
Butterfly valve 1.00E-06 H 0.161 
5.7.2 LP- water Hot well level low** 6.00E-08 H 0.010 
extraction De-aerator level hiqh** 6.00E-08 H 0.010 
Condensate extraction pump 1.21 E-05 H 0.880 
5.7.2 (a) LP - Gland seal Tube 2.20E-07 H 0.038 
condenser Excessive scaling*** 1.00E-07 H 0.017 
5.7.2 (b) LP heater #1 &2 Orifice 1.50E-07 H 0.026 Pneumatic actuator 1.21 E-05 H 0.880 
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Control relay 0.01/year 0.1 81 
Solenoid valve 4.60E-06 H 0.553 
Level switch 8.00E-08 H 0.014 
Drain pump 8.43E-06 H 0.772 
Level switch 8.00E-08 H 0.014 
Low water level** 1.00E-08 H 0.002 
Clarifier* 1.00E-06 H 0.1 61 
Water de- Mono-valve filters* 8.00E-08 H 0.014 
5.8 mineralization Cation exchanger* 2.00E-06 H 0.296 
system Anion exchanger* 2.00E-06 H 0.296 
Mixed bed exchanger* 2.00E-06 H 0.296 
* Failure parameters are fixed in consultation with plant officials 
** Failure parameters are fixed based on failure rate data for machinery components 
from field statistics (subjective) 
H- hours. 
220 
Q.) 
... 
ca 
E 
+=i 
t/) 
Q.) 
... 
t/) 
0 
(..) 
:r... 
ca 
a. 
Cl) 
:r... 
:r... 
0 
'to-
... 
Cl) 
Q.) 
..c 
t/) 
Cl) 
(..) 
>< w 
I 
LL 
>< 
"'C 
s:::::: 
Cl) 
a. 
a. 
<( 
Trade 
BM 
BM 
BM 
BM 
BM 
BM 
BM 
PF 
PF 
MW 
MW 
MW 
Laborers 
Total hours/Labor cost 
Small tools 
Maintenance cost-Repair cost estimate 
Men Days Hrs/day 
General Foreman 0 0 
Foreman 0 4 2 
Fitter/welder 0 4 12 
Apprentice 3 0 2 12 
Apprentice 2 0 
Apprentice 1 0 
Helper 0 5 12 
0 
Foreman 0 5 12 
Welder/Journeyman 0 5 12 
Foreman 0 500 
Welder/Journ~yman 0 3000 
Apprentice 0 4 8 
Journey 0 0.76 8 
lnstrumentcian 12 
Electrician 12 
Total Hrs. Rate in Dollars 
0 $46.21 
0 $44.90 
0 $41 .26 
0 $38.04 
0 $32.81 
0 $27.64 
0 $38.04 
0 
0 $45.49 
0 $42.64 
0 
10 $41.47 
20 $40.22 
0 $38.60 
0 $34.64 
0 
12 $25.00 
12 $25.00 
54 
$3.00 
Total 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
414.7 
804.4 
0 
0 
$300 .00 
$300 .00 
$1 ,819.10 
$162.00 
$1 ,981 .10 
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Risk analysis results 
Probability 
Maintenance cost of Risk 
Subsystems/ Production Scenario occurrenc factor in $ Risk RA S.No Major system lost cost Total cost e for the for 20 Index nk Components Repair Spare consequence 
cost parts cost scenario years (20 years) 
5. Power plant Steam generator 30,481 30,000 3,618,000 3,678,481 3,678,481 0.9999 3,678,113 
Air and flue gas system 3,967 30,000 2,068,056 2,102,023 
Fuel oil system 6,804 10,000 1,093,770 1,110,574 
Turbine steam supply 6,804 10,000 1,093,770 1,110,574 
Turbine rotating system 9,033 2,500 290,520 302,053 
Generator 94,100 1,500,000 39,960 1,634,060 
Condenser 3,455 0.00 871,290 874,745 
LP feed water system 1639 500 224030 226,169 
HP feed water system 2624 15000 2461218 2,478,842 
Instrument and service air 5,249 20,000 0.00 25,249 
system 
5.1 Steam generator Boiler 30,481 30,000 3,618,000 3,678,481 3,678,481 0.9989 3,674,434 1.837 1 
Furnace 5,487 3,500 925,965 934,952 
Economizer 126,823 0.00 0.00 126,823 
Steam drum 200 2,956 71,235 74,391 
Super heater 6,804 10,000 1,093,770 1,110,574 
Re-heater 6,804 10,000 1,093,770 1,110,574 
Water walls 0.00 17,747 1,969,987 1,987,734 
Blow down system 15,963 12,000 5,400 33,363 
Chemical supply system 1,034 2,100 180 3,314 
Auxiliary steam supply 5,945 4,500 779,895 790,340 
5.2 Air and flue gas 3967 25000 1309960 1,338,927 2,102,023 0.9914 2,083,945 1.042 3 
system Forced draft system west 
Forced draft system east 3967 25000 1431216 1 ,460,183 
Steam air heater system 8295 10000 95400 113,695 
west 
Steam air heater system east 8295 10000 95400 113,695 
Air pre-heater system west 3967 30000 244451 278,418 
Air pre-heater system east 3967 30000 2068056 2,102,023 
224 
Air flow control west, east 8295 10000 95400 113,695 
Flue qas system 126823 0.00 0.00 126,823 
5.3 Fuel oil system Fuel oil transfer system* 14518 1000 28417 43,935 1110574 0.9866 1,095,692 0.548 6 
Fuel oil forwardino system* 17377 25000 46170 88,547 
Heavy oil system 6804 10000 1093770 1,110,574 
Light oil system 860 10800 0.00 11 ,660 
Pipe 850 1000 2160 4,010 
Fuel additive system 890 10800 0.00 11 ,690 
5.4 (a) Turbine steam 2870 1800 3240 7,910 
supply Boiler stop valve 1110574 0.9999 1,110,462 0.555 5 
Main stop valve 11643 3000 12960 27,603 
Motorized valve 1526 1000 2160 4,686 
Gate valve 1332 110 2160 3,602 
Globe valve 1332 190 2160 3,682 
Check valve 1526 45 2160 3,731 
Combined re-heat valve • 14150 3000 15120 32,270 
Orifice 1332 500 1080 2,912 
TIT 112 71 1080 1,263 
Steam and control system 100 200 256 556 
Control valve 6340 15000 7560 28,900 
PIT 112 2217 1080 3,409 
Boiler control failed 6804 10000 1093770 1,110,574 
5.4 (b) Turbine rotating 752 1351 2160 4,263 302053 0.9999 302,022 0.151 8 
system Motor 
Gear box 3764 476 6480 10,720 
Governor 2981 1000 2160 6,141 
Globe valve 14150 12600 15120 41 ,870 
Intercept valve 14150 18000 15120 47,270 
Motor 1396 1947 2160 5,503 
Oil pump 1396 901 6480 8,777 
Oil pump 1396 901 6480 8,777 
Drive 4653 737 6480 11 ,870 
Shaft packing 10229 30000 5400 45,629 
Journal bearinq 9033 2500 290520 302,053 
Thrust bearing 3900 2251 1 7992 34,403 
Vibration detector 1077 591 0.00 1,668 
Oil deflector 1505 6000 5400 12,905 
225 
Turbine Instrumentation and 423 500 101587 102,510 
control 
Moving blades* 18776 120000 37800 176,576 
Turbine rotors* 1309 1000 23220 25,529 
Nozzle· 16943 24000 37800 78,743 
Nozzle diaphragm* 9163 37500 37800 84,463 
Coupling ' 1309 75000 43200 119,509 
Rotor pos1t1on detector* 1077 233 1080 2,390 
Oil cooler* 1176 935 2160 4,271 
5.5 Generator Journal bearing* 3011 2937 7560 13,508 1634060 0.9780 1,598,110 0.799 4 
Oil deflector* 4140 2000 7560 13,700 
Rotor* 75280 1000000 37800 1,113,080 
Stator* 94100 1500000 39960 1,634 ,060 
Shaft seal 2045 5000 1080 8,125 
Generator brush 632 702 360 1,694 
Rectifier 448 1000 360 1,808 
Hydrogen seals* 5646 20000 10800 36,446 
Hydrogen cooling system 7528 10000 493762 511 ,290 
Seal oil pump 1396 979 6480 8,855 
Motor* 752 848 0.00 1,600 
Terminal box 752 2000 3240 5,992 
Bushings 3764 10000 7560 21,324 
Control system 1981 350 540 2,871 
5.6 Condenser Vacuum system 678 18725 540 19,943 874745 0.9939 869,409 0.435 7 
Cooling water supply system 2680 8000 2160 12,840 
Screen wash system 2680 10000 0.00 12,680 
Condenser back wash 1533 3600 0.00 5,133 
system 
Condenser 1786 2000 291269 295,055 
Condenser tubes 3455 0.00 871290 874,745 
Vent valve 100 15.00 0.00 115 
Low pressure 
5.7.2 feed water 2624 10800 2160 15,584 286584 0.9995 286,441 0.143 9 
system Extraction pumping system 
Gland seal condenser 2214 4000 2160 8,374 
LP heater #1 2214 4000 2160 8,374 
LP heater #2 2214 4000 2160 8,374 
Reserve feed water system 691 6502. 0.00 7,193 
Water de-mineralizing 691 6502. 0.00 7,193 
system 
Hydrazine supply system 691 1517 180 2,388 
226 
Morphoilne system 691 151 180 2,388 
-
Condensate make-up 0.00 1000 224030 225,030 
Condensate make-up system 1639 500 284445 286,584 ins&con 
High pressure 
5.7.3 feed water 15371 5250 1143585 1 '164,206 2478842 0 9999 2,478,594 1.239 2 
system Feed auxiliaries 
Feed water supply pump #1 2624 15000 2461218 2,478,842 
Gland sealing 150 300 2328 2,778 
Motor failed 2624 75000 0.00 77,624 
Gate valve 1533 1600 2160 5,293 
Feed water supply pump #2 2624 15000 574762 592,386 
-
LP heater #4 413 2500 61875 64,788 
LP heater #5 1654 5000 222750 229,404 
LP heater #6 1526 1500 31842 34,868 
Feed water heater Ins.& Con. 2956 200 71235 74,391 
De-aerator 499 2000 123322 125,821 
Feed water piping and 61230 10000 1620888 1,692,118 
support 
Feed water heater ins and 210 200 76545 76,955 
control 
5.9 Instrument air Screw compressor motor 5249 9112 0.00 14,361 25249 0.9650 24,365 0.012 10 
Screw compressor 5249 20000 0.00 25,249 
Compressor control 224 832 0.00 1,056 
Gate valve failed 1200 1950 0.00 3,150 
Pressure switch failed 112 82 0.00 194 
Check valve failed 413 1391 0.00 1,804 
Filters 200 106 0.00 306 
Gate valve failed 1600 930 0.00 2,530 
Dryers failed 200 1700 0.00 1,900 
Gate valve 816 468 0.00 1,284 
Pressure switch 112 82 0.00 194 
Check valve 413 274 0.00 687 
Control valve 1556 1500 0.00 3,056 
5.1.1 Furnace Igniter fails 5281 15000 311917 332,198 934952 0.9825 918,590 0.459 7 
Burners 5487 3500 925965 934,95 
Retractable soot blowers* 6218 2500 0.00 8,718 
Rotary soot blowers* 4625 2000 0.00 6,625 
Accumulation of ash 0.00 126823. 0.00 126,823 
Manual door* 1733 500 2160 4,393 
Refractory lining* 123 2000 3240 5,363 
5.1.2 Economizer Economizer tubes 14423 15000 5400 34,823 126823 0.6291 79,784 0.039 14 
227 
Supply header 13758 10000 5400 29,158 
Vent valve 1722 26 5400 7,148 
Globe valve failed 2131 130 5400 7,661 
Excessive scaling 0.00 126823 0.00 126,823 
5.1 .3 Steam drum Cyclone separator 1000 18686 5400 25,086 74391 0.9855 73,312 0 036 15 
Feed water control system 200 2956 71235 74,391 
LIT 4809 978 5400 11 '187 
Steam drum 25060 10000 5400 40,460 
Down comer nozzle 2839 0.00 5400 8,239 
Worn gaskets and leakage 2072 750 1080 3,902 
Safety valve 1393 3000 1080 5,473 
Faulty plate dryers 18686 1000 5400 25,086 
Liners broken 18686 1000 5400 25,086 
5.1.4 Super heater SS heater 14423 20000 5400 39,823 1110574 0.9925 1 '1 02,244 0.551 6 
PS outlet header 6548 10000 3240 19,788 
Safety valve 1091 3000 303885 307,976 
TIT 177 71 3240 3,488 
Steam and control system 50 200 88020 88,270 
Attemperator 6548 5000 3240 14,788 
Control valve 1364 1500 3240 6,104 
PIT 177 2217 3240 5,634 
Boiler control 6804 10000 1093770 1 '110,574 
Nozzle 2855 2624 3240 8,719 
Globe valve 2131 341 4320 6,792 
By pass valve 1065 341 4320 5,727 
5.1.5 Re-heater Primary re-heater 14423 20000 271701 306,124 1110574 0.9970 1 '1 07,242 0.553 5 
Re-heater inlet header 6548 10000 3240 19,788 
Control system 6804 10000 1093770 1,110,574 
Control valve 1364 1500 3240 6,104 
Nozzle 2855 2624 3240 8,719 
Globe valve 2131 682 4320 7,133 
Boiler control 6804 10000 1093770 1,110,574 
5.1 .6 Blow down 3196 130 2160 5,486 33363 0.9733 32,472 0.016 16 
system Globe valve 
Angle valve 1538 144 2160 3,842 
Control valve 1538 2100 2160 5,798 
Check valve 1538 692 2160 4,390 
Level switch 177 10 2160 2,347 
By pass valve 1598 140 2160 3,898 
Blow down tank 15963 12000 5400 33,363 
Water seal 1598 350 3240 5,188 
5.1.8 Chemical supply 691 1517 180 2,388 2388 0.9786 2,337 0.001 29 
system M,A,H Supply pump #1 
Ball valve 1034 110 180 1,324 
228 
Motor 691 848 180 1,719 
Strainer 790 850 180 1,820 
Safety valve 1034 111 180 1,325 
Globe valve 1034 130 180 1,344 
Check valve 1034 47 180 1,261 
5.2 .1 Forced draft fan 3967 25000 1309960 1,338,927 1338927 0.9962 1,333,839 0.666 3 {a, b) west and east FD fan west 
FD fan motor west 3967 52514 96425 152,906 
Furnace draft control 5463 5000 175500 185,963 
Inlet guide van drive 1318 592 270 2,180 
Combustion control 8295 10000 95400 113,695 
Inlet dampers 2696 4000 270 6,966 
Inlet damper drive 1318 592 270 2,180 
Timer 224 471 0.00 695 
Relay 224 180 0.00 404 
FD fan east 3967 25000 1431216 1 ,460,183 1460183 0.9969 1,455,656 0.727 2 
FD fan motor 3967 52514 160706 217,187 
5.2.2 Steam air heater 1580 384 180 2,144 113695 0.9557 108,658 0.054 12 {a, b) west and east Globe valve 
Control valve 1278 1000 180 2,458 
Com. and gas control 8295 10000 95400 113,695 
Globe valve failed 790 192 180 1 '162 
Gate valve 790 180 180 1 '150 
Tubes damaged 2838 627 1080 4,545 
Dust collected over fins 4215 0.00 8064 12,279 
5.2.3 Air pre heater 3967 30000 244451 278,418 278418 0.9724 270,733 0.013 8 {a,b) west and east AH west 
Drive motor 3967 2136 244451 250,554 
Air in temp. low 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Broken seals 12647 2777 15120 30,544 
Plugged hot baskets 12647 0.00 15120 27,767 
Ducts 2062 600 180 2,842 
AH east 3967 30000 2068056 2,102,023 2102023 0.9729 2,045,058 1.022 1 
Drive motor 3967 2136 244451 250,554 
5.2.4 Air flow control 224 1054 0.00 1,278 113695 0.9568 108,783 0.054 10 {a, b) system FIT 
Fl failed 224 1889 0.00 2,113 
FCS 224 1889 0.00 2,113 
Combustion control 8295 10000 95400 113,695 
3.9 Flue gas system More slag built up 1268230 0.00 0.00 126,823 126823 0.9720 123,271 0.061 9 
Oxygen analyzer 224 2103 0.00 2,327 
Ducts 2062 600 180 2,842 
Lining 4000 2000 5400 11 ,400 
5.3.1 Heavy oil system LIT 112 978. 0.00 1,090 1110574 0.9989 1 '109,352 0.554 4 
229 
Control valve 1556 15000 2160 18,716 
By pass valve 666 1842 2160 4,668 
Gate valve 666 1842 2160 4,668 
Gate valve 1332 1842 2160 5,334 
Fuel oil boosting system 6677 5000 364500 376,177 
Temperature controller 112 53. 0.00 165 
Control valve 890 15000 2160 18,050 
Combustion control 8295 10000 95400 113,695 
Burner pipe and valves* 20774 15000 1003275 1,039,049 
Burner management 4324 4000 92745 101,069 
Boiler master control failed 6804 10000 1093770 1,110,574 
5.3.2 Light oil system Gate valve 666 0.00 0.00 666 11660 0.9921 11 ,567 0.005 21 
Strainers 1419 110 0.00 1,529 
Oil pump 860 10800 0.00 11 ,660 
Pump control 224 703 0.00 927 
Motor failed 860 3719 0.00 4,579 
Control valve 890 3000 0.00 3,890 
Globe valve 666 130 0.00 796 
Piston valve 666 47 0.00 713 
5.3.3 Fuel additive 666 132 0.00 798 11690 0.9201 10,755 0.005 22 
system Globe valve 
Check valve 666 45 0.00 711 
Reducer failed 450 93 0.00 543 
Piston valve 666 102 0.00 768 
Pump 890 10800 0.00 11,690 
Pneumatic control system 224 161 0.00 385 
Motor 890 750 0.00 1,640 
5.6.3 Vacuum Butter fly valve 1533 458 540 2,531 19943 0.9942 19,827.33 0.009 17 
Motorized valve 1533 700. 540 2,773 
Motor 678 6000 540 7,218 
Vacuum pump 678 18725 540 19,943 
Check valve 678 467 540 1,685 
Heat exchanger 947 1229 540 2,716 
Gate valve 678 432 540 1,650 
Level control valve 865 350 540 1,755 
Gate valve 678 47 540 1,265 
Globe valve 678 341 540 1,559 
5.6. 1 Cooling water 2680 8000 2160 12,840 12840 0.9990 12,827 0.006 19 
supply system Pump 
Motor 2680 7500. 2160 12,340 
Relief valve 678 750 2160 3,588 
Motorized valve 2680 1500 2160 6,340 
Timer 112 2078 0.00 2,190 
Selector switch 112 447 0 00 559 
230 
Screen block 2497 0.00 1080 3,577 
5.6.1 Screen wash 2680 10000 0.00 12,680 12680 0.9951 12,617 0.006 20 (b) system Pump 
Motor 2680 3719 0.00 6,399 
Butterfly valve 2000 205 0.00 2,205 
Gate valve 1300 558 0.00 1,858 
Check valve 678 801 0.00 1,479 
Timer 112 2078 0.00 2,190 
Pressure switch 112 276 0.00 388 
Pump control* 224 832 0.00 1,056 
5.7.2 Water extraction Butterfly valve 2761 1200 2160 6,121 15584 0.9865 15,374 0.007 18 
Motor 2624 7500 2160 12,284 
Gate valve 778. 7500 1080 9,358 
Pump control 224 832 1080 2,136 
Check valve 778 801 1080 2,659 
Condensate extraction pump 2624 10800 2160 15,584 
5.7.2 Gland seal 413 393 1080 1,886 8374 0.8556 7,1 64 0.003 26 (a) condenser Check valve 
Globe valve 413 341 1080 1,835 
Orifice 413 500 1080 1,993 
Butter fly valve 2870 2000 1080 5,950 
Nozzle 2855 220 1080 4,155. 
Globe valve 413 149 1080 1,642 
Tube 2214 4000 2160 8,374 
Cleaning the tubes 2408 0.00 0.00 2,408 
5.7.2 Low pressure 
(b,c) feed water 413 500 1080 1,993 8374 0.9998 8,372 0.004 23 heater #1&2 Orifice 
Globe valve 413 341 1080 1,835 
Motor control valve 413. 1500 1080 2,993 
Tubes 2214 4000 2160 8,374 
Excessive scaling 2408 0.00 4320 6,728 
Butterfly valve 2870 2800 1080 6,750 
Nozzle 2855 107 2160 5,122 
Check valve 2870 3600 1080 7,550 
Pneumatic actuator 250 59 0.00 309 
Control relay 224 193 ' 0.00 417 
Solenoid valve 1033 133 0.00 1 '1 66 
Motor 752 1351 0.00 2,103 
Drain pump 752 4000 0.00 4,752 
5.7.4 Reserve feed 1526 1500 1080 4,1 06 7193 0.9998 7,191 0.003 25 
water system Motor control valve 
Gate valve 666 649 1080 2,395 
Control station 224 1954 0.00 2,178 
231 
Solenoid 224 169 0.00 393 
Pump control 224 832 0.00 1,056 
Pump 699 6502 0.00 7,193 
Motor 691 3150 0.00 3,841 
Orifice 413 500 1080 1,993 
Check valve 413 637 0.00 1,050 
Water de-
5.8 mineralization 1204 1000 2160 4,364 7193 0.9585 6,894 0.003 27 
system Clarifier 
Mono-valve filters 1204 1000 2160 4,364 
Cation exchanger 1204 1000 2160 4,364 
Anion exchanger 1204 1000 2160 4,364 
Mixed bed exchanger 1204 1000 2160 4,364 
Gate valve 413 558 0.00 971 
Butterfly valve 413 111 0.00 524 
Pump 691 6502 0.00 7,193 
Pressure switch 224 82 0.00 306 
Motor 691 3150 0.00 3,841 
Check valve 413 637 0.00 1,050 
M- Morpholine, A-Ammonia , H- Hydrazine 
* Details of the cost not available in plant records, estimated upon interviewing plant officials. 
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High pressure feed water system 
function[F]=hpf(x) 
a18=0.001-0. 0001 *x; 
a17=0.001-0.0001 *x; 
a16=0.93-0.0763*x; 
a15=0.23-0.0189*x; 
a14=0.95-0. 0780*x; 
a13=0. 79-0.0648*x; 
a12=0. 79-0.0648*x; 
a11 =0.99-0.0813*x; 
a1 0=0.99-0.0813*x; 
a9=0.87-0.0714*x; 
a8=0.81-0.0665*x; 
a7=0.23-0.0189*x; 
a6=0.95-0.0780*x; 
a5=0.87 -0.0714*x; 
a4=0.23-0.0189*x; 
a3=0.81-0.0665*x; 
a2=0.95-0.0780*x; 
a1 =0.79-0.0648*x; 
p 1 =( 1-( 1-a 1 )*( 1-a2)*( 1-a3)*( 1-a4) ); 
p2=( 1-( 1-a5)*( 1-a6)*( 1-a 7)*( 1-a8) ); 
p3=(1-(1-p1 )*(1-p2)) ; 
p4=(1-(1-a 1 0)*(1-a11 )*(1-a 12)*(1-a13)); 
p5=(1-(1-a14 )*(1-a15)*( 1-a 16)); 
p6=a17*a18; 
F=( 1-( 1-p1 )*( 1-p2)*( 1-p4 )*( 1-p5)*( 1-p6)*( 1-a1) )-0.8; 
x=fzero(@hpf, 0) 
x= 
10.6507 
clear all ; 
close all; 
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fid 1 =fopen('hpff.dat' ,'w'); 
%y=-1 0: .001 :1 0; 
%for i=1 :length(y) 
%x=y(i) 
x=10.6507; 
a18=0.001; 
a17=0.001; 
a16=0.93-0.0763*x; 
a15=0.23-0.0189*x; 
a14=0.95-0.0780*x; 
a13=0. 79-0.0648*x; 
a12=0. 79-0.0648*x; 
a11 =0.99-0.0813*x; 
a1 0=0.99-0.0813*x; 
a9=0.87-0.0714*x; 
a8=0.81-0.0665*x; 
a7=0.23-0.0189*x; 
a6=0.95-0.0780*x; 
a5=0.87 -0.0714*x; 
a4=0.23-0.0189*x; 
a3=0. 81-0. 0665*x; 
a2=0.95-0.0780*x; 
a1 =0.79-0.0648*x; 
p1 =( 1-( 1-a 1 )*( 1-a2)*( 1-a3)*( 1-a4) ); 
p2=( 1-( 1-a5)*( 1-a6)*( 1-a 7)*( 1-a8) ); 
p3=(1-(1-p1 )*(1-p2)); 
p4=(1-(1-a 1 0)*(1-a11 )*( 1-a 12)*(1-a13)); 
p5=(1-(1-a 14 )*(1-a 15)*(1-a 16)); 
p6=a17*a18; 
F=( 1-( 1-p1 )*( 1-p2)*( 1-p4 )*( 1-p5)*( 1-p6)*( 1-a 1) )-0.8; 
fprintf(fid1, 'a1 = % 7.6f\n', a1 ); 
fprintf(fid1, 'a2 = %7.6f\n', a2); 
fprintf(fid1, 'a3 = %7.6f\n', a3); 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a4 = %7.6f \n', a4); 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a5 = %7.6f\n', a5); 
fprintf(fid1, 'a6 = %7.6f\n', a6); 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a7 = %7.6f\n', a7) ; 
235 
fprintf(fid1 , 'aS = % 7.6f \n' , a8) ; 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a9 = %7.6f\n' , a9); 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a10 = %7.6f\n' , a10) ; 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a11 = %7.6f\n', a11) ; 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a12 = %7.6f \n', a12); 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a13 = %7.6f\n', a13); 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a14 = %7.6f \n', a14); 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a15 = %7.6f\n' , a15) ; 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a16 = %7.6f\n', a16) ; 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a17 =% 7.6f\n' , a17); 
fprintf(fid1 , 'a18 = %7.6f\n' , a18); 
fprintf(fid1, 'x =%7.6f\n' , x); 
fprintf(fid1 , 'F =%7.6f\n', F) ; 
fclose(fid 1) 
%end 
%plot(y,F); 
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